The marginal value productivity of short-term credit and an examination of external credit rationing for representative farm firms in two Mexican municipios by Ladman, Jerry Ray
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1968
The marginal value productivity of short-term
credit and an examination of external credit
rationing for representative farm firms in two
Mexican municipios
Jerry Ray Ladman
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ladman, Jerry Ray, "The marginal value productivity of short-term credit and an examination of external credit rationing for
representative farm firms in two Mexican municipios" (1968). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 3678.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/3678
This dissertation has been 
microfilmed exactly as received Q 8-14,803 
LADMAN, Jerry Ray, 1935-
THE MARGINAL VALUE PRODUCTIVITY OF 
SHORT-TERM CREDIT AND AN EXAMINATION 
OF EXTERNAL CREDIT RATIONING FOR 
REPRESENTATIVE FARM FIRMS IN TWO 
MEXICAN MUNICIPIOS. 
Iowa State University, Fh.D„ 1968 
Economics, general 
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan 
THE MARGINAL VALUE PRODUCTIVITY OF SHORT-TERM 
CREDIT AND AN EXAMINATION OF EXTERNAL CREDIT RATIONING 
FOR REPRESENTATIVE FARM FIRMS IN TWO MEXICAN MUNICIPIOS 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of 
The Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major Subject: Economics 
by 
Jerry Ray Ladman 
Approved : 
In CharOT^of Major Work 
Head of Major Department 
D0an/of Gradui 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1968 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1 
Mexican Agriculture and Agricultural Credit 1 
Land Tenure and Agricultural Credit 3 
Mexican Agricultural Credit 5 
The Present Study 8 
CHAPTER II. A THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE FARMER'S DEMAND FOR 
SHORT-TERM CREDIT 14 
Introduction 14 
Marginal Analysis 15 
The Basic Model: The Farmer's Potential Demand for 
Short-term Credit 17 
The Farmer's Demand for Short-Term Credit Under "Ignorance" 24 
The Farmer's Demand for Short-Term Credit Under Uncertainty 26 
The Effect of External Credit Rationing on Farmer's 
Use of Credit 35 
Summary 40 
CHAPTER III. LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 41 
Introduction 41 
Linear Programming Analysis 41 
The Potential Demand for Short-Term Credit 45 
The Demand for Short-Term Credit Under Ignorance and 
Uncertainty 53 
External Credit Rationing 55 
The Demand for Short-Term Credit with a Discount 55 
The Empirical Model 57 
Summary 71 
iii 
CHAPTER IV. THE REGION AND THE REPRESENTATIVE FARM FIRMS 
Introduction 
Description of the Region Studied 
Representative Farm Firms 
Agricultural Activities 
Product Prices 
Factor Prices 
Fixed Costs 
CHAPTER V. SHORT-TERM CREDIT IN THE TWO MUNICIPIOS 
Introduction 
The Banco Ejidal and the Banco Agrfcola 
Commercial Bank Credit 
The Agricultural Credit Union 
Merchant Credit 
Other Lenders 
Crop Insurance 
CHAPTER VI. TESTS OF HYPOTHESES AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
Hypothesis A 
Hypothesis B 
Hypothesis G 
Hypothesis D 
Summary and Conclusions 
LITERATURE CITED 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
iv 
Page 
APPENDIX A 392 
APPENDIX B — GLOSSARY OF SPANISH TERMS 397 
1 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Mexican Agriculture and Agricultural Credit 
Agriculture accounted for 17.2 percent of gross national product of 
the Mexican economy in 1965 and in the same year 44.6 percent of its 
population was considered rural (66, pp. 63-65). Agriculture figures 
prominently in Mexico's economic goals. In its fight for foreign 
exchange, agricultural products have accounted for more than one-half 
of the nation's exports.^ One of Mexico's primary goals is to expand 
the agriculture sector to meet the demands of overall development (52, 
pp. xix-xx), and at the same time raise the standard of living of the 
rural population. 
Venezian estimates that the Mexican agricultural product grew at 
an annual rate of 4.1 percent between 1950 and 1965, while the total 
economy grew at an annual rate of 6 percent (66, pp. 63-65). The 
agricultural growth has been relatively strong as attested by an United 
States Department of Agriculture study showing that Mexico's rate of 
growth of agricultural production ranked third among 26 developing 
nations (65, p. 15). 
Studies by Hertford indicate that about 70 percent of Mexican 
agricultural growth has come about by extension of the land under 
cultivation and increases in the employment of farm labor (43, pp. 2-6). 
Irrigation has been important in opening new lands. Brandenberg reports 
For example, in 1965 agriculture accounted for 52.1 percent of the 
total exports (5). 
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that approximately 56 percent of Mexico's agricultural production comes 
from irrigated lands, and that since 1926 the Federal Government has 
directed an average of 12 percent of its annual budget toward the 
development of water resources (12, pp. 259-260). 
There are limits, however, to land expansion. Castilla estimates 
that only 15.3 percent of the nation's 196,500,000 hectares are suitable 
to cultivation and that about half of these need irrigation (17). 
It appears that more capital will be needed in the future to go 
along with land and labor in order to increase productivity per hectare. 
The need for more shortand intermediate-term credit is apparent. 
According to Brothers and Solis; 
". . . continued rapid development in Mexico is dependent upon 
radical upgrading of the productivity of agricultural land and 
labor, which in turn must depend upon the introduction and/or 
extension of the use of irrigaticn, fertilizers, insecticides, 
and machinery." (13, p. 199) 
The major objectives of this study are to examine the individual 
farm firm's need for short-term credit, to determine the marginal 
productivity of this credit, and to develop a demand for short-term 
2 
credit function in both a theoretical and empirical context. The 
determination of the individual farm firm's demand for short-term credit 
is developed within the confines of the fixed resources, especially land, 
which the farm firm has at its disposal. 
2 Short-term agricultural credit in this study is defined to be 
credit issued for a period of time of one year or less and used in the 
production of agricultural products on the farm and for the farm family's 
consumption needs. For elaboration of this definition see Chapter II. 
3 
Land Tenure and Agricultural Credit 
Mexico has a "mixed" land tenure system composed of elidos and 
propietarios (private property owners). This tenure structure grew out 
of the Revolution of 1910 and the ensuing Constitution of 1917. A major 
cause of the Revolution was the desire by the peasants to break up the 
3 
large haciendas and return the land to the people who worked it. The 
Revolution was successful and Article 27 of the Constitution sets forth 
the principles of agrarian reform and land ownership: 
"... necessary measures shall be taken to divide up large landed 
estates; to develop small landed holdings in operation; to create 
new agricultural communities with indispensible lands and waters; 
. . . centers of population which at present either have no lands 
or water or which do not possess them in sufficient quantities for 
their needs, shall be entitled to grants thereof, which shall be 
taken from adjacent properties, the rights of small landed holdings 
in operation being respected at all times." (68, p. 616) 
It remained for the Codigos Aerarios (Agrarian Codes) to establish 
the manner undet" which the land reform would take place. Basically the 
hacienda system was destroyed in order to give Mexico its present tenure 
system of pequenos propietarios (small private landholders) and eitdos 
(". . . a system of communal tenure in which lands are held as the 
property of a town or village either for collective use or for distribu­
tion among the eiidatarios for cultivation in small plots to which each 
3 
It is estimated that only 1.96 percent of the active rural 
population owned land in 1910 (1, p. 67). 
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individual has a right of occupancy and usiifruct.") (16, p. 171).^ 
This program of land reform has been criticized as creating a 
problem of minifundios (31, p. 18). Mintfundio is defined to be a farm 
"that is so small that at present levels of technology it cannot give the 
farm family an acceptable level of living" (16, p. 165). The 1960 
National Agriculture census data as reported in Alvaro de Alborn^z 
lend support for this view. These data show that eiidatarios (the 
individual eildo farmers) holding land accounted for 53.1 percent of the 
farmers but that the eiidatarios controlled only 26.3 percent of the 
total Mexican farm land (1, pp. 67-68). An explanation is that the 
Agrarian Code (21, Art. 76) restricts the eiidatario to farming a plot 
of 10 hectares of irrigated land or 20 hectares of non-irrigated 
(seasonal) land. Another objective of this study therefore is to 
investigate the eiidatario's possibilities for generating income, 
employing short-term credit, when farming these legal-sized plots. 
Comparisons then will be made with similar results for the pequeno 
propietario studied. 
The ejido system was not new in Mexico. It had its roots in 
cooperative land holding Indian villages which existed many years 
prior to the Spanish Conquest. The Spanish also had experience with 
European cooperative farming villages and brought their ideas to 
Mexico, so that this form of tenancy continued to exist after the 
Conquest. Later many of the Indians were placed unuer the control of 
the ecomiendas and later haciendas but the hope of returning to the 
cooperative land-holding village never perished and hence was a logical 
form of tenancy to return to after the Revolution. For elaboration of 
these ideas, see Whetten (68)i 
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Mexican Agricultural Credit 
The "official" government banking systems, private banks, credit 
unions, merchants and dealers, and private individuals or money lenders 
are the main sources of agricultural credit for the farmers of Mexico. 
The "official" banking systems lending to agriculture consist of the two 
largest lenders, El_ Banco Nacional de Cr^dito Aer^rola, £.A. (the 
National Agricultural Credit Bank) and EJL Banco Nacional de Cr^dito 
Ejidal, (the National Eiido Credit Bank) and their respective regional 
banks. These banks lend to pequeno propietarios and eiidatarios 
respectively. Smaller but important government lenders (especially in 
certain locales in the country) are Banco Nacional de Comercio 
Exterior, S.A. (National Bank of Foreign Commerce), El Banco Nacional 
Agropequario, S^.A. (National Agriculture and Livestock Bank) and La 
Financieria Nacional Azucarea, S_.A. (National Sugar Finance Bank). In 
addition the Fondo de Garantis % Fomente para la Agriculture 2 Ganaderfa 
y la Avicultura is a government organization using government and 
foreign funds in a supervised credit program. These funds are for 
intermediate-term loans which are discounted to the private banks and 
in turn lent by the banks to the individual farmer under technical 
supervision provided by the Fondo. 
Little information is available on the volume of loans made fay 
lenders outside the banking systeiffT" The credit issued by the whole 
banking system from 1960 to 1965 is reported in Table 1.1. This table 
shows that agriculture received an average of 13.2 percent of the 
nation's annual bank credit in the last six years. About one-half of the 
Table 1.1. Financing of agriculture by Mexican banking system* 
(millions of pesos) 
Volume of agriculture loans 
Financed by ^ Financed by Volume of Volume of agriculture loans 
national banks private banks all bank as percentage of volume of 
Year Total Volume % Volume % loans all bank loans 
1960 5811.9 3004.3 51.7 2807.6 48.3 39780.5 14.6 
1961 6582.8 3522.7 53.4 3060.1 46.6 46055.9 14.3 
1962 7360.7 3791.1 51.5 3569.6 48.5 53454.4 13.8 
1963 8237.0 4076.6 49.5 4160.4 50.5 61251.5 13.4 
1964 9317.9 4013.3 43.1 5304.6 56.9 74434.9 12.5 
1965 10664.7 4286.7 40.2 6378.0 59.8 87370.5 12,2 
6 year average 47.3 52.7 13.2 
^Source; Departamento de Estudios, Banco de Mexico, S.A., Mexico. Data concerning 
financing of agriculture. Private communication. 1967. 
^National Banks include Banco Eiidal, Banco Agricola, Banco de Comercio ^  Exterior, 
Fomento Gooperativo, Bancos Régionales del Banco Eiidal jg Banco Agricola, and for 1965 only. 
El Banco Agropequario. 
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banking system's agricultural credit was handled by the private banks and 
the other half by the "official" banks. 
External credit rationing 
A small minority of the country's farmers receive credit from the 
major institutional lenders. Alvaro de Albornoz, in his comprehensive 
study of Mexican agricultural credit, estimates that only about 15 percent 
of the country's eiidatarios receive credit from the Banco Ejidal and that 
only 2 to 5 percent of the eligible farmers are served by the Banco 
Aer^cola (1, pp. 143, 317). These banks represent the government's two 
largest credit agencies for agriculture and account for nearly half the 
agricultural credit lent by the banking system. Many other farmers get 
credit outside the banking system, but often on very poor terms.^ Since 
the Banco Agrfcola and the Banco Eiidal make all loans at constant rates 
of interest the above figures are symptomatic of external non-price credit 
rationing. External non-price rationing is defined to be a situation in 
which the supplies of credit for any reason limit the amount of money they 
will lend the farmer at the going rate of interest, where this limit keeps 
the farmer from borrowing the amount he wants to borrow and in fact would 
borrow in the absence of such a limit.^ It would appear that the chief 
^Andraca and Patino report national studies showing that money 
lenders and some business firms that sell agricultural supplies were 
charging from 50 to 300 percent annual interest (2, pp. 73-74). 
^This concept should be carefully distinguished from "internal" 
credit rationing, which is the limit on the amount borrowed that is self-
imposed by the farmer. For a complete presentation of the concept of 
external credit rationing and its effects on the borrower, see Chapter II. 
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cause of external non-price rationing in the figures cited by Albornoz 
is simply a shortage of loanable funds for agriculture.^ Other factors 
such as the laws regulating banking, internal bank operations and 
national agricultural policy may also cause external non-price credit 
rationing to affect the credit using farmer. If external non-price 
credit rationing exists it will cause the farmer to use less credit than 
g 
he would prefer. 
Another objective of this study is to specify the possible causes 
of external credit rationing and to empirically consider their possible 
effects on the farmer's use of credit. Special consideration will be 
given to the legal structure underlying agricultural credit, agricultural 
policy, and the organization and operations of the lenders. 
The Present Study 
Purpose, objectives and hypotheses 
The preceding discussion indicates the importance of agricultural 
credit to Mexican agriculture and economic development. Although by 
many standards Mexico has a relatively large system of agricultural 
credit, a number of questions centering around the individual farmer's 
use of credit are raised and remain to be answered. These questions 
^The statement to this effect was always heard in interviews with 
local bankers and high banking officials in both the private and 
official banks. 
g 
From here forward the words "non-price" will be deleted from the 
phrase "external non-price credit rationing" but are assumed to be 
implicit unless otherwise stated. 
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give rise to the following objectives of this study. 
1. To determine representative farm firms in the two municipios 
under study that represent farms of the several types of land 
tenancy. 
2. To determine for each representative farm firm the demand for 
short-term credit. 
3. To determine for each representative farm firm the marginal 
value productivity of credit at various specified levels of 
credit. 
4. To determine for each representative farm firm a monthly 
profile of short-term credit needs. 
5. To determine for each representative farm firm the supply of 
short-term credit available to it from the one or more credit 
institutions that normally would supply it with credit in order 
to see if external credit rationing would exist. 
6. To determine if minifundio may be a problem by viewing the 
income possibilities of the credit-using representative farm 
firms of the eiidatarios. 
7. To make comparisons across the various representative farm 
firms with respect to the demand for credit, the marginal 
value productivity of credit, the monthly credit profile, 
sources of credit, external credit rationing, and the 
possibilities of income generation. 
To attain these objectives, an empirical investigation will be under­
taken of the demand and supply of agricultural bank credit for 
10 
representative farmers in the two municipios (counties) of Apatzing^n and 
Zaragoza in the State of Michoacan. The hypotheses are to be tested; 
A. That for each representative farm firm and for a given lender, 
there is a range which defines the boundaries of the farmer's 
demand for short-term credit within which the farmer can 
profitably use credit because the value of the marginal 
productivity of a unit of credit is greater than the cost of 
the unit of that credit. 
B. That the various representative farmers are subject to external 
credit rationing. 
C. That a credit using eiidatario can make a "desirable" income. 
D. That there are differences among representative farm firms 
with respect to: 
1. their demand for short-term credit; 
2. their monthly credit needs; 
3. their sources of credit; 
4. their external credit rationing; and 
5. their net incomes. 
Because of the limited size of the area under study, the results 
must necessarily be interpreted only in light of this region. It is 
hoped, however, that they may provide some insight into credit use in 
similar regions in Mexico as well as forming a small base of emperical 
information for farmers, bankers, extension personnel and policy makers. 
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The region under study 
Figure 1.1 locates the municipios of Apatzing^n and Zaragoza in the 
state of Michoacin. These two municipios were selected because of 
several main characteristics which were important factors in the present 
study. Considered as a unit the two municipios contain a large number of 
ejidos and pequeno propietarios. Both irrigated and non-irrigated 
(seasonal) land are present. Several commercial crops have been intro­
duced as the area has undergone a significant transformation toward 
commercial agriculture. The Banco Eiidal, the Banco Agricola, commercial 
banks, merchants, dealers and a local credit union are well established 
9 
sources of short-term agricultural credit. 
Research in agricultural credit in Mexico and research in the region under 
study 
Most research on agricultural credit in Mexico has been of a 
descriptive nature. Some authors have done an extensive job of describing 
bank operations and analyzing gross figures such as census data or data 
published by the individual banks. 
9 Chapters IV and V contain a more complete description of the region, 
the farm units and sources of agricultural credit. 
^'^Noteworthy among these are Alvaro de Albornoz (1), Johnson (44), 
and Rao (58). In addition, numerous articles have been written. 
Undoubtedly Ing. Ramc^n Fernandez y Fernandez has been the most prolific 
author. His articles used in the preparation of this study were (27), 
(28), (29), (30), and (31). Some recent studies have had empirical 
content. Castillo (18) studied the eiido system in ^  Bajio. Dias 
Bandab (24) studied agricultural credit in the same area around Gelaya 
and Eckstien (26) studied the collective eiido system. 
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In the particular region under study, in 1966 David Barkin finished 
a cost-benefit analysis of the water resource and area development 
project whose area includes both municipios. At the present time a study 
of the region is being undertaken by the Gentro de Investigaciones 
Agrarias which is part of a national empirical study of land tenancy. The 
two municipios are included as part of their national sample. Data from 
this farm level survey were utilized in the present study. 
The format of the study 
In this chapter the problems have been presented, the purposes 
specified, and the objectives and the hypotheses to be tested established. 
In Chapter II a theoretical model of the farmer's demand for operating 
capital and short-term credit is developed including considerations of 
uncertainty, lack of technical knowledge, and external credit rationing. 
In Chapter III the theory is put in the framework of a linear program 
and the parametric linear program which was used to generate the farmer's 
demand for short-term credit is presented. A feature of this model 
is the development of a monthly credit profile indicating the farmer's 
monthly needs for short-term credit. 
Chapter IV briefly discusses the region under study with particular 
attention to the land tenancy. Representative farm firms to be used in 
the analysis are established. Chapter V describes the various lenders 
in the zone and discusses how their operations can cause external credit 
rationing. 
The final chapter discusses the results of the empirical study and 
the conclusions that can be made. 
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CHAPTER II. A THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE 
FARMER'S DEMAM) FOR SHORT-TERM CREDIT 
Introduction 
Galbraith defines credit to be . . the transfer of assets or 
wealth, or the right to acquire assets or wealth, from a man who has to 
a man who hasn't. And this is done against a promise to repay the value 
of what was borrowed and something more" (33, p. 31). In this study 
short-term credit is defined to be credit used for a period of time of 
one year or less and is considered to be nothing more than a way to 
increase the quantity of operating capital the farmer has on hand at any 
time. Murray and Nelson state that "owned capital is basically no 
different from borrowed capital. When employed jointly in the business 
the two are indistinguishable . . . the same principles apply to the 
use of both" (57, pp. 1-2). 
It is important, however, to separate capital in the form of credit 
from capital which is owned outright. Unless the farmer already has 
reached the optimum level of capital use the addition of more capital 
through credit can enable the farmer to change his farming operations 
in order to increase his income and make more efficient use of his 
resources. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical 
framework for the specification of a farmer's demand function for short-
term credit. Special consideration is given to the effects of low 
levels of technical knowledge, uncertainty, and external credit rationing 
as they affect the farmer's demand. Each of these concepts is considered 
individually in the following development of the theory. 
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The theory is developed first by using marginal analysis. However, 
because of the inherent limitations of this analysis, it is developed in 
a linear programming context in the following chapter. 
Marginal Analysis 
The theory of the firm states that given a production function, a 
firm with one variable resource should employ the resource until the 
marginal value product of the resource is equal to its price assuming 
that profit maximization is the goal of the firm and that pure competition 
prevails in both the factor and product markets. Hence, the firm's 
demand curve for this input is the locus of all points where the marginal 
value product of the resource is equal to its price (47, pp. 285-286). 
Operating capital — capital employed for one year or less — can 
be considered a single variable resource with other specified resources 
assumed fixed. Operating capital in the form of cash is not a productive 
resource; it only gives the farmer, the purchasing power to acquire other 
1 2 
productive resources. ' The demand for operating capital can be viewed 
as the demand for a single variable resource in the firm, where the 
^It could be argued that credit in and of itself does have value in 
that with it the farmer can acquire additional resources and without it 
he can't. The resulting product of credit, however, must be only a 
product of the resources acquired and it will therefore be assumed to 
have no value in and of itself. 
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For purposes of the following analysis it is assumed that any 
operating capital in kind could be sold and the receipts used to purchase 
other resources if the farmer needed to do so in order to satisfy the 
optimality condition. 
16 
capital is employed in the purchase of resources in a way so that the 
3 
familiar resource efficiency condition is satisfed. This condition, 
states that the ratio of the marginal value product of each resource 
purchased with operating capital to the resource's price is equal to a 
similar ratio for all resources purchased with operating capital. 
Where operating capital is unlimited this ratio will always equal one, 
but where capital is limited the ratio will always be greater than or 
equal to one, but will have a constant value for all of the resources 
purchased with capital. A model incorporating this conception of the 
demand for operating capital is developed in the following section. 
3 
This demand function is developed solely on the basis of marginal 
principles. Chandler (20, pp. 1-22) has taken a different approach and 
developed demand functions for credit based upon principles of competi­
tion, e. g., the lending alternatives the borrower has available to him. 
An example will indicate his thesis. A large well-to-do farmer might 
have a very elastic demand function because he has several sources of 
credit and can demand low interest rates, or take his business to 
another lender. On the other hand, a small and poor farmer might have 
an inelastic demand function because he has only one or a few possible 
lenders. He would be willing to pay higher rates because he has virtually 
no bargaining power. 
In the view of this writer. Chandler's thesis is not relevant to the 
clients of the official banking system of Mexico. The legal structure 
specifies uniform and constant interest rates which rules out "price 
rationing" and hence Chandler's system. The private banks have more 
opportunities for varying the "fixed" rates of interest by requiring 
balances in the checking account, assessing service charges, etc., but 
these will be ruled out in order to simplify the analysis. If the 
analysis were with money lenders undoubtedly Chandler's analysis would 
hold because the borrower who resorts to the moneylender as a source of 
credit usually has few or no alternative sources and must take his credit 
at their terms. 
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The Basic Model: The Farmer's Potential 
Demand for Short-Term Credit 
The basic model is developed under the assumptions of certainty, 
complete technical knowledge, and a perfectly elastic supply of credit 
available for a period of one year at a rate of interest r. The farmer 
is assumed to be a profit maximizer who is planning his operations for 
the coming year. He has savings, T, or debt, - T, at the beginning of 
the year. He also has a minimum acceptable level of living expenditures, 
Y, and sets funds aside for these expenditures at the beginning of the 
year.^ The amount of owned operating capital available to him for his 
farming operations at the beginning of the year is given in Equation 2.1. 
T - Y = V, where v ^  0 (2.1) 
The farmer will use borrowed operating capital in the form of short-
term credit, c, to supplement v in order to carry out his farming 
operations at the optimal level of capital use. 
If V = 0, the farmer will employ operating capital entirely in the 
form of short-term credit for his farming operations. If v > 0, the 
farmer will not need to employ this much short-term credit because his 
stock of owned operating capital can substitute for it.^ On the other 
^If at the end of the year the farm fifm has profits the farmer 
knows he can use them to increase his consumption expenditures at that 
time. 
^If the stock of owned capital v were sufficient to permit the 
farmer to reach the optimum level of employment of operating capital he 
would not need to employ credit, but would have a surplus of funds to 
save, invest or to use to increase his consumption expenditures. 
18 
hand, if v < 0, the farmer will need to employ more short-term credit to 
meet some of his consumption needs or to cover past debts as well as his 
current needs for the farming operation. 
It is assumed that the farmer can use operating capital (and credit) 
for consumption purposes. This is reasonable in that the farmer and his 
family must be able to meet at least the minimum required living 
expenditures while waiting for the receipts from the harvest at the end 
of the growing season. This assumption is particularly relevant in 
lesser developed countries. BeIshaw states: 
"A large portion of the demand for credit is for working expenses, 
and of this a large proportion is used to meet living expenses for 
consumption. It is therefore undesirable, indeed impractical, to 
adopt a rigorous distinction between credit for production and 
credit for consumption." (9, pp. 43-44)^ 
The farmer's overall value production function, X, is defined in 
Equation 2.2. The farmer produces m products with n variable factors 
of production, a fixed amount of land 'z, and operating capital q. This 
operating capital is defined to be the sum of owned operating capital 
available for production, v, and the borrowed operating capital in the 
form of short-term credit, c. 
X=f(a+a, b + b,d + d, • • •, i+i, • • n + n, z, q) 
(2.2) 
where q = c + v 
Each of the n variable factors is split into two parts. The first, 
designated by i, is the part of factor i controlled by the farmer without 
^The Summary Report of the International Conference on Agricultural 
and Cooperative Credit (63, p. 11) supports this view. 
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using operating capital. An example is family labor. The second, 
designated by i, is the part of factor i that only can be acquired by 
the farmer by using operating capital. Both i and i must be at positive 
or zero"levels. Those parts acquired by the employment of operating 
capital are expressed as functions of operating capital in Equation set 
2.3. The total amount of operating capital, q, that is employed is the 
sum of the amounts used in acquiring each resource, q^, for each of the 
1 factors as shown in Equation 2,4, 
a = a(q), b = b (q), d = d (q), • • •, i = i(q), • • • 
n = n(q) (2.3) 
q = + qy + + ' • • + + • • ' + q^  (2.4) 
It is assumed that there are only positive marginal products of operating 
capital, that there are diminishing returns to operating capital, that 
any of the n factors may be used in the production of any of the m 
products, and that operating capital cannot be used to acquire more land 
by rental or purchase. 
The production due to the employment of operating capital as a 
means of purchasing more variable factors is defined in Equation 2.5. 
The value of production, X^, due to operating capital is a function of 
the factors acquired by operating capital used in combination with the 
fixed supply, K, of factors on hand and land. 
Xq = q(a, b, d, ' ' ', i, " ' n, K) (2.5) 
where K = h(a, b, d, • • •, i, • • •, n, z) 
The farmer's potential demand function for operating capital is 
derived by taking the total derivative of Equation 2.5 with respect to 
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a change in the amount of operating capital in order to obtain the 
marginal value product of operating capital. This potential demand 
function is shown in Equation 2.6. 
= + + + M Éi 
dq 3a dq 5b dq 3d dq 3i dq 
+ - ' ' + ^ 1? 
Equation 2,7 shows how the factor efficiency conditions are met for the 
resources employed with operating capital. The marginal value product 
dX 
of the i factor is given in Equation 2.6 to be The price, p^^, 
of the i*"^ factor is defined in Equation 2.8 to be the quotient of the 
quantity of capital, dq^, in employing the i*"^ factor, divided by the 
quantity purchased da. Equation 2.9 shows that the total change in 
capital employed is the sum of the amounts employed in each of the i 
factors. 
U Pa ° » Pb ' Id Pd li Pi ° • • • " to Pn 
(2.7) 
dq. 
Pi = "dT (2.8) 
n 
dq = Z dq., i ^  c (2.9) 
i=a ^ 
The marginal value product for operating capital can be graphed as in 
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Figure 2.1 as the demand DD' for operating capital.^ In Figure 2.1a 
it is assumed that the net difference between owned capital and planned 
consumption is zero, i.e. v = 0. The marginal value product of capital 
employed in the farming operation is entirely due to the use of borrowed 
capital, i.e., short-term credit. Following the traditional analysis 
the curve formed by plotting the marginal value products of increments 
of capital is the demand curve for short-term credit. It is assumed 
the supply of credit. SS', is infinitely elastic. Therefore the optimum 
amount of credit employed by the farmer is OP, because at this amount the 
interest rate r is equal to the marginal value product of operating 
capital. 
dX^ 
r = -5^  (2.10) 
Figure 2.1b illustrates the case where v > 0. The marginal value 
product of capital curve can be partitioned. Here the range 00' 
represents the productivity of owned capital employed and only that 
portion to the right of O' is attributable to credit. In this case the 
farmer's demand for short-term credit is defined over the range O'p for 
the same reasons given in the preceding paragraph. The amount of credit 
required in Figure 2.1a is reduced by the amount of 00 ' in Figure 2.1b. 
Figure 2.1c illustrates the third possibility where v < 0. In this 
case an amount of credit OO" must be employed to meet the assumed needs 
The curvative of the curve has not been specified and has been 
selected as above for expositional purposes. The exact shape of the 
curve would be determined by viewing the second derivative. 
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operating capital 
(a) V = 0 
D 1 
1 \ 
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1 
1 
1 ^\^1 S ' 
1 
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(b) V > 0 
operating capital 
'l S ' S 
1 // 
(c) V < 0 
operating capital 
Figure 2.1. The potential demand for total operating capital and short-
term credit 
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for living expenditures or debts. The rational farmer would want to use 
credit of 0''P to cover both productive and non-productive purposes. In 
comparison with Figure 2.1a 00^^ represents the amount of credit required 
in addition to that used for directly productive purposes OP, 
It is apparent that the demand for short-term credit is the demand 
for operating capital less the amount of operating capital on hand. The 
optimum level of operating capital employed by the firm is the same 
whether part or all of the operating capital is owned or borrowed. This 
assumes that the farmer's opportunity cost on his owned capital is 
g 
equivalent to the interest rate r. 
In order to simplify the following discussion it is assumed that the 
demand for operating capital is when v = 0. In this case all of the 
demand for operating capital is the demand for borrowed capital in the 
form of short-term credit. In case v f 0 the reader can easily determine 
the necessary change in the amount of credit by following the above 
analysis. 
In Mexico the rates of interest charged by the various institutional 
lenders are fixed. The farmer is really only interested therefore in 
that portion of the demand schedule for operating capital where the 
marginal value products are equal to or greater than the interest. 
The model can be modified to incorporate the concept of the marginal 
8 
The results are slightly different under a discount system when 
the amount of credit is considered as the size of the loan before the 
discount. For a discussion of the effect, see the "Demand for Short-
term Credit with a Discount" in Chapter III. 
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value product of operating capital discounted for the constant annual 
interest cost per peso borrowed. Equation 2.6 would now be written as 
Equation 2.11 and Figure 2.1a would be diagramed as Figure 2.2. The 
farmer would still borrow the optimum amount of operating capital as 
defined by Equation 2.10. The difference in the diagramatic presenta­
tion is that the optimum amount of borrowed capital in Figure 2.2 is 
where the horizontal axis and curve DD' intersect. The curve DD' of 
Figuife 2.1a has been, in effect, lowered by the constant r so that the 
horizontal axis and the supply of credit curve SS' are the same. 
da + J&lçW)+ E&dd + . . .^^di 
dq 9a dq 3b dq 3d dq 5i dq 
+ • • • + ^  4^ - r (2.11) 
on dq 
The Farmer's Demand for Short-Term Credit Under "Ignorance" 
The potential demand function 2.11 assumed complete technical 
knowledge. It is quite likely, however, that the farmer would not have 
access to this knowledge or the management practices associated with it. 
If this were the case his production function 2.2^ would lie on a lower 
production surface than that expressed in Equation 2.2. The lack of 
knowledge might come about due to the lack of education, the lack of 
adequate extention facilities, or simply resistance on the farmer's 
part with respect to learning or change. 
The derivation of the farmer's "ignorance" demand function for 
short-term credit is exactly the same as was described above, the only 
difference is that a different production function is used because of 
the relaxation of the complete technical knowledge assumption. The key 
credit Q s 
Figure 2.2. The potential demand for short-term credit discounted for the rate of interest 
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equations are as follows: 
Xj = fj(a + a, b + b, d + d, • • *, i + i, ' * n + n, z, q) 
(2.2;) 
Xj-q = qj.(K, a, b, d, • • •, i, • • •, n) (2.5%) 
ffïï . !!l da + !!l db + dd + . . . + 2!l di 
dq 5a dq 3b dq ôd dq 91 dq 
+ ' ' - +15:1? - ' 
The function can be shown diagramatically as in Figure 2.3 where 
II ' represents a possible "ignorance" marginal value product of credit 
curve such as is expressed in Equation 2.11^. This is only one of a 
family of curves, each member being specified by an "ignorance" produc­
tion function 2.2^. Each curve would have its own individual shape and 
could be different than the curve II ' as drawn. As a general rule, 
however, functions expressing a relatively large amount of "ignorance" 
would be plotted lying to the left near the origin and those expressing 
a small "ignorance" would lie to the right and close to the curve of 
potential demand, DD'. The function and its relative position depend 
entirely on the farmer's lack of application of the most recent technical 
knowledge. 
The Farmer's Demand for Short-Term Credit Under Uncertainty 
In the development of the model certainty has been assumed. This 
simplifying assumption is now relaxed. 
The farmer operates under uncertainty when the parameters of a 
probability distribution such as price or yield are unknown and hence the 
Figure 2.3. The "ignorance" demand for short-term credit 
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probability of the occurrence of an event cannot be established empirically 
or quantitatively (39, p. 443). This differs from risk where the 
parameters of the probability distribution are known. Some events that 
are- uncertain for the farmer can be cast into a risk context by an 
insurance company. The company can then sell insurance to the farmer so 
that he can reduce his uncertainty to a fixed cost. Some things, however, 
are not insurable such as variations in income due to low prices and/or 
q 
low yields . The presence of uncertainty causes the farmer to take 
measures to "hedge". These measures are defined to be his aversion to 
uncertainty^^. They are purely subjective and vary with the individual 
farmer. It is assumed in this study that the farmer is not a gambler and 
therefore has positive or zero aversion to uncertainty. 
How does the aversion to uncertainty affect the model of the 
farmer's demand for short-term credit? First, it is assumed that the 
sources of uncertainty are in variations in income and possible losses 
of the farmer's equity which both come about by variations in market 
prices or yields. Second, the farmer must develop models of price and 
yield expectations. Very simple models have been selected by the author 
which base expectations on recent historical experience. Expected market 
prices and yields are both the average of the last five years. Factor 
9 
Government price-support programs and mutual crop insurance can 
reduce the uncertainty but they still do not reduce it to zero. 
^^Historically this concept has been called risk aversion in the 
literature. However, in this study the term aversion to uncertainty is 
believed to be better because it is uncertainty and not risk that is 
being considered. 
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prices are considered to be constant and hence certain. 
Because these are only expectations the farmer realizes that the 
outcomes may be different but he has no way of quantitatively specifying 
the probable deviations and their effects on his income or equity 
situations. By assumption the farmer is not a gambler, so he is not 
influenced by the possibility of obtaining an income higher than his 
expected income. Rather, he is concerned only with combinations of 
yields and prices that would generate lower than expected levels of 
income, or losses. Lower than expected levels of Income can cause the 
farmer to reduce his level of planned savings, his planned consumption, 
his equity, or any combination of the three. His equity is defined to 
be simply the difference between his assets and liabilities. If he 
suffers a loss then he must use part of his equity in order to pay back 
the loan and interest as well as provide for family consumption 
expenditures. It is possible that he could refinance the loan to be 
repaid in future years, but this would increase future financial burdens 
— a situation he wants to avoid. Also, if the farmer should have 
several losses or possibly only one loss in his financial history, he 
knows that it may be difficult to secure future loans. He therefore 
wants to maintain his good credit rating by avoiding losses. All of 
these things indicate the farmer is likely to try to escape these 
unfavorable consequences by hedging against unfavorable outcomes. It is 
these considerations which give rise to his aversion to uncertainty. 
A function representing this aversion may be conceptually set forth 
in a subjective manner, although it is not possible to exactly specify 
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the function because aversion to uncertainty is a highly individual, 
psychological, and subjective matter^^. As shown above, the general 
result of unfavorable outcomes is a reduction in equity. The principle 
of increasing risk has therefore been selected as the basis for the 
12 
aversion to uncertainty function . This principle argues that as the 
farmer increases the size of his financial undertaking (in the present 
case by borrowing) in relation to his equity the chance of loss of his 
13 
equity increases '. 
The general effect of the aversion to uncertainty function is to 
The purpose of this discussion is not to try to measure 
uncertainty but simply to show how it can affect the farmer's demand 
for short-term credit. 
12 This well known principle was first developed by Kalecki 
(46, pp. 95-106). 
13 
An example would be a farmer who receives credit at an interest 
rate of 10 percent a year. If he borrows $1,000 and suffers an 
unfavorable outcome which gives him a 20 percent loss on principle, 
he would need to reduce his equity by $200 for the loss and $100 for 
the interest cost. If he had borrowed $2,000 his equity loss would 
have been $600. If he had borrowed $4,000 his equity loss would have 
been $1,200. Hence it is readily seen that his equity is under more 
jeopardy as the amount he borrows increases. 
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subjectively discount the function of the demand for short-term credit . 
The discount factor D is given in the Discount Function 2.12. The 
magnitude of the discount is represented by D, the total amount of 
credit outstanding by Cj and equity by E so as to form the credit 
q 
equity ratio —. The term U is to represent other factors giving rise 
to uncertainty aversion. 
D = f(|, U) (2.12) 
n 
The ratio — increases as more funds are borrowed because E is fixed at 
the beginning of the year. In accordance with the principle of in-
c 
creasing risk as the ratio — increases the size of the discount D 
increases. 
The magnitude of D at a certain level of credit will undoubtedly 
be affected by the mix of the various crops grown and their expected 
^^Heady (39, p. 553) developed a concept of the subjective discount 
but in a more traditional sense. He says, 
". . .Greater prospective incomes, when they arise from use of 
more capital and credit, have less 'value' to the entreprenuer 
because they become less certain and pose increased probability 
of distasteful consequences (bankruptcy). Since each income in­
crement involves greater uncertainty, each successive addition to 
prospective income is discounted by an increased amount. Different 
increments of income in a single time period of the future might 
be discounted by adding an allowance for safety to the market or 
internal interest rate. A different allowance for safety margin 
can be added for each increment of income. For example, the first 
$1,000 increment in prospective income may be discounted by 5 
percent, the third by 12 percent, and the tenth by 40 percent 
I t  
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earnings. For example, if the crops were "risky" D would be larger than 
if they were considered stable. A mix of stable and risky crops would 
likely give rise to a smaller D than all crops of a risky nature. 
Baker (4, p. 124) points out that the composition of the farmer's 
equity will also affect the size of the discount. If his equity is 
liquid the magnitude of D would be less than for non-liquid equity, and 
for those loans which tend to be self liquidating the magnitude of D 
will be less than for those that are not self liquidating^ The farmer 
is sure to give consideration to those assets he would have to sell in 
order to make up a loss. The more he values them the larger will the 
magnitude of D tend to be. 
This concept can be incorporated into the demand for short-term 
credit function as in Equation 2.13. The potential demand discounted 
dx' dx' 
for aversion to uncertainty, is the potential demand less 
the discount D. 
dX' dx' 
If the farmer were using as his base the ignorance demand function, 
the analysis would be the same except that he would discount from the 
ignorance demand rather than the potential demand. The discount D can 
be thought of as a self-imposed premium or cost the farmer places on 
borrowing additional funds. It represents the subjective cost he 
undertakes in order to employ an additional unit of credit. When this 
cost equals the marginal value product of the unadjusted demand, i.e., 
dx' 
where of Equation 2.13 has a value of zero, then the farmer is at 
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his self imposed optimum. 
The relationship between D and the unadjusted potential demand 
curve is illustrated by Figure 2.4. The horizontal axis can also 
represent the C/E ratio when E is fixed. As drawn, curve UU' inter­
sects the horizontal axis where C/E equals one. The discount, D, from 
dx' 
the unadjusted potential demand, DD, is equal to at this optimal 
level of credit use, SQj. If the farmer were more pessimistic the 
magnitude of discount D from curve DD would be larger and fche adjusted 
demand curve UU' would lie downward and to the left. If, on the other 
hand, he were more optimistic, the discount, D, would be less and the 
curve would lie upward and to the right of its present position but still 
beneath curve DD 
The efficiency conditions still will be met but they must incorporate 
the additional subjective cost of credit represented by the aversion to 
uncertainty, D. Equation 2.8 can be written as Equation 2.14 to 
incorporate this. Equation 2.7 can then be written as Equation 2.15 to 
show the efficiency conditions are met. Equation 2.14 states that the 
real price of credit, p/ is composed of the interest cost and a cost D 
due to subjective aversion to uncertainty. A similar analysis holds if 
the farmer is discounting from the base of his ignorance demand function. 
pi - + 0) (2-14) 
l>M'Pb = t Pd - • • • = If Pi 
â'pn 0-15) 
Figure 2.4. The potential and "ignorance" demand for short-term credit adjusted for aversion 
to uncertainty 
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The Effect of External Credit Rationing on Farmer's Use of Credit 
In the development of the model up to this point a perfectly elastic 
supply of short-term credit at the annual market rate of interest has 
been assumed. By definition, when external credit rationing exists, this 
assumption must be relaxed. 
External credit rationing, in the context of non-price rationing, 
was defined in Chapter I to be a situation where the suppliers of credit 
limit the amount of money they will lend the farmer at the going rate of 
interest such that this limit keeps the farmer from borrowing the amounts 
he wants to borrow and, in fact, would borrow in the absence of such a 
limit^^'^^. There are several ways in which such limits to the amount 
of credit can be fixed. First, the laws regulating banking institutions 
set maximum limits to the size of the loans on the basis of expected 
^^This is a definition of non-price credit rationing similar to that 
developed by Schultz (60, pp. 126-139). 
^^There is also price credit rationing where the lender practices 
price discrimination in order to ration credit to the individual farmer; 
For a complete discussion of this type of rationing, see Dahl (23, 
pp. 126-140). 
Price rationing is assumed to be irrelevant in this study because 
the interest rates of the official banks are established by the bank and 
are uniform for all farmers and for all sizes of the loan. Closing 
costs, minimum balances, and other factors which can raise the rate of 
interest are not used. In the case of the private banks certain upper 
limits exist and a uniform and constant rate of interest is charged but 
it is required that various sizes of balances are to be kept in the bank 
and there are varied sizes of closing costs which can cause the effective 
rate of interest to vary. These will be assumed not to be present, 
however, in order to keep the analysis uniform in the consideration of 
only non-price credit rationing. 
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income or the amount of mortgagable assets. If these limits are not 
sufficient to cause external credit rationing, the rationing may still 
be brought into play by other factors. Or if these legal limits do ration 
credit, the magnitude of the rationing can be increased by the same 
other factors. For example, other factors can come into play when the 
lenders have "house rules" to regulate the size of loans ; or when there 
is a shortage of funds the lenders ration credit by decreasing the size 
of the individual loans. Based upon the farmer's credit rating the 
lenders may limit the loan size. The lender may not view the farmer's 
production possibilities as does the farmer or his aversion to uncertainty 
may be greater than the farmer's. In both cases they would limit the 
size of the loan. The upshot is that external credit rationing can take 
place for a number of reasons. 
The supply of credit function to the individual farmer is defined 
in Equation 2.16 under the condition of limited credit and where S is 
the supply of credit, r is the interest cost per peso of credit, and L 
is the limit imposed by the lender. The function can vary depending 
upon the limit the lender wants to impose, or is forced to impose by 
law. This concept is illustrated in Figure 2.5, where the supply 
function, S, is perfectly elastic over the range, OL, but becomes 
perfectly inelastic at L. 
S = S(r, L); ^  ~ = « when 0 s S > L, and 
^ ^ = 0 when S = L (2.16) 
It is shown in Figure 2.6 how external credit rationing can come 
interest 
cost per 
peso of 
credit 
0 
Figure 2.5. The supply of short-term credit 
s 
l 
I 
i w i 
credit 
Figuire 2»6« XlXustiration of exteirna.1 cirsdit rationing 
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about. The figure is the same as Figure 2.4 with the exception that 
supply functions similar to that of Figure 2.5 have been added. The 
supply function now lies on the horizontal axis. There are several 
different supply functions represented by the curves where the sub­
script represents a specific function which is similar to all of the 
other supply functions except for the limits, 80^,^, imposed. Each 
supply function will be analyzed in terras of Figure 2.6, in order to see 
its implications for external credit rationing. The extremes are 
examined first. 
One extreme, SQ^S^, represents the case where the limit is not 
effective for any of the.four possible demand curves: the potential 
demand DD', the ignorance demand IIthe potential adjusted demand 
UU', nor the ignorance adjusted demand UU'. ence, external credit 
rationing does not exist. 
The other extreme, SQ^S^, presents a clear cut case of external 
credit rationing no matter what demand curve is the effective curve. 
In this case, the magnitude of the rationing is - SQ^ if DD ' is the 
effective demand; SQ^ - SQ^ if UU' is the effective demand ; and 
SQg - SQ^ if UU' is the effective demand. 
The intermediate cases represent rationing if DD' is the effective 
demand and if SQgSg, and SQ^j, SQ^Sg, or SQ^S^ are the supply functions, 
or if II ' is the effective demand and SQj S^, or SQ^S^ are the 
supply functions, or if UU' is the effective demand and or SQ^S^ 
are the supply functions. The magnitude of the rationing can be 
determined for each case as done above. 
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The effect of external credit rationing is always to reduce the 
farmer's use of credit below that level which he would prefer to use if 
the rationing were not present, since at the rationed level of credit 
the marginal value product of credit is greater than its interest cost. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented the basic principles of the theory under 
which this study was taken. The potential demand for operating capital 
and then credit was presented in terms of marginal analysis. Special 
consideration was given to the lack of technical knowledge, uncertainty 
and external credit rationing. This analysis will be continued in the 
following chapter within the framework of linear programming. 
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CHAPTER III. LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Introduction 
The two purposes of this chapter are to continue the development of 
the theoretical model of a demand for short-term credit function in a 
linear programming context and to develop the empirical model. Because 
of their interrelatedness the two objectives are considered together. 
Linear Programming Analysis 
Limitations of marginal analysis 
The marginal analysis shows the farm firm's demand for short-term 
credit as it maximizes profits under the assumptions of a continuous 
production function, a fixed stock of owned operating capital, other 
fixed resources, and perfect competition in the product and factor 
markets. 
The first two assumptions do not accurately represent, however, the 
environment in which the farmer makes his decisions. The farmer does 
not usually consider the firm's production function to be continuous. 
Rather he considers a finite number of ways of doing things. For 
example, he may consider five crops and consider four different ways of 
growing each crop. In this case he would have 20 different ways of doing 
things. Each way of doing things is defined as an activity. As the 
farmer considers each activity he must take account of the resources 
required to undertake the activity. His goal is to select a set of 
activities which will maximize his profits, given the levels of the 
various resources available. 
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The second assumption of a fixed stock of owned operating capital 
is also unrealistic. Each activity not only uses operating capital at 
certain times of the year in order to purchase resources, but it also 
generates capital at other times when the produce of the activity is 
sold. This generated capital can then be used by the farmer to supple­
ment his owned capital and possibly to decrease his needs for short-
term credit. In determining his annual need for short-term credit, the 
farmer should therefore take aeeount of this generated capital because 
of its possible effects on reducing his needs for short-term credit at 
certain times of the year. 
These two assumptions of the marginal analysis and their inherent 
restrictions can be relaxed if the analysis of the demand for short-
term credit is put in the framework of a linear program. 
Linear programming 
A linear programming problem is described by Hadley (37, p. 4) 
as follows; "Given a set of n linear inequalities or equations in m 
variables, we wish to find non-negative values of these variables which 
will satisfy the constraints and maximize or minimize some linear 
function of these variables". In mathematical terms and in terms of 
the problem at hand this means that there is a linear objective function 
3.1 to be maximized where Z represents total net revenue of the firm, 
X. is the activity and e, is the net return over variable costs for 
J J 
the activity. 
m 
Z = S e.X. (3.1) 
j=l ^ ^ 
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Net revenue of Equation 3.1 is maximized subject to a set of n linear 
inequalities as shown in the Inequality Set 3.2. 
+  h l h  + • • • •  +  +  •  •  •  +  ^  b ^  ( 3 . 2 )  
i = 1, 2, ' ' n 
The left hand side of each inequality is composed of r variables X^, 
j=l, 2, ' • • m, and each j represents an activity. The right hand side 
is b^, the amount of resource i that is available. The technical 
coefficient between resource i and product j is ïepresentsd by All 
j activities are assumed to be in the program at zero or positive levels. 
Xj k 0 for all j (3.3) 
This program requires certain mathematical assumptions which have 
economic implications. They are 1) linearity, which means constant 
returns to scale for each activity; 2) additivity, which implies that 
the total product of the various activities in the solution must be the 
sum of the products of these individual activities or that the total 
resources used must be the sum of the resources used by the various 
activities in the solution; 3) divisability of all factors and products; 
4) a finite number of activities and resources; and 5) single valued 
expectations with respect to yields, prices and resource supplies 
(40, pp. 17-18). 
In applying the logic of linear programming to his farming operation 
the farmer selects a profit maximizing or an optimum set or mix of 
activities such that he has not exceeded any levels of the limited 
resources and cannot change this mix in any way in order to increase 
profits. Contrary to the marginal analysis his decision criterion is 
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based on the productivity of the various activities as opposed to the 
productivity of the resources in producing the activities. The program's 
corresponding dual-solution shows, however, that the results are the same 
as in marginal analysis, for the farmer is implicitly imputing marginal 
value products or shadow prices to his scarce resources in the linear 
1 
program . 
A resource i is defined to be scarce when there is no more available 
for use, such that the i*"^ inequality in Set 3.2 becomes an equality. 
The shadow price associated with this scarce resource shows the valuation 
of the resource at the margin or the increase or decrease in the objective 
function if one unit of the scarce resource was added to or subtracted 
from the existing stock of the resource. By definition it is equivalent 
to the marginal value product of the scarce resource. 
Following this analysis the marginal value product of short-term — 
credit, and hence the demand for short-term credit, can be determined in 
the same context as developed in the previous section on marginal analysis, 
but within the framework of a linear program. 
Every optimal profit maximizing linear program (primal) has a 
corresponding dual that minimizes the total imputed price or value of 
all resources and the imputed price of each scarce resource. The dual 
shows that the price system serves as to the proper guide to an optimal 
production program. Its counterpart, the primal, shows an optimal 
production program based on activity selection and implies prices or 
values for the services of the scarce resources. The imputed prices for 
the various resources in the dual solution can be shown to be equivalent 
to the marginal value products of the various resources. Fortunately, 
in most computation problems it is not necessary to solve the dual to 
obtain the marginal value products of the scarce resources because the 
commonly used simplex method gives these values directly. For a complete 
discussion of the dual, see Had ley (37) or Dorfinan, Samuelson and 
Solow (25). 
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• The Potential Demand for Short-Term Credit 
The model uses the same principles set forth in the previous 
chapter in determining the demand for credit, but within the context of 
linear programming. A variable resource linear program is used in 
combination with changing stocks of operating capital. 
Variable resource linear program 
A variable resource linear program such as that outlined by Heady 
and Candler (40, pp. 232-234) can be used to generate a demand schedule 
for a given resource b^. Resource b^ will become a scarce resource 
when the i*"^ equation of 3.2 becomes an equality in an optimal solution 
of a linear program. A scarce resource has an imputed marginal value 
product associated with it. In accordance with traditional theory a 
firm is willing to pay a price for a resource equivalent to its marginal 
value product. Therefore the firm would be willing to pay a price 
equal to the marginal value product of b^ for the marginal unit of 
resource b^ employed. Stated another way, given a set of fixed resources, 
resource b^, and perfect competition in the factor and product markets, 
the marginal value product of b^ generated by the program represents a 
point on the firm's demand schedule and demand curve for resource b^. 
The variable resource program can generate an approximation of the 
firm's demand schedule for resource b^ by first obtaining an optimal 
solution with the level of b^ set at zero or a very low level. Then by 
increasing the level of b^ at discrete intervals the program can obtain 
a series of optimal solutions; one solution for each level of b^. When 
the optimal solution shows b^ to have a marginal value product exactly 
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equal to the price of the resource the firm is at an optimum level of 
2 
employment of that resource given the set of fixed resources. 
If resource were operating capital in the form of short-term 
credit the demand schedule for short-term credit could be determined 
and the corresponding demand curve plotted. This is the essence of the 
derivation of the demand for short-term credit used in this study, but 
with the additional feature of changing stocks of operating capital. 
Changing stocks of operating capital 
With activities both using and generating capital the amount of 
operating capital will vary throughout the year. The farmer will need 
to take account of this stock in his decision as to which activities 
will make up his optimal mix. Harrison (38) developed the concept of a 
capital profile in order to accomplish this. In essence the concept is 
to choose time periods, say each month, and determine a monthly cumulative 
balance of receipts and expenditures for each activity in order to 
determine its capital requirements on a month by month basis. Stewart 
(61) put the concept in the framework of a linear program but did not 
consider credit separately nor parameterize capital. 
In the present study the farmer is assumed to have a line of credit 
c available to him in any month of the year. Therefore his total supply 
2 
In order to obtain the exact demand schedule in the linear 
programming context it is necessary to have the program indicate the 
changes in the basis. As the basis changes the shadow prices are likely 
to change giving rise to another discontinuity or step in the function. 
These changes in the basis are incorporated in the following discussion 
and in the empirical model. 
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of operating capital in month t, is the sum of the amount of 
owned operating capital in month t, and c. This relationship is shown 
in Equation 3.4. 
c + Vj. = q^. (3.4) 
The amount of owned operating capital at the beginning of month t, v^, 
represents the cumulative carry-over from the previous month as shown 
in Equation 3.5. 
^ " 't-l + ^t-l ' Vl (3-5) 
The farmer is assumed to sell any products and pay back any loans at the 
end of the month. He is assumed to borrow at the beginning of the month. 
In 3.5 v^ equals the sum of the receipts y^ ^ for month t-1 and the owned 
capital for the same month, v^_^, less all expenses v^_j^ for the same 
month. The farmer is assumed to spend operating capital for a predeter­
mined amount of monthly expenditures including expenditures for living 
3 
expenses. Other capital needs are for taxes and repairs. These 
expenditures are easily incorporated as part of u^.. 
Given his line of short-term credit c the farmer can view his 
capital use and his need for short-term credit on a month by month 
basis for any set of activities. The set of Equations 3.6 show how 
these needs are determined. 
3 
The expenditures, u , include the Y living expenditures set forth 
in Chapter II but they are now considered on a monthly rather than 
annual basis. Likewise, v^, is the monthly equivalent of annual stock 
of capital, v, presented in Chapter II. 
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Month 
1 c + 
2 c + Vg = 4% 
3 c + V3 = qj 
12 c + v^2 " *ïi2 (3'6) 
where v, = (T« is savings carried over from the previous 
^ " year) 
v2 « vi + pi -
v3 = v2 + y2 - ug 
2^ = ^ 11 + ^ 11 - "11 
The amount of operating capital available in any month t is q^ but this 
amount depends entirely on the mix of activities and short-term credit. 
Therefore the farmer will select an activity mix that will maximize 
income over the whole year. The amount of short-term credit outstanding, 
c^, in any month t is determined by the difference between the expenses 
in the month, u^, and the amount of capital, v^, carried over from the 
previous month, but where this amount must be less than or equal to 
the line of credit c as shown in Equation 3.7. It is reasonable to 
expect Vj. to be negative in many months. In those months the credit is 
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used to cover past debts as well as current expenses. When credit, c^, 
in any month has a value such that c^ s 0 it implies that the fanner has 
cash balances on hand, i.e. v^ > u^, and has no need for credit in that 
month, 
u^ - v^ = c^ 3 c (3.7) 
In months where credit is employed, c^ > 0, then this amount can 
impose a limit on the size of the firm if c^ = c or the firm uses credit 
to the limit of its line of credit. As with other scarce resources a 
marginal value product is imputed to the month c^ where c^ = c. The 
economic interpretation is that if the farmer had one more unit of 
credit added to his line of credit this unit would increase his objective 
^This can be shown algebraically. 
From 3.6: v^ = v^_^ - u^^ + (3.71) 
From 3.7: c: . = u. . - v. , (3.72) 
t-i t-l t-l 
"Vi  "  Vi  •  Vl  
Substituting 3.72 into 3.71 
't • • "t-l 
If y^ ^ < c^ ^ then v^ will be negative in Equation 3.73 indicating 
the farmer carries a debt of v^ into month t. Conversely if 
y^ ^ > c^ ^ the v^ is positive indicating the farmer carries a net 
balance (savings) of operating capital, v^ into month t. It is very 
likely that v^ will be negative during most months of the growing season 
until a crop is harvested permitting receipts to flow into the system. 
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function by the amount of the marginal value product. In cases where 
more than one c^ = c then the meaningful month, hereafter called the 
critical month, is the month with the largest marginal value product. 
Those months using credit where c^ < c do not have a marginal value 
product imputed to them for an additional unit of credit made available 
in this month would not be useful to the firm. 
One other factor must be accounted for to complete the model, i.e., 
the assignment of the borrowing costs to the months where credit is 
employed. This is easily done by separating borrowed capital from owned 
capital and forcing the program to use borrowed capital only after 
exhausting the supply of owned capital in any month. By putting 
borrowing activities into the program as both columns and rows, separation 
of borrowed capital from owned capital is achieved and interest costs 
can be computed as part of u^ for any month t. An explanation of the 
empirical model and a complete elaboration of the mechanics of this 
operation are presented later in this chapter. 
The potential demand for short-term credit can be determined 
following the format set forth above using a variable resource, in this 
case a variable capital linear program. The assumptions are complete 
technical knowledge, certainty, a perfectly elastic supply of credit, a 
fixed set of resources except operating capital, and perfect competition 
in the product and resource markets in addition to the linear programming 
assumptions. The demand schedule is determined by varying credit from a 
zero level to a level where the marginal value product is zero. This 
is equivalent to the point where the marginal value product of operating 
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capital is equal to the interest rate. At this point the firm's use of 
credit is an optimum because the interest charges are already included as 
part of the cost of production. Figure 3.1 shows how a demand schedule 
plotted as a demand curve would be expected to appear, given a set of 
fixed resources. 
The general appearance of the function is a downward sloping 
discontinuous linear function. The general dotraward slope is due to 
the assumption of decreasing marginal returns. The linearity assumption 
gives rise to the flat or horizontal steps. The height above the axis 
represents the marginal value product. It is constant over a range where 
the farmer uses more credit to increase the quantity grown of a certain 
activity. The most profitable activity given the resource base enters 
the program first. The discontinuity occurs when the basis changes, 
that is when it is no longer feasible to expand this activity because 
the farmer encounters a physical restraint, a limiting resource. 
Therefore the next unit of credit is employed with another activity which 
has a lower marginal value product. This process continues until ulti­
mately the cost of credit is equal to its marginal value product and the 
demand curve intersects the horizontal axis at This is the farmer's 
optimum use of credit. 
A certain level of savings, T^, is assumed at the beginning of the 
year. If the actual level of savings, T^, exceeded the assumed level 
the credit needs would be reduced by T - T = t'. If T > T then the 
•' a o o a 
credit needs would need to be increased by T^ - T^ = t . Following the 
discussion of the previous chapter it is also likely that some minimum 
dq 
ln 
to 
d 
credit 
Figure 3.1. The potential demand for short-term credit as determined by a linear 
programming model 
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level of operating capital is needed in order to provide for the planned 
consumption expenses, especially if the initial level of savings is 
small. Under these circumstances the farmer's demand for credit would 
have a lower bound that corresponds with this minimum level. The upper 
bound is always determined by the point of optimum use of credit. 
The Demand for Short-Term Credit Under Ignorance and Uncertainty 
The assumptions of complete technical knowledge and certainty may 
be relaxed and the model adjusted accordingly as was illustrated with 
marginal analysis in the previous chapter. Under ignorance the yields 
and/or technical coefficients of each activity would change and hence 
force the farmer to make his choices among a set of activities which 
correspond to a lower production surface. The resulting program solution 
would have a lower marginal value productivity of operating capital at 
all levels of credit use and would also reduce the optimum amount of 
credit employed as illustrated by curve II' in Figure 3.2. 
The effect of uncertainty would parallel that discussed in the 
marginal analysis causing the farmer to employ a subjective discount D 
due to his aversion to uncertainty. As before the magnitude of the 
discount D is expected to increase with the amount of credit employed. 
The results of aversion to uncertainty are illustrated in Figure 3.2 
by UU ' and UU ' for the potential and ignorance demands respectively. 
Both of these effects, ignorance and aversion to uncertainty, are 
shown to change the demand for short-term credit by causing lower 
marginal value products of credit and hence creating optimum levels of 
credit use that are lower than the optimum of the potential demand. 
\\\\\w\n\\w> d' 
credit 
Figure 3.2. The potential and "ignorance" demand for short-term credit adjusted for aversion 
to uncertainty in a linear programming model 
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External Credit Rationing 
The analysis of external credit rationing is the same as set forth 
in the previous chapter. The linear program model has a built-in 
feature, however. The model is essentially operating as a banker who 
limits the line of credit available to the farmer and therefore shows 
what combination of activities the farmer would want to undertake given 
external credit rationing. 
The Demand for Short-Term Credit with a Discount 
Up to this point the volume of credit c has been assumed to be 
equivalent to the volume of borrowed capital available for employment in 
the firm. Therefore a unit of credit was interchangeable with a unit of 
operating capital. The optimum employment of operating capital occurred 
when the marginal value product of this capital was equal to the interest 
rete, that is, when the net return to a marginal unit of credit employed 
was zero. 
When the interest charges are paid in advance, as under a discount, 
the results change slightly. The farmer only receives borrowed operating 
capital, q' equivalent to the amount of credit, c, less the discount 
(in pesos), M, as shown in Equation 3.8. The rate of interest, r', the 
farmer actually pays on the amount of capital, q', that is actually 
employed in the firm is determined from Equation 3.9. 
c - M = q ' (3.8) 
q'(l + r 0 = c (3.9) 
The farmer will want to employ credit to supplement his capital 
until the marginal value product of a unit of credit is equal to the 
56 
"new" interest cost r'. By so doing he will maximize his income. At 
this, point the marginal value product of operating capital is not equal 
to T'. Rather, it is equal to r' plus the productivity of M as shown in 
Equation 3.10. The reason is that a "free" unit of capital has an 
additional amount of funds, namely the discount, M, to employ that a 
dx 
= ».io) 
unit of credit does not have. 
The previous analysis presented in Chapters II and III need not be 
altered much. It is important to realize, however, that the demand for 
short-term credit, c, cannot be considered as equivalent to the demand 
for operating capital because for each unit of borrowed operating 
capital, q', an additional amount of q'r' of credit equal to the discount 
M, will be needed as shown in Equation 3.9. Because of the inter-
relatedness between owned and borrowed capital the farmer will prefer to 
view the demand for operating capital as the demand for owned or borrowed 
funds employed in the firm using r' as the rate of interest. The amount 
of borrowed funds, q', must then be multiplied by the quantity (1 + r') 
in order to arrive at the amount of credit c. The optimal condition for 
employing operating capital if as much as one unit of credit is borrowed 
will be given by Equation 3.10 which is where the marginal value product 
of credit is zero. 
Because Mexican lending institutions use the discount procedure the 
empirical model was built to incorporate this feature. 
57 
The Empirical Model 
The empirical model employed in this study closely follows the 
theoretical linear programming model developed in the previous sections. 
The assumptions that have been made will be retained unless stated 
otherwise. Given an objective function five terms must be specified in 
order to undertake a linear program. They are; 1) the activities, 2) the 
limiting resources, 3) technical coefficients between, resources and 
products, 4) factor prices, and 5) product prices. Chapters IV and V 
specify each of these five items. In the present chapter this informa­
tion from these two chapters is used to set forth a linear program, very 
similar to that used in the empirical analysis. This chapter explains 
how the model works and its assumptions. The next two chapters specify 
the above five items, the assumptions surrounding them, and the possible 
effects of these assumptions on the model. 
The only differences between the model presented here and the one 
actually employed is that the number of periods has been reduced to four 
and the number of real activities has been reduced to four. The reasons 
for making these two changes are purely for expositional purposes. They 
do not change the content nor the workings of the model. 
The situation 
The program presented corresponds to the representative farm firm 
of 50 hectares of the propietario from the municipio of Apatzing^ n. The 
farm business year in this example begins in July and terminates at the 
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end of June.^  At the beginning of the farm year the farmer is assumed 
to have no crops under production and hence plans his crop production in 
accordance with his resource availability. He is assumed to have an on­
going milking operation and a fixed level of planned consumption 
expenditures each quarter. He owns a 46 horsepower tractor which he 
plans will give 720 hours of service a quarter. His total labor supply 
including Ufo regular laborers is equivalent to 210 days a quarter. He 
has no savings at the_beginning of the year. 
The objective function 
The farmer has the objective of maximizing profits, Z, in an objec­
tive function of the form presented in Equation 3.1. Table 3.1 shows in 
the Z row the e/s associated with each activity X^ . Those ey's which 
are positive are receipts and those which are negative are costs. The 
contribution of any XjBj to the objective function depends entirely 
upon the level that activity Xj appears in the solution as the ey's are 
assumed constant at all levels of production. 
The resources 
The resources available to the farm firm are specified in Table 3.1, 
as the RHS (right hand side column vector stating the limited resources 
available to the farmer) column vector. Each resource corresponds to the 
In order to reduce the discussion to four quarters it was most 
convenient to start the farm year in July. However, in the models 
actually run it was begun in June, because none of the crop activities 
carried over between May and June. Therefore the farmer could start 
from "scratch" at the beginning of the farm year. 
Table 3.1a. Example of the empirical linear program model 
RHS Real activities Milking activity 
B A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
Objective fon Z 4869.46 2238.62 797.23 2295.04 27100 
Land PI 50^  1.00 1.00 10.00 
P2 50^  1.00 1.00 1.00 10.00 
P3 50^  1.00 1.00 10.00 
P4 50^  1.00 1.00 10.00 
Labor P21 210^  26.80 5.00 54.00 
P22 210Z 81.00 2.00 54.00 
P23 210^  6.00 6.00 54.00 
P24 210^  3.00 5.00 54.00 
Tractor P41 0^  21.35 14.79 
P42 0^  4.68 10.12 
P43 0^  14.79 4.67 
P44 02: 50.60 
Capital P51 0^  610.17 77.50 -6775 
P52 0^  1333.04 153.90 776.30 -13550 
P53 Oz -4869.46 537.13 -797.23 791.80 -20352 
P54 0^  -4869.46 967.13 -797.23 1071.80 -27100 
Income tax P80 2000.00^  1588.56 47.56 677.50 
Quarter I , II 
Income tax 
Quarter 
III, IV PlOO 
AI O
 
o
 
d
 
o
 
o
 
CM 
166.29 168.34 677.50 
Milk row P71 1= 1 
Table 3.1b (Continued) 
Labor hiring Tractor hiring Tractor (owned) operating 
Objective Hi H2 H3 H4 Ml M2 M3 M4 Tl T2 T3 T4 
fen Z -18.50 -18.50 -18.50 -18.50 -32.45 -32.45 -32.45 -32.45 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 
Upper bound 720 720 720 720 
Labor 
Tractor 
Capital 
P21 -1 .13 
P22 -1 .13 
P23 -1 .13 
P24 -1 .13 
P41 -1 -1 
P42 -1 -1 
P43 -1 -1 
P44 -1 -1 
P51 18.50 32.45 4.46 
P52 18.50 18.50 32.45 32.45 4.46 4.46 
P53 18.50 18.50 18.50 32.45 32.45 32.45 4.46 4.46 4.46 
P54 18.50 18.50 18.50 18.50 32.45 32.45 32.45 32.45 4.46 4.46 4.46 4.46 
Table 3.1c (Continued) 
RHS Borrowing Wages Living Expenditures 
B1 B2 B3 B4 
B 
Objective fen Z -.0278 -.0278 -.0278 -.0278 -27640 -21780 
Capital 
Credit 
Wage row 
Living 
expendi­
ture 
row 
P51 0^  -.9730 6660 5445 
P52 OS: .0278 -.9730 14320 10890 
P53 0^  .0278 .0278 -.9730 20980 16335 
P54 0^  .0278 .0278 .0278 -.9730 27640 21780 
P61 1 
P62 C^  1 
P63 C^  1 
P64 C^  1 
P72 1 = 1 
P73 1 = 
Table 3.Id (Continued) 
Real Estate Income tax I, II 
RHS Tax 
B RET ITll IT21 IT31 IT41 IT51 IT61 IT71 IT81 IT91 ITlOl 
Objective fen Z 2448 -.02 -.06 -.07 -.08 -.09 -.10 -.11 -.13 -.16 -.18 
Capital P53 0^  
P54 OS: 
Real Estate Tax P74 1 = 
Income tax P80 2000^  
Quarters I,II P81 1500^  
P82 1500& 
P83 3000^  
P84 3000^  
P85 3000^  
P86 6000^  
P87 6000^  
P88 6000& 
P89 6000^  
P90 12000& 
Income tax PlOO 20002 
Quarters III,IV PlOl 15002 
P102 15002 
P103 30002 
P104 30002 
P105 30002 
P106 60002 
P107 60002 
P108 60002 
P109 60002 
PllO 120002 
.05 .06 .07 .08 .09 .10 .11 .13 .16 .18 
.05 .06 .07 .08 .09 .10 .11 .13 .16 .18 
-1 
1 
•1 -1 -1 -1 
1 
•1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Table 3.Id (Continued) 
Objective fen Z 
RHS 
B 
Capital P53 OS: 
P54 OS: 
Real Estate TaxP74 1 — 
Income tax P80 2000^  
Quarters I,II P81 1500^  
P82 1500^  
P83 3000^  
P84 3000Z 
P85 3000^  
P86 6000^  
P87 6000^  
P88 6000^  
P89 60002 
P90 120002 
Income tax PlOO 20002 -
Quarters III, PlOl 15002 
IV P102 15002 
P103 30002 
P104 30002 
P105 30002 
P106 60002 
P107 60002 
P108 60002 
P109 60002 
PllO 120002 
Income tax III, IV 
IT12 IT22 IT32 IT42 IT52 IT62 IT72 IT82 IT92 ITI02 
-.05 -.06 -.07 -.08 -.09 -.10 -.11 -.13 -.16 -.18 
-1 
1 
"1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
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of Inequality 3.2. In this example the resources are specified as 
the amount available per quarter. The resources are land, labor, 
tractor power, and operating capital.^  The farmer uses his operating 
capital to meet all cash expenses and to hire additional labor or tractor 
services if necessary. He can supplement his owned capital with short-
term credit as is outlined in the following section on borrowing 
activities. It is assumed in this example he has no savings so the 
entries in the RHS column for the capital rows are zero^  
The RHS column also has entries which permit the linear program to 
perform special functions. Those entries used in this model are those 
associated with the predetermined activities and tax rows and are discussed 
in their respective sections. As shown in the table all of the coeffi­
cients of the RHS column are inequalities or equalities. The purpose of 
the equalities is discussed in the section dealing with the predetermined 
activities. 
The crop activities 
The crop activities are specified as column vectors A1 through A4 
in Table 3.1. Each coefficient in the column is the equivalent of the 
a^ j of Inequality 3.2 and shows the fixed technical relationship between 
the i^  ^resource and the activity. Zero values for a^  ^are not 
entered. Positive values for a^  ^indicate resource use and negative 
values indicate resource supply. These signs have particular relevance 
Mule team power was also specified for the eiidatarios studied. 
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to the operating capital rows as illustrated in the following example. 
Activity A1 uses $610.17 of operating capital in the first quarter 
(row P51). In the second quarter an additional $722.87 is used. 
Therefore the entry for this quarter (row P52) is the cumulative balance, 
$1,333.04, of capital that is tied up in this activity. At the end of 
the second quarter the crop is sold and at the beginning of the third 
quarter (row P53) the total receipts less sales tax and the $1,333.04 
cumulative expenses from the third quarter are $4,869.46. Because these 
receipts supplement the supply of operating capital they have a negative 
sign. There are no more expenditures in the third quarter for this 
activity so the same balance is carried forward to the fourth quarter 
(row P54). The other real activities have capital row entries that 
follow the same pattern. 
The discussion of the income tax entries in the crop activity 
COlumn vectors is deferred until the following section on taxes. 
The tractor operating activities 
Table 3.1b shows the tractor (owned) operating activities. The 
RHS column has coefficients of zero for rows P41 through P42. When an 
activity requires tractor services in the first quarter the - 1 
coefficient permits one unit (hour) of these services to be brought in 
from column T. The upper bound on this column is 720 hours, the number 
of hours of tractors services the farmer estimates he has available in 
the quarter. The hourly operation costs are estimated to be $4.46. 
This amount is subtracted from the objective function in the Z row. 
In the first quarter capital row, P51, this cost is entered as an expense. 
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This expense is the cumulative balance in future months and is carried 
through to the end of the year in each successive quarter (rows P52 
through P54). The employment of owned tractor services also uses labor 
so the corresponding entries are made in the labor rows (P21 through 
P24). 
The tractor hiring activities 
If the farmer uses all of his own tractor services in any quarter 
he may wish to hire additional services. This is accomplished in the 
linear program as shown in Table 3.1b. Because the hourly costs of 
$32.45 are higher than the costs of operating the owned tractor services 
the program will not hire tractor services in any quarter until all 
available owned tractor resources in that quarter are used, i.e., the 
upper bound on the tractor operating column is reached. There are no 
labor requirements with hiring tractor services. The cumulative capital 
requirements are handled as outlined above under the tractor operating 
activities. 
The labor hiring activities 
When the farmer employs all of his available labor supply in any 
quarter he may wish to hire additional labor. The available supply by 
quarters is listed in rows P21 through P24. The mechanics are the same 
as explained above for hiring tractor services and the capital rows are 
also handled in the same way. 
67 
The predetermined activities 
7 
There are four predetermined activities in the program. The first 
is the milking activity. Table 3.1a shows this activity's use of the 
resources of land, labor, tractors, and also shows the cumulative 
quarterly net receipts over expenditures in the capital rows. The second 
is the wage activity in Table 3.1c. The entries in the capital rows show 
-^ he cumulative wages of the salaried employees for each quarter. The 
third is the living expenditures activity also shown in Table 3.1c. This 
column vector has entries in the capital rows showing the cumulative 
balance of funds necessary in each quarter in order to maintain the 
predetermined level of consumption. The last is the real estate tax 
as shown in Table 3.Id where this column vector shows the capital 
required in the third quarter to pay last year's taxes. 
Each of these activities is brought into the solution by means of 
an equality. The coefficients of 1 in the RHS column vector in rows P71 
through P74 are one side of an equality. On the other side of the 
equality is a 1, which is the only non-zero element in each of these 
rows. It is the a^  ^entry in the corresponding column. Through this 
method each activity is forced into the solution because the solution 
demands the RHS is satisfied. Therefore, as an example, one unit of the 
real estate tax column is always brought into the solution. The other 
The four predetermined activities are listed separately in this 
model. In the actual model, however, they were combined in order to 
form one equality. This procedure saved computation time and expense 
because it facilitated obtaining a feasible solution. 
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predetermined activities are brought into the solution in a similar 
manner. 
The income tax activities 
Because the production period includes two years the farmer must 
pay income taxes in each of the two years. The tax is determined from 
a tax base that is figured on total gross sales. Each activity that 
earns income in year one has an entry representing its tax base in row 
P80. An example is crop activity A1 in Table 3.1a. Those which earn 
income in year two have entries in row PlOO as crop activity A2 in the 
same table. Table 3. Id illustrates hoif the tax is figured in the 
program. Row P80 contains a series of - I's. As the farmer's tax base 
exceeds $2,000 then he must pay tax on the next $1,500 at the rate of 
$.05 per $1.00 of tax base. As the tax base exceeds $3,500 the farmer 
must pay $.06 and the process continues with successively higher rates 
as more tax base is generated through product sales. Because the tax 
is a cost it is subtracted from the objective function. The payment of 
the tax in the third quarter requires capital to be used in this 
quarter as indicated in row P53. Since there are no receipts the same 
balance is carried over to the fourth quarter in row P54. 
The tax for the second year requires no capital in this problem 
because it is paid in the third quarter of the second year. It is, 
however, subtracted from net revenue because it is properly considered 
a variable cost of production. 
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The borrowing activities 
For each activity positive and negative entries have been made in 
the capital rows to indicate cumulative balances of costs or receipts. 
In any quarter where the sum of the positive entries for all activities 
in the solution exceeds the absolute values of the negative entries the 
farmer must borrow. 
The farmer is assumed to be able to borrow funds at the beginning 
of any quarter and pay them back at the end of any quarter at a quarterly 
g 
interest rate, r', of 2.78 percent on the capital employed per quarter. 
This process is easily accomplished in the program by employing borrowing 
activities as set forth in Table 3.1c. 
Each borrowing activity has a corresponding row vector. The row 
vector has a RHS value of c which is the line of credit available. When 
in any quarter the line of credit, c, is completely employed the farmer 
cannot borrow more funds in this quarter. An example is used to illus­
trate the workings of these activities. 
If the farmer could profitably use credit in period one and has not 
yet used up all of his line of credit he will borrow $1.00 more from c 
in row P61, but in terms of available capital, qhe will only receive 
$.9730 because the discount of $.0270 is subtracted by the lender before 
the farmer receives the funds. This amount as shown in borrowing 
activity B2 has a negative sign in the capital row P51 because it 
q 
This corresponds to a 10 percent discount rate per year. 
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contributes to the capital supply. The borrowing costs for one quarter 
are subtracted from the objective function. The borrowing costs are 
also carried through the successive capital rows as the cumulative 
balance of borrowing costs. If the farmer needs to borrow funds 
during the second quarter the process would be repeated in the same 
9 
manner with borrowing activity B2. 
The shadow prices on each of the four capital rows or the four 
borrowing rows are the shadow prices or marginal value products used in 
determining the farm firm's demand for short-term credit as previously 
was outlined. 
g 
This procedure has the inherent drawback of slightly overstating 
the capital requirements in some months in order to save understating 
them in other months. The problem is that of trying to maintain a 
cumulative balance of receipts and expenditures. In order to accomplish 
this in each borrowing activity the interest payments are carried 
down in the periods after the funds are borrowed with the idea that when 
sufficient net receipts over costs come into the system they will permit 
the loan to be paid off, including interest". Where no receipts are 
forthcoming for two quarters, additional funds must be borrowed in the 
second quarter to cover the interest payments. This is not representa­
tive of what would happen. The farmer would wait until the receipts came 
in before he had a capital requirement to pay the interest charges. When 
building the model there was no apparent alternative to the method used 
that would eliminate this drawback because if the interest payments were 
neglected in any quarter after the loan was paid back the capital 
requirements would have been understated by the amount of the interest 
payments and the objective function correspondingly overstated. 
To view the extent of this problem a program was run in which all 
of the land was planted to cotton, a capital intensive crop. The amount 
of overstatement of the capital requirements in the seventh month, when 
the capital requirements were highest, amounted to $150 per hectare 
where a level of zero monthly consumption expenditures was assumed and 
the rate of discount was 10 percent. The overstatement was $200 per 
hectare where a level of $1,816.63 of monthly consumption expenditures 
was assumed. 
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Summary 
Linear programming analysis fits particularly well with the analysis 
of the farm firm. Implicitly it uses the same criteria as marginal 
analysis. It can easily be employed as an empirical tool. In the present 
case it is used to derive a demand schedule for short-term credit 
employing the concepts of variable resource programming and changing 
stocks of capital. An example of the empirical model used in this study 
was presented in order to illustrate the workings of the model. The 
following two chapters specify the components of the program. The last 
chapter uses the results of the program to test the hypotheses set forth 
in the introduction. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE REGION AND THE REPRESENTATIVE FAEM FIRMS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to specify the representative farm 
firms in detail, providing the basis for understanding the components of 
the linear program model outlined in Chapter III. 
First the general setting is provided by a description of the region. 
Then the representative farm firms are specified with particular attention 
to their resources, livestock operations and living expenditures. Next 
the farming activities assumed to be available to the farmer are discussed 
followed by the product prices, the factor prices and fixed costs. 
Description of the Region Studied 
Physical characteristics 
The two municipios of Apatzingan and Zaragoza are among the eight 
municipios that lie in a valley in the west central part of the state of 
Michoac^ n known as the Tierra Caliente (the hot land). This valley is 
approximately 75 miles long and 45 miles wide (8, p. 15). A large portion 
of this valley forms a rolling flat plain dissected by a few rivers and 
streams and occasional small mountains. The edge of the valley is 
ringed by other mountains of volcanic origin. The altitude varies from 
250 meters to 400 meters above sea level. The climate is hot with the 
temperature ranging from a minimum of 11 degrees to a maximum of 42 
degrees centigrade. The average annual rainfall is 694 milimeters and 
is distributed irregularly from June to October (22, p. 2). 
The soils are porous, being formed by a top layer of silt that is 
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high in organic matter over subsoils of sand, gravel, and rocks. They 
are classified as good agricultural soils if any surface rocks are 
cleared away (22, pp. 2-3). 
Economic organization 
Barkin (8, p. 26) reports that in 1960 the population census showed 
that of the 35,355 working persons in the Tierra Caliente, 79.3 percent 
were employed in agriculture, 6.4 percent in industry, 6.5 percent in 
commerce, and 5.9 percent in services, and the rest in other employment. 
Most of the industry and high volume commerce is related to agri­
culture. There are numerous suppliers of insecticides and fertilizers in 
the city of Apatzing^ n, the nerve center for the region. Some mix their 
own fertilizers, and in 1966 the Banco Eiidal had an insecticide mixing 
plant under construction. The Bank also has a large lime processing plant 
and there are another five smaller plants in the city. There are eight 
cotton gins in the city, three tractor and implement dealers and numerous 
stores selling irrigation equipment and farm supplies. Most of the 
zone's economic activity transpires in Apatzingin because of its central 
role as a market, supplier, source of credit, and home for the major 
local and federal government offices.^  
The recent development of the region 
The region has undergone a big change since the early 1950's when 
the first results of the federal government's large scale water resource 
T^he whole area is identified with the city and is -well known as 
the zone, valley, or region of Apatzing^ n. 
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and area development project began to take affect.^  In 1947 the Comlsi<^ n 
del Tepalcatepec was formed encompassing the whole Tepalcatepec river 
basin which includes the Tlerra Caliente plus some other 28 municipios 
in the states of Michoacan and Jalisco.^  Barkin (8, p. 59) reports that 
more than 75 percent of the funds invested in this river basin project 
were invested in the Tierra Caliente and more than half of all the money 
invested was directed to irrigation.^  In addition, the large sums spent 
on the farm-to-market roads and the construction o£ the main paved highway 
to Uruapan have opened markets for the zone's products and permitted the 
inflow of resources and consumer goods to the zone. 
Agriculture 
Agricultural production has increased and its composition has 
changed, especially in recent years, as a result of large scale increases 
2 
Prior to this time the area was quite isolated due to poor communi­
cations. Com was the number one crop and some limes and livestock were 
raised. Some land was irrigated under the auspices of the Distrito 
de Riego de Tierra Caliente which was formed in 1938. 
The region was considered as part of the tough frontier of Mexico 
due to the number of refugees of the law who abided there and the 
prevalance of tropical diseases and poor communication facilities. 
In 1960 the Comisidn was incorporated into the larger Comisidn 
del Rio Balsas. 
B^arkin (8, p. 56) uses Comisic^ n del Rj!o Balsas data to show that of 
312,000,000 pesos invested through 1965 that 177,305,000 went for 
irrigation, 78,849,000 for communications (primarily roads), 3,517,000 
for agriculture research and education, 11,538,000 for education, 
6,286,000 for potable water and sewage, and 14,655,000 for hospitals, 
disease control and electrification. 
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in irrigation. Table 4.1 shows the changes in acreages and crops between 
1946-1950 and 1946-1965 as estimated by Barkin. Land planted to cotton 
grew at the expense of corn in the last five years reported and the 
acreages of cantaloupe and watermelon have grown considerably in the last 
ten years reported. This indicates the trend in the zone toward a 
commercial agriculture and a trend away from the traditional Mexican 
agriculture of corn and beans. These new crops are export oriented.^  
Cotton is the number one Mexican export eapturing 19.3 percent of all 
exports in 1965 (5). Cantaloupe and watermelon exports, primarily to 
the United States, accounted for 1.3 percent of all Mexican exports in 
the same year (5). 
Table 4.2 shows the area in the Tierra Caliente under irrigation 
from 1949-1950 up to 1964-1965. The total area increased 482.4 percent 
in the 15 year period. The area devoted to those crops grown exclusively 
with irrigation such as cotton, cantaloupe and watermelon increased 
rapidly as they were introduced to the zone. Nearly two-thirds of the 
corn is grown with water. Only one third of sesame is grown under 
irrigation, most likely because it is hardy and has low water intake 
requirements. 
These crops are highly labor intensive as grown in the zone although 
limited mechanization has come to the zone. The number of tractors and 
farm implements has increased in recent years as some creditors have 
A^patzingin cotton is eagerly sought by buyers of short-staple 
cotton because during the harvesting season it does not generally rain 
and the cotton is clean and free from moisture. 
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Table 4.1. Area cultivated in the Tierra Caliente, Michoacan 1949-50 to 
1964-1965* 
Area cultivated Percent increase in area 
cultivated 
1949-50 1954-55 1959-60 1964-65 1954-55 1959-60 1964-65 
Crops (hectares) 
Total 42317 63314 105664 109500 53, .2 149. 7 158. 8 
Beans 587 1100 1608 500 87, .4 173. 9 -14. 2 
Cantaloupe 256 1335 4552 6000 421, .5 1678. 1 2243. 8 
Corn^  22310 33000 55292 20000 47, .9 147. 8 -10. 4 
Cotton 12 500 4099 42000 4066, .7 34058. 3 349000. 6 
Limes 3146 4458 8380 8000 4L ,7 166. 4 154. 3 
Rice 6852 11661 13828 12000 70, ,2 101. 8 75. 1 
Sesame 7887 8000 10690 12000 1. 4 35. 5 52. 1 
Sugar Cane 658 129 553 -C -80. ,4 -16. 0 n.a 
Watermelon 79 131 3964 5000 65. ,8 4917. 7 6229. 1 
Others 530 3000 2698 4000 466. ,0 409. 1 654. 7 
S^ource: Barkin (8, p. 72) 
''includes corn and beans sown together 
^^ Less than 100 hectares 
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Table 4.1 (Continued) 
Relative distribution 
of crops 
1949-50 1954-55 1959-60 1964-65 
Crops (percent) 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Beans 1.4 1.7 1.5 0.5 
Cantaloupe 0.6 2.1 4.3 5.5 
Cornb 52.7 52.1 52.3 18.3 
Cotton 0,8 3.9 38.4 
Limes 7.4 7.0 7.9 7.3 
Rice 16.2 18.4 13.1 11.0 
Sesame 18.6 12.6 10.1 11.0 
Sugar Cane 1.6 0.2 0.5 
Watermelon 0.2 0.2 3.8 4.6 
Others 1.3 4.7 2.6 2.7 
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Table 4.2. Irrigated area in the Tierra Caliente. Michoac^ n 1949-50 to 
1964-65* 
Irrigated area Increase in irrigated area 
over 1949-50 
1949-50 1954-55 1959-60 1964-65 1954-55 1959-60 1964-65 
Crops (hectares) (percent) 
Total 15368 31515 71994 89500 
Beans 0 133 1107 -a 
Cantaloupe 256 1335 4552 6000 
Corn^  2600 10204 33537 12500 
Cotton 12 500 4099 42000 
Limes 3146 4458 5674 6000 
Rice 6852 11661 13828 12000 
Sesame 1500 1464 3331 4000 
Sugar Cane 658 129 553 0 
Watermelon 79 131 3964 5000 
Others 265 1500 1349 2000 
S^ource : Barkin (8, p. 73) 
I^ncludes corn and beans sown together 
105.1 368.5 48.2 
a a 0 
421.5 1678.1 2243.8 
292.5 1189.9 380.0 
4066.7 34058.3 349000.0 
41.7 80.4 90.7 
70.2 101.8 75.1 
-2.4 122.1 166.7 
-80.4 -16.0 -100.0 
65.8 4917.7 6229.1 
466.0 409.1 654.7 
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Table 4.2 (Continued) 
Relative distribution of Proportion of cultivated area 
irrigated area irrigated 
1949-50 1954-55 1959-60 1964-65 1949-50 1954-55 1959-60 1964-65 
Crops (percent) (percent) 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 36.3 49.8 68.1 81.7 
Beans 0 0.4 1.5 0 0 12.1 68.8 0 
Cantaloupe 1.7 4.2 6.3 6.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Gorn^  16.9 32.4 46.6 14.0 11.7 30.9 60.7 62.5 
Cotton 0.1 1.6 5.7 46.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Limes 20.5 14.1 7.9 6.7 100.0 100.0 67.7 75.0 
Rice 44.6 37.0 19.2 13.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sesame 9.7 4.6 4.6 4.5 19.0 18.3 31.2 33.3 
Sugar Cane 4.3 0.4 0.8 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0 
Watermelon 0.5 0.4 5.5 5.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Others 1.7 4.8 1.9 2.2 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 
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loaned money to the farmers to hire these services and, in some cases, 
purchase tractors.^  These tractors are primarily used in land preparation 
operations and cultivating and are not extensively used for other 
purposes. Migrant workers come into the Tierra Caliente during critical 
seasons to meet the labor needs.^  
These crops are also very good hosts to and sensitive to insects 
and disease. Because it never freezes, the entomological and pathological 
problems mount each year. This situation requires high levels of use of 
insecticides and fungicides and raises the costs of production and can 
g 
also endanger marketability. 
Agricultural credit 
Agricultural credit has played an important role in permitting the 
zone to change to commercial agriculture because the commercial crops 
are capital intensive. Most of the farmers in the zone are (were) not 
capable of self-financing this type of agriculture. 
All implement dealers in Apatzingin have company plans for financing 
the purchase of tractors and agricultural implements. The private banks 
also finance machinery loans, and the Banco Ejidal and Banco Agr^ cola 
have financed tractor and machinery purchases. 
B^arkin (8, p. 88) states about 15,000 migrant workers came into 
the zone in 1965. 
N^umerous carloads of Apatzing^ n cantaloupe were turned back by 
United States border authorities in the Spring of 1967 because the 
concentration of chemical residue from insecticide applications was above 
the acceptable tolerance level. 
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The Banco Eiidal has been the pace setter, concludes Barkin 
(8, p. 127). It was the instrument of innovation with its specific 
clientele, the eiidatarios, and as a result of its successes, the private 
lenders came into the zone and the whole cotton industry began to 
develop. The Banco Agr^ cola has been less active, but in recent years 
has grown considerably (8, p. 127). 
Table 4.3 shows in round numbers the hectares of cotton financed by 
the various sources in the valley of Apatzing^ n in the summer of 1966, 
The Banco Eiidal is by far the largest. The only credit union that 
operates in the zone is second. It receives a large portion of its funds 
from the Banco Agrfcola which also loans directly to their own clients. 
The Empresas Longoria. Despepitadora Tepalcatepee, Hermanos STEVE and 
Despepitadora ITOH are private firms that gin cotton, sell supplies, and 
buy the harvest. The other sources include private banks, merchants and 
individuals. 
Cotton is by far the number one crop for local credit. Other crops 
are catered to, but without the inducement of cotton, many of the lenders 
would not be in the zone and the official banks would not likely have as 
many funds as they presently have. 
Cantaloupes and watermelon are grown extensively in the winter 
cycle but their financing is largely from outside the zone by packers or 
by persons who have their own sources of credit. The local merchants, 
banks, and official banks don't become too involved, possibly because of 
the risky nature of these crops primarily due to their dependency upon 
the U.S. market. The growers seem to be persons who can afford to take 
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Table 4.3. Hectares of cotton financed by various lenders In the Valley 
of Apatzingan 1966* 
Lender Hectares financed 
Banco Ejidal 14,000 
Banco Agricola 3,000 
Union de Credito Los Reyes 6,000 
Despepitadora Tepalcatepec 2,000 
Empresas Longoria 2,000 
Hermanos STEVE 500 
Despepitadora ITOH 500 
Others 2,000 
Total 30,000 
S^ource; Information obtained in an interview in 1966 with 
Rodolfo Gonzalez de la Garza, Près idente de la Asociacfon Algondonera 
del Valle de Apatzingan. Empresas Longoria, Apatzingan, Michoacàn 
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a big loss in any year. 
Land tenure 
The land tenure systems in the zone can be classified in three 
distinct groups; 1) the eiidatarios, farming elide land, 2) propietarios, 
farming their own land, and 3) arrendatarios, farming land they rent for 
one or more cycles. There are various combinations of the above classes 
but these combinations don't follow any particular pattern and data do 
not exist to measure them. 
9 
The municipio of Zaragoza is almost entirely ejido . In 1960 nine 
eiidos were within its boundaries with Nueva Italia by far the largest. 
Table 4.4 gives the census data for the municipio. It shows the 
eiidatarios have an average of about 24 hectares per eiidatario, but that 
only 10.7 of these are tillable. Of this tillable land, an average of 
8.8 hectares are irrigated. The rest are mainly in pastures or wooded 
land which are likely held for the common use of the eiidos. 
These figures are what might be expected. The agrarian Code (21, 
Art. 75) states that each eiidatario in an irrigated area will be given 
a plot of 10 hectares to farm for his own account. Article 80 (21) 
9 
At the turn of the century this area was sparsely populated. In 
1907 the Gussi brothers, Italians, purchased most of the present municipio 
and set up an arrangement with the government to colonize and irrigate it. 
In 1938 their well-developed land was expropriated by President Lazaro 
Cardenas and was made into collective eiidos which were operated as 
collective farms. Even though they received government support and 
attention, the eiidatarios in 1956 decided to give up the collective 
organization in favor of an individual eiido as it remains today. 
For elaboration on this theme, see Hernandez Segura (42). 
Table 4.4. Land tenure and classification of lands in the Municipos of Apatzing^n and 
Zaragoza I960® 
Municipio and 
form of 
tenure 
No. of 
farm 
units 
Land 
size 
Tillable 
Total 
Hectares 
land 
Irrigated Seasonal Humid Fruit orchards 
Apatzing^n Total 543 192013 75550 8981 64316 2 2251 
Propietario 
>5 has Total 384 138146 42043 4489 36124 2 1428 
Ave./unit 359. 7 109.5 11.7 94.1 3. 7 
<5 has Total 132 205 205 2 200 3 
Ave./unit 1. 6 1.6 1.6 
E^idos Total ^ b 27 53662 33302 4409 27992 820 
Ave./e i idatario 39. 1 24,3 3.2 20.4 6 
Zaragoza^ 
Eiidos Total 9 37513 16725 13752 2574 399 
Ave./e i idatario 24. 0 10.7 8.8 1.6 3 
S^ource: Censo Agrfcola, Ganadero, y Ejidal 1960 (53) 
N^umber of eiidatarios with land holdings in the municipio was 1372 
N^umber of ejldatarus with land holdings in the municipo was 1561 
T^here were 6 other farm units listed in the Census but they only accounted for 29 hectares 
so are not listed here. 
Table 4.4 (Continued) 
Hectares 
Municipio and No. of farm units Other lands 
form of 
tenure Pasture in Woods Unproductive Unproductive 
hills and [ land land for Agr. 
plains 
ApatzingiCn Total 543 
Propietario 
>5 has Total 384 
Ave./unit 
<5 has Total 132 
Ave./unit 
Eiidos Total , 27 
Ave./ejidatario 
Zaragoza*^ 
Eiidos Total 9 
Ave./ejidatario^ 
105682 
87508 
227.9 
18174 
13.2 
16599 
10.6 
8151 324 
7274 301 
18.9 .8 
877 
. 6  
4062 
2 . 6  
23 
67 
2306 
1025 
2.7 
1286 
.9 
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Table 4.4 (Continued) 
Hectares 
Municipio and No. of farm units Tillable land not being farmed 
form of 
tenure Total In nonuse rotation Other Total as percent of 
reasons tillable land 
Apatzing^ n Total 543 
Propietario 
>5 has Total 384 
Ave./unit 
<5 has Total 132 
Ave./unit 
Ejidos Total 27 
Ave./eiidatario 
Zaragoza^ 
Eildos Total 9 
Ave./eiidatario 
60514 18373 
38026 17290 
99.0 45.0 
202 
1.6 
22286 1083 
16.2 .8 
6468 
4.1 
926 
.6 
42141 
20736 90.4 
54.0 
202 100.0 
1.6 
21203 67.5 
15.5 
5542 17.2 
3.5 
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specifies that each ejido will have sufficient pasture land, recreation 
land, and wood so as to satisfy the needs of the community. 
The eiidatarios' land in Zaragoza is entirely irrigated by the 
gravity method. Although they can officially be restricted to only 
irrigating six hectares a cycle, it is usual that they can irrigate 
their full ten hectares each cycle^ .^ 
The municipio of Apatzingan is quite differently structured as 
Table 4.4 shows. The census reports data for three types of £am units: 
propietarios with more than 5 hectares, less than 5 hectares, and ejidos. 
Those propietarios with less than 5 hectares do not appear to be 
very active in the municipio even though they account for about one third 
of the private landholders. Almost 100 percent of their land is going 
unfarmed. The other class of private landholder is important, controlling 
in 1960 about 2.6 times the land as eiidatarios. The average farm size 
is very large, 359.7 hectares, but with an average of only 109.5 hectares 
tillable. The bulk of the rest is in pastures. Of the tillable land, a 
little more than 10 percent was irrigated. Apparently more than 90 percent 
of the land was not under production. 
An explanation of this strange phenomena is in order. The area was 
settled originally by large hacendados and was primarily devoted to 
cattle raising. With agrarian reform these farmers have feared losing 
their property. Many of them did, in fact, lose their property because 
^^This information was obtained in an interview in 1966 with Ing. 
Hinojosa of the Banco Eiidal, Nueva Italia, Michoac^n. 
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in 1960 there were 27 eiidos in the munieipio. Others sold their land 
in smaller parcels, but a few of them have retained their land and use 
it to grow a few acres of crops, limes, with the rest for grazing. 
Article 104 of the Agrarian Code (21) says that in case of expropriation, 
the propietario has the right to keep 100 hectares of irrigated cropland 
or 200 hectares of seasonal crop land or 300 hectares of land dedicated to 
fruit culture or 150 hectares of land dedicated to cotton growing if 
irrigated by fluvial or pump. Article 114 (21) states that a farmer may 
maintain sufficient land to pasture the equivalent of 500 head of large 
cattle. Under this system the farmer is not encouraged to improve his 
lands beyond certain points because it encourages expropriation to form 
eiidos in the manner set forth by the Codigo Agrario. 
It is believed that there are many propietarios in the municipio 
who have smaller units of about 50 hectares in size that are almost 
completely irrigated^^. A few landholders have very large holdings of 
pasture land or seasonal land which tend to raise the farm unit averages. 
It is also common among the large farmers to manage a large expanse of 
land that is composed of tracts owned by several members of the family. 
By operating in this way they have the large scale operations but don't 
have the fear of expropriation because the wife, the uncle, etc., all 
own their part of the land and have the property owners rights as 
specified in the Codigo. 
^^ This is corroborated by Centro de Investigaciones Agrarias survey. 
See Table 4.6. 
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The 27 eiidos in the municipio had an average of 39.1 hectares of 
land per eiidatario. They had relatively little irrigated land, only 
an average of 3.2 hectares out of 24.3 hectares of tillable land. The 
bulk of the rest of the land is in pastures and woods. This again fits 
closely with the provisions of the Agrarian Code (21, Art. 76) which says 
that on seasonal land the eiidatario will have 20 hectares as his own 
plot. The ejido (21, Art. 80) will have common pasture, recreation, 
and wood lands to satisfy the needs for the community. 
Figures show that 67.5 percent of the tillable land is going unused. 
Several reasons may exist. First, the land is not suitable for growing 
cotton or melons or rice without irrigation. For this reason, credit is 
limited to them because of the Banco Eiidal's policy of loaning primarily 
to cotton growers. Second, these persons usually have a small herd of 
livestock and may be using some of their own plots to pasture them in 
addition to the common land. 
Table 4.5 shows the amount of land irrigated in the Apatzing^n 
irrigation unit in the summer of 1965 and the winter cycle of 1965-1966. 
This unit does not correspond exactly with the municipio boundaries 
but includes the municipio and gives an indication of the type of 
irrigation in the municipio. Pumps in deep wells and streams are heavily 
utilized, accounting for 47.6 and 34.8 percent for the summer and winter 
crop cycles respectively. This sort of irrigation raises the costs of 
production due to the necessary capital investment in well and equipment 
as well as operating cost. 
In both municipios the arendatarios are abundant. The lands are 
Table 4.5. Land under irrigation, by type of irrigation, Unidad de Riego Apatzing^n for summer 
and winter cycles 1965-1966® 
Hectares 
Cycle 
Summer 1965 
Propietario Ejido Total 
Winter 1965/66 
Propietarlo Ejido Total 
Gravity 
(Has.) 2748 
Percent of total 40.1 
Temporary dams 
(Has.) 24 
Percent of total .4 
Pumps in s treans 
(Has.) 1089 
Percent of total 15.9 
Pumps in deep wells 
(Has.) 2993 
Percent of total 43.7 
3056 
67.3 
134 
2.9 
108 
2.4 
1240 
27.3 
5804 
50.9 
158 
1.3 
1197 
10.5 
4233 
37.1 
2209 
59.3 
89 
2.4 
1429 
38.3 
1775 
74.5 
135 
5.7 
472 
19.8 
3984 
65.3 
224 
3.7 
1901 
31.1 
Total (Has.) 6854 
Percent of total 100 
4538 
100 
11392 
100 
3727 
100 
2382 
100 
6109 
100 
S^ources: Information obtained in interview in 1966 with Ing. Ces^ r Gastilla P^rez, 
Gerente del Distrito de Riego Tepalcatepec. Comisfon del Rio Balsas, Apatzing^n, Michoac^ n and 
Centro de InvestigacdSigÊs Agrarias (19, p. 31) 
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usually rented for the purposes of growing cotton or melons. Some local 
farmers expand their operations but many persons from outside the region 
come into the zone to grow cotton. Figures from the List of Cotton 
Producers show that in the summer of 1964 about 6,500 eiido hectares were 
12 
rented in Zaragoza to grow cotton. About half of these hectares were 
privately financed and the rest financed by gins, the credit union, or 
local banks in the area. In the municipio of Apatzing^ n about 1600 
hectares were rented, with about 300 rented from e.iIdos. About 20 
percent of the total rented land was financed privately and the rest 
13 financed locally. 
All cotton growers in the region must secure permission from the 
Federal Government to grow the cotton and are not permitted to plant 
more than 50 hectares per person registered. 
13 
A^ encia de Apatzing^ de la Secretarfa de Agricultura y Ganaderfa, 
Apatzingan, Michoac^ n. Productores de algodon, refaccionados y 
independientes registrados durante el ciclo 1964/65, municipios de 
Apatzingan y Zaragoza. Private communication. 1966. 
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This condition points out an interesting situation in that the 
eiidatarios are not supposed to rent out their plots except under 
carefully defined conditions^ .^ This law appears to be discreetly 
ignored in the region. Possibly the explanation is that the land would 
go unfarmed if the eiidatario (or propietario) could not rent it because 
he couldn't secure credit to farm it or at least not enough to farm it 
using capital intensive resources such as fertilizer, insecticide, etc. 
The irrigated land rents for about $700 to $1,000 per hectare for the 
cotton season and it is probably more profitable and a lot less work to 
rent it out than try to farm with other crops without credit. In 
addition, the farmer can then work as a laborer for his renter or other 
farmers and earn at least the going daily wage iÂ^  addition to his land 
rent^^. 
Articles 158 and 159 of the Codigo (21) state that the eiidatario 
will not rent his land except when the land is in the hands of a lady who 
has family responsibilities, he is an inheritor who is less then 16 
years old, he is incapicitated or has suffered illness which keeps him 
from working the land. 
During the field investigation, it was stated on numerous occasions 
by officials of the Banco Eiidal and other knowledgable persons that 
another situation was legal. Where the land was undeveloped for machine 
tillage because of surface rocks or trees, the eiidatario could rent his 
land for two years provided that the renter agreed to clear the land 
and/or remove the rocks. This was a way for getting the renter to carry 
the burden of land improvement. After the two year period it is assumed 
that the eiidatario will farm his own land again. 
^^This was an explanation given by Banco Eiidal authorities and 
other knowledgable persons in the zone. 
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Coordinated policy making 
The Acuerdo Presidencial del ^ Enero de 1953 established the 
organization of the CoiiSite Directiva. which is the agricultural planning 
commission for various zones of the country specified by the Secretary 
of Agriculture^^. 
This committee is composed of the head of the irrigation district 
who acts as chairman, and a representative of the Secretary of Agriculture 
who acts as secretary. Other voting members are agents of the Banco 
Eiidal, Banco Agr^ cola, and the eiidatarios and pequegos propietarios 
in the irrigation district. Many other agricultural organizations are 
invited to send non-voting delegates to the meetings which are held at 
least once a month. 
The committee has as its primary responsibility to plan the use of 
agricultural resources in the district and carry out these plans once 
they have been approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary 
of Water Resources. Their plans take into consideration the availability 
of all irrigation water, the specific use of the same and the availability 
and use of credit. In addition, they try to encourage the development and 
use of improved agricultural practices in the zone. They set the approved 
dates of planting each crop in the district, taking account of growing 
conditions and the availability of water, and farmers who use official 
credit or crop insurance must plant and harvest within these dates. 
^^ Ing. Cesar Castilla P^ rez, Gerente del Distrito de Riego 
Tepalcatepec, Comision del Rio Balsas, Apatzing^ n, Michoac^n. Acuerdo 
Presidencial del 2 de Enero de 1953. Private communication. 1966. 
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This group has a great deal of control over the growth of the zone 
and can be used effectively by the Secretary of Agriculture and the 
Secretary of Water Resources to carry out national agricultural objectives. 
All but the two farmer voting members are employed directly or indirectly 
by these two ministries. Also, both ministries have to approve their 
plans. Therefore the government largely has the power to control 
agricultural production in the zone. 
Summary 
The zone is a rich agricultural zone if it is under irrigation. It 
is in a rapid state of transition now due to the influence of irrigation, 
cotton and other commercial crops. Farmers with irrigation and with 
sufficient working capital are the producers of such crops. Those who 
don't have both of these inputs are forced to grow traditional crops in 
a traditional way. Therefore many of this group of farmers have rented 
their land to persons within or from outside of the zone. 
Agricultural credit has been important in developing the zone with 
the Banco Eiidal being the largest institutional lender. Eiidos and 
propietarios are both prominent forms of land tenancy. 
Many persons in the zone feel that cotton has had its day. The 
world market is uncertain and costs are rising due to heavy applications 
of insecticides. They believe that the zone should devote more land to 
lime and livestock production. It appears that they are, in part, 
correct in that the marginal producer may be forced out of cotton. The 
world market for lime juice is very strong now (45) and may cause some 
resources to be shifted in this direction. But as long as the Mexican 
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government relies on cotton for its biggest source of foreign exchange 
and hence directs credit to the farmers for this crop, cotton will be 
hard to replace. In addition, the many private businesses such as the 
gins and the insecticide and fertilizer dealers have a vested interest 
in cotton production and will try to keep the industry alive. 
Representative Farm Firms 
The role of representative farm firms 
The representative farm firms established for the two munieIpios 
specify the resource availabilities that were used in the linear programs. 
It is understood that these farm firms are not representative of all 
farms in the two municipios nor are they to be construed as average 
farms. They are designed simply to represent different farming organiza­
tions in the two municipios that approximate many of those that exist in 
the municipios. 
In accordance with the objectives of this study the basic differen­
tiation between representative farm firms is land tenure.- Within each 
tenancy class the farm firm is defined on the basis of the composition 
of its resource base and proportion of land and other resources devoted 
to livestock activities. In particular the amount of irrigated and 
seasonal land, the form and amount of power (tractor or horse and mule), 
the amount of labor (farmer, family and regular help), and the form and 
size of livestock enterprises are specified. In addition, the farmer's 
equity was computed to determine limits to mortgage borrowing. 
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The method of specification of the representative farm firm 
The data used in specifying the representative farm firms was obtained 
from a farm level survey run by the Centro de Investigaciones Agrarias in 
the summer of 1965. The Centro encountered problems in making successful 
contacts with the farmers surveyed and hence ended up with a small sized 
sample. They drew their sample of propietarios from the Secretary of 
Agriculture's List of Cotton Producers in the region. This biased the 
results in favor of farms planted to cotton. This effect is probably 
minimized in that cotton is by far the crop most extensively grown in the 
region as is shown in Table 4.1.^^ 
In order to verify the information obtained from the survey data, a 
return trip was made to the zone to discuss the representative farms with 
agriculturalists and bankers who had experience in the zone. Minor 
changes were incorporated after these interviews. 
The representative farm firms 
Four representative farm firms were established for the two tenace 
classes of eiidatario and pequenospropietario. It was decided not to 
establish farms for arrendatarios because they are often farmers who 
^ I^t was learned during the field investigation that this excluded 
from the sample some large propietarios in the municipio of Apatzing^n. 
These farmers typically have a lot of their land in lime orchards or 
pasture for their large cattle herds and do not intensively row crop 
their farms. It was decided to exclude this type of farmer from the list 
of representative farm firms because the farmer is not primarily a crop 
farmer and is not representative of the farmers in the municipio to 
warrant the time necessary to include them in this study. 
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came from outside the zone to cultivate cotton or melon and who have no 
particular local credit source to deal with. Often they are financed by-
sources outside the region. There are local eiidatarios and propietarios 
who rent land to supplement their own holdings, others who rent out their 
lands, and eiidatarios who own small plots of land. These farmers appear 
to be in the minority, or at least their respective situations are 
sufficiently varied to exclude them from serving as the basis for forming 
additional representative farms. 
The four representative farm firms are defined in Table 4.6. They 
consist of an eiidatario in Zaragoza and two eiidatarios and a pegueno 
18 
propietario in Apatzing^n. The resources specified are the amounts 
available each month. Monthly availability of each resource was selected 
as the unit of specification because the climate and irrigation permit 
year around crop farming and because one of the purposes of the study is 
to show a monthly need for short-term credit. In the linear program the 
resource needs for each activity were estimated on a monthly basis and 
the resources availability was specified on a monthly basis. 
On the basis of the sample survey the eiidatario of Apatzing^n was 
originally defined as having a plot of 10 hectares of seasonal land. 
Later, when the 1960 census data became available, the data suggested that 
on the average the farms might have more tillable land available. Table 
4.4 shows 24.3 hectares to be the average. Assuming some of the reported 
tillable land is held in common this figure approximates the 20 hectare 
plot size set forth in the Agrarian Code for an eiidatario with seasonal 
land. Therefore, it was decided to form another representative farm firm 
with 20 hectares as the size of the plot. This will facilitate the 
discussion of considering whether or not this eiidatario is a vieturn of 
minifundio because in this case he has the exact amount of land prescribed 
by the Code. 
Table 4.6. Four representative farm firms defined for the Municipios of Zaragoza and Apatzing^n 
Municipo and Land ^hectares) 
representative Total Tillable Non- Total 
farm firm tillable value (pesos) 
irrigated seasonal 
Column number 12 3 4 5 
Zaragoza 
1. Eiidatario 10 10 
Apatzing^n 
2. Eiidatario 10 
3. Eiidatario 20 
4. Pequeno 50 50 
Propietario 
10 
20 
65000 
32000 
64000 
340000 
Table 4.6 (Continued) 
Munieipo and 
representative 
farm firm 
Column number 
Machinery and equipment 
Car or Value Tractor Value 
pick-up (pesos) and (pesos) 
equipment 
Other 
value 
(pesos) 
10 
Total 
machinery 
value 
(pesos) 
11 
Tractor 
hours 
available 
per 
month 
12 
Farm 
buildings 
Total 
value 
(pesos) 
13 
Zaragoza 
1. Ejidatario 
Apatzing^ n 
2. Ejidatario 
3. Ei idatario 
4. Peqedno 
Propietario 
17500 42350 
1000 
1000 
1000 
40000 
1000 
1000 
1000 
99850 240 25000 
Table 4.6 (Continued) 
Municipo and Livestock (head) 
representative Horses Value Milk Value 2 year Value Calves Value Bulls 
farm firm and (pesos) cows (pesos) olds (pesos) (pesos) 
mules 
Column number 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Zaragoza 
1. Eiidatario 2 1000 
Apatzing^n 
2. Eiidatario 4 2000 5 5000 4 1100 1 
3. Eiidatario 4 2000 5 5000 4 1100 1 
4. Pegeuno 18 27000 9 9000 9 4500 
Propietario 
Table 4.6 (Continued) 
Municipo and 
representative 
farm firm 
Column number 
Livestock (head) 
Value Total 
(pesos) value 
livestock 
(pesos) 
23 24 
Horse or 
mule team 
(jornales/ 
mo.) 
25 
Labor supply (jomales/mo.) 
Farmer Family Regular Total jornales 
help per month 
26 27 28 29 
Zaragoza 
1. Ei idatario 
Apatzing^n 
2. Eiidatario 
3. Eiidatario 
4. Pegeuno 
Propietario 
1000 
1000 
1000 
9100 
9100 
40500 
25 
50 
50 
20 
20 
20 
20 
25 
25 
25 
50 
45 
45 
45 
70 
Table 4.6 (Continued) 
Municipo and Mortgagable property 
representative Value (pesos) 
farm firm Eiidatarios Propietarios 
30 = 11 + 24 31 = 5 + 11 + 13 + 24 
Column number 30 31 
Zaragoza 
1. Ei idatario 2000 
Apatzing^n 
2. Eiidatario 10100 
3. E1idatario 10100 
4. Peqeuno 
Propietario 
505350 
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Land Columns 1-4 of Table 4.6 specify the amount of land each 
farm firm has. It was assumed that each farm is located in the flat-
land, that the land has been cleared of trees and rocks, and that it has 
uniform soil types. These physical conditions definitely would have to 
be classed as "good" and "desirable" for the municipios but they are not 
atypical. The method of irrigation is assumed to be by gravity. 
Table 4.5 showed that in Apatzing^ n a large portion of the land is under 
irrigation by deep well pumps. If this were the case the representative 
19 farmer's costs per hectare would be higher. This type of irrigation 
would increase the farm firm's need for operating capital. 
Machinery Columns 6-12 show that the pequeno propietario is 
20 
the only farmer to have a tractor. The tractor is assumed to be a 
19 
Estimated costs of production prepared by the Banco Eiidal and 
Banco Agrfcola show that irrigation by deep well and pump in the zone 
increases the operating costs by about $400-500 per hectare per cycle for 
cotton over the cost of irrigation by gravity. In addition to these 
costs are the fixed costs of drilling, installation, depreciation, and 
maintenance and repair of the well and equipment. 
20 Generally the eiidatarios do not have tractors, cars, or pickups. 
In an interview in 1966 with Ing. Jose Rojas of the Banco Agrario de 
Zamora (Banco Eiidal), Apatzingan, Michoac^ n, he estimated that about 
five percent of the eiidatarios on temporal land in the municipio of 
Apatzingan had cars or pickup trucks. In an interview in 1966 with Ing. 
Hinojosa, op. cit., he estimated that about ten percent of the eiidatarios 
in the municipio of Zaragoza had cars or pickups and that three percent 
had tractors. In an interview in 1966 with Ing. Hector Gcimez Romero, 
Gerente, Banco Agrario de Zamora, Apatzingan, Michoac^ n, he stated the 
Banco Eiidal had financed about 20 tractors and tractor mounted equipment 
in the past five years. 
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three-year old, 46 horse power tractor. It is debt free and the tractor, 
plow, disk harrow planter and cultivator have a present value of 
21 $42,350.00. It is assumed the tractor can work an average of eight 
hours a day each day of the month or 240 hours per month. The rest of 
the time is involved in servicing, breakdowns, or in moving between 
jobs. Farmers can hire tractor services, as is the custom in the 
region, at the standard rates for the region. 
Animal power Columns 14 and 25 show the mule team or horse power 
available. Each team is assumed to be able to work 25 eight hour days a 
month. The farmer pastures these animals and spends $25 a head per month 
for grain to supplement the pasture. 
Labor The labor supply is shown in columns 26-29. Each laborer 
is assumed to work a iomal (eight hours) a day in "direct" labor with 
field work or livestock activities. To be sure, the farmer and farm 
worker are busy more than eight hours a day but it is assumed the balance 
of their time is in "overhead" labor such as going to and from the fields, 
doing odd jobs, repairing farm machinery or attending to personal needs 
such as rest and relaxation. The technical coefficients in the activities 
are defined for direct labor only. All laborers are assumed to be 
available for 25 days a month. The other days are Sundays or holidays. 
The farmer, however, was assumed to have an equivalent of five days less 
21 
This value is based upon new tractor and equipment prices after 
depreciation. In an interview in 1966 with Ing. Miguel Torres Vega, the 
Ford Tractor dealer in Apatzingan, Michoac^n, he estimated that the new 
cost of this equipment would be $60,500. Other tractor dealers' prices 
were comparable. The depreciation figured to be 10 percent a year using 
a straight line method. 
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of time available for field work due to the necessity of going to town 
and the general duties of administration and management. It is assumed 
that the farmer can hire additional day labor at the minimum daily wage. 
Livestock operations The eiidatarios and peguenos propietarios 
in Apatzingin both are assumed to have milking operations. As a general 
22 
rule the eiidatarios in Zaragoza do not have major livestock operations 
It is not uncommon for a farmer to have a few chickens and pigs but these 
amount to so little that they are excluded from the study. 
The milking operations are considered to be fixed. The farmer is 
not permitted to use his working capital to increase the size of these 
operations. Undertakings of this sort usually involve intermediate or 
long-range plans and credit and this study is restricted to one year. 
Dairying in the region is handled very simply. The warm climate 
doesn't require barns and the cows are all milked by hand, oftentimes 
while tied to the corral fence. Hence the farmer does not usually have 
a large investment in equipment. Good stock is usually of a Brahma-
Hols tein or Brahma-Brown Swiss cross. Milk is assumed to sell for an 
23 
average of $1.50 per liter. 
22 
In an interview in 1966 with Ing. Hinojosa, op. cit., he estimated 
that about 25 percent of the ejidatarios in the municipio had sizable 
livestock production. 
23 
This information was obtained from interviews in 1966 with various 
milk producers but in particular from Don Arturo Chavez, Apatzing^ n, 
Michoacan, one of the largest dairymen in the region. 
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The peauenosDroDÎetario has 18 good quality cross-bred cows. It 
is assumed that about 85 percent are in lactation at any one time. In 
addition he has nine yearlings or two year olds and nine calves for herd 
replacement or sale. The "fresh" cows produce an average of 900 liters 
of milk a year. The sale of this milk and the calves or older stock 
brings in an assumed average revenue of $2,500 per month. Costs are 
assumed to be $200 per month to cover medicine and minerals. The cows are 
fed entirely on lush irrigated sorgo and perennial para grass pasture. 
They are milked once a day. The farmer must pay an additional $25 per 
hectare to the irrigation commission in June and December for irrigation 
rights. The milking operation requires 18 iornales a month to do all 
chores associated with the herd including maintenance of irrigation 
canals and fences. In May 6.33 units of tractor time are required for 
preparing the soil and planting the new sorgo crop. The milk is kept 
cool by well water until marketed. 
The eiidatario in Apatzing^n has a smaller herd of five cows of 
common breeding. He also has a bull and four calves. On an average 
four cows are in lactation and each produces 500 liters of milk a year. 
Between milk sales and calf sales he has an assumed average monthly 
revenue of $267. His expenses are assumed to be $35 per month. He 
^^ The Centro de Investigaciones Agrarias'survey data showed many 
pequefib propietarios either had milking operations or lime orchards. A 
milking operation was chosen for this study because more farmers surveyed 
by the Centro de Investigaciones Agrarias had milking operations than had 
orchards and because it was learned that it isn't desirable to grow cotton 
near lime orchards. The insecticides used on cotton kill the fly that is 
the predator against the insects that harm limes. 
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pastures his livestock on the common e1ido pastureland and pays out $100 
per month for this privilege in the summer season from June through 
November. In the winter he supplements the pasture with forage. Labor 
requirements are six iornales per month. 
Mortgagable property 
The representative farmer's mortgagable property is specified in 
columns 30 and 31 of Table 4.6. It is assumed that he will not mortgage 
anything but his farm land, farm buildings, livestock and machinery. His 
house, any life insurance, savings, and other investments are excluded. 
It is also assumed that all of the property listed is owned outright and 
therefore can be mortgaged to the "limit" if desired. 
The eiidatario cannot mortgage his land as stated in Article 138 of 
the Agrarian Code (21). Therefore this restricts his mortgagable 
property considerably when compared to the pequeno propietario. 
Management 
The levels of management are assumed to be uniform across all 
representative farm firms. Moreover, in order to generate a "potential" 
demand for credit the management level is assumed at a high, but not to 
be construed as extremely high, level. All technical coefficients for 
the activities are determined in this framework. 
There are two inherent dangers in the assumption with respect to 
the actual situation which will affect the interpretation of the results 
obtained in the empirical problem. The first is overstating the level of 
management for the farmers in the municipios. The second is that there 
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is no difference between the eiidatarios and pequeîicB propietarios with 
respect to their management ability. 
Average annual yields in the region as reported by the Secretary of 
Water Resources (56) are generally lower than those utilized in the 
25 program. For purposes of making loans the Banco Eiidal and Banco 
Agrfcola prepare cropping plans, budgets, and yield estimates for crops 
grown with a certain set of resources.In general these yield estimates 
are lower than those utilized in the program for more or less the same 
set of resources. The yields used in this study are designed to represent 
a "potential" demand and therefore must be interpreted as raising the 
marginal value product of credit over what might be expected under average 
conditions. 
The literature would indicate that two major factors tend to cause 
the ejidatario to have a lower level of management ability than the 
propietario. - These are a lower level of education and the organization 
and structure of the ejido system which contributes to inefficiencies. 
Castillo (18, p. 155) in his study of the ejido in comparison with the 
/ 
pequeno propietario in EjL Baiio found that eiidatarios generally had 
less opportunities for education, made less efficient use of resources. 
25 
These yields disguise the true differences, however, in that they 
do not specify what combination of resources were used in production, 
i.e., fertilizer, insecticide, etc. 
See the following chapter for an explanation of these estimates. 
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and had a lower level of technical knowledge. Castillo (18) agrees with 
Alvaro de Albomoz (1, pp. 303-304) and Fernandez y Fernindez (30) that 
the ejtdo structure and organization is not, in general, conducive to 
establishing high quality farmers. Freebaim (32) found in his study in 
the Yaqui Valley that although the inputs used by eiidatarios and 
propietarios were similar, the eiidatarios made less return (1 percent 
compared to 14 percent) than the propietarios per peso of input. In­
sofar as this is true in the municipios under study the potential demand 
for short-term credit and the marginal value product of credit would be 
less for the eiidatarios. However, in the yield estimates prepared by 
Banco Eiidal and Banco Agrfcola for use in the municipios no apparent 
pattern appeared to indicate that the banks had different yield expecta­
tions for their respective clients. This would indicate that in this 
region the official banks consider credit using farmers as being more or 
less equal managers. In interviews with other lenders, however, it was 
found that merchants and private banks preferred not to deal with 
eiidatarios. It was intimated that they were, in general, less credit 
worthy. This opinion may be influenced by the fact that these lenders 
believe the Banco Eiidal is already working with those who are credit 
worthy. Further the merchants and private banks don't care to work with 
the eiidatario because he has little mortgagable property to use as a 
guarantee against his loans. 
Living expenses 
As was discussed in Chapter II expenditures for living expenses 
cannot always be divorced from capital and credit needs. It is assumed 
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that the representative farmers can use production credit to meet some of 
their consumption needs if necessary. Information was not available for the 
farmers in the two municipios. The Secretary of Industry and Commerce 
recently made a survey of all municipios in the state and found that of 
the farm workers in Michoacan, 89.2 percent had incomes of less than 
$1,500 per month and 81.6 percent had incomes of less than $750 per 
month (53). The modal class included incomes from $300-749 per month 
and represented 48 percent of the workers. These figures do not state 
how well the rural worker was living but do give an idea of the magnitude 
of their incomes. Cardosa Mejia (14, p. 37) reports, however, that the 
standard of living in Michoacan is considered to be in the lower 25 
percent of Mexico and the level is generally "poor". 
The Mexican Central Bank did a study of national rural levels of 
living in 1963. Figures shown in Table 4.7 taken from this study provide 
a more accurate view of levels of consumer expenditures. From these data 
four levels of monthly living expenditures were selected and each was 
tried with each representative farm in order to consider the effects of 
living expenditures on credit needs and to see whether or not sufficient 
income can be generated to cover them. 
The first level selected was the average monthly expenditure of the 
modal strata of monthly family income. This strata included 32 percent 
of Ifhe farm families. Their incomes were between $301 and $600 monthly 
and their expenditures averaged $621.31. They were net dissavers. The 
second level of average monthly expenditure was selected as that of the 
lowest strata where net saving occurred, $1001 to $1500 as monthly 
Table 4.7. Monthly family incomes and expenditures for the rural sector of Mexico 1963* 
Family monthly Families Monthly Monthly 
income strata income expenditures 
(pesos) Total Percent 
number of total 
0-300 939460 
301-600 1050749 
601-1000 725641 
1001-1500 183845 
1501-3000 254307 
3001-4500 57239 
4501-6000 21300 
6001-10000 7545 
more than 10000 3000 
Totals 3242986 
Means 
28.97 216.94 480.44 
32.40 429.59 621.31 
22.38 764.43 816.39 
5.67 1223.30 1191.00 
7.84 2100.00 1816.63 
1.77 3629.57 3060.43 
0.65 5317.79 3960.38 
0.23 7307.41 5039.40 
0.09 16586.32 4885.98 
100.0 
738.39 831.91 
S^ource: Oficina de Proyecciones Agricolas Banco de Mexico, S. A. Encuestra sobre 
ingresos y gastos familiares en Mexico 1963. Mexico, D. F., 1963. Cited in VillaseBbr (67). 
Table 4.7 (Continued) 
Family monthly Percent of expenditures spent for: Deficit or 
income strata surplus 
(pesos) Hous ing Food Shoes Vehicles, Insurance Other (pesos) 
drink and furniture. things 
tobacco clothing appliances 
0-300 14.2 145.74 28.05 2.47 0.03 31.00 -263.45 
301-600 8.63 94.23 18.38 1.80 0.07 21.59 -191.72 
601-1000 7.00 66.36 14.10 2.73 16.61 -52.50 
1001-1500 7.28 58.64 11.08 3.03 0.07 17.26 32.30 
1501-3000 6.11 44.22 11.04 3.19 3.97 18.70 2.83.37 
3001-4500 5.07 37.78 7.38 6.85 5.66 21.58 569.14 
4501-6000 2.54 21.92 9.87 12.79 4.74 22.61 1357.41 
6001-10000 9.79 19.43 8.72 2.39 3.76 24.87 2268.01 
more than 10000 0.90 8.53 3.17 9.85 7.07 11700.34 
Totals 
Means 7.30 65.86 14.17 3.63 1.71 20.01 -93.62 
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income. Only 5.67 percent of the families had incomes in this strata. 
Their mean expenditures were $1,191.00 per month. The third level 
selected was the strata of $1,501 to $3,000. The mean monthly expenditure 
was $1,816.63 and 7.84 percent of the farm families had incomes in this 
strata. Only 2.74 percent of the Mexican farm families had monthly 
family incomes greater than this. The fourth level selected was that of 
zero expenditures per month. This was used as a benchmark in order to 
view the quantity of credit used for production purposes without 
consideration of consumption expenditures. 
It is assumed that the representative farmer sells all of his 
produce in the market and then buys back that which he needs for family 
consumption. This simplifying assumption does not fit with the actual 
situation. Usually the farmers, especially the eiidatarios, keep some of 
their own com for tortillas and some of their milk for family consump­
tion. This assumption affects the solution by raising consumption 
expenditures slightly where the farmer is a com or milk producer. The 
farmer undoubtedly sells these products at a lower price than he can 
repurchase them and he has the added cost of transporting these products 
to the market. 
Agricultural Activities 
The livestock operations were previously defined. The main thrust 
of the study, however, is to test the hypotheses considering the farmery's 
cropping alternatives. The crops grown in the region were shown in 
Table 4.1. Cotton, corn, rice and sesame (tied), limes, cantaloupe, and 
watermelon were the principle crops grown in 1964-1965. With the 
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exception of limes and watermelon these are the crops considered 
available to the representative farmers operating under irrigation. 
Limes were not included for the reasons mentioned earlier. Watermelon 
was excluded because it is best suited to the sandy soils near the 
rivers and streams. This soil is not typical of the larger part of the 
two municipios. Moreover, cantaloupe is a very similar crop with a 
similar market, growing conditions and risk. This type of high-return or 
high-loss crop therefore is represented by the cantaloupe growing 
activity. Sorgo was added as an additional crop on the encouragement of 
technicians at the local experiment station in the zone. It has recently 
been introduced to the zone and is considered to have a good future. The 
farmer on seasonal land is assumed to be able to grow those crops suitable 
to seasonal farming: corn, sesame or sorgo. 
The eiidatarios own mule and work horses and are given the alterna­
tive of farming with this source of power. Crop yields on land farmed 
with horses or mules are generally lower due to a poorer seedbed 
preparation. These farmers may also hire tractor services (see below) 
if they desire. The pequeno propietario owns his own tractor and it is 
assumed that he does not have the alternative of farming with horse or 
mule teams. He can hire additional tractor services if necessary. 
The levels of seeding, fertilizer and insecticide application are 
those recommended by the technicians of the local experiment station in 
Antunez for a farmer who is a good manager and who wants to maximize 
profits. Generally the technicians' recommendations included crops 
grown with fertilizer and insecticides. In order to provide an 
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alternative of crops with lower capital requirements to the farmer with 
limited capital each crop was also considered to be grown using no 
fertilizer or insecticide, with fertilizer alone, or with insecticide 
alone. Crops grown under irrigation could be grown in either the winter 
or summer cycle. Therefore with four variables; cycle, source of power, 
fertilizer and insecticide, sixteen possible combinations of each crop 
were considered for irrigated crops. Cotton was an exception. It is 
only grown in the summer cycle and is grown using only the very necessary 
insecticides. Another exception is cantaloupe which is considered to be 
grown in the winter, with tractor power, insecticide and fertilizer. 
Sorgo does not require insecticide so is another exception to this 
pattern. The non-irrigated crops can be grown only in the summer cycle 
and hence have a maximum of eight alternative resource combinations. 
However, the experiment station technician did not recommend fertilizing 
corn or sorgo so these two alternatives were omitted. 
All crops were assumed to be planted in accordance with the approved 
planting dates established by the Secretary of Agriculture. Likewise, 
all were assumed to be harvested in accordance with the approved har­
vesting dates established by the same ministry. This makes them eligible 
for crop insurance and official bank credit. 
Physical and monetary resources required for each activity are 
specified in Tables 4.8 through 4.21. Tables 4.22 through 4.25 specify 
the yields, product prices, sales tax and "partial" operating capital 
requirements. The capital requirements are considered "partial" because 
they do not include costs of family or hired labor, hired tractor 
Table 4.8. Land requirements by month for all crop activities 
Months activity uses land 
Activities 
Cantaloupe Corn Cotton Rice 
Irrigated Seasonal Irrigated Irrigated Irrigated 
winter summer winter summer summer winter 
Activity designation A1 A6-A9 A10-A17 A18-A25 A2-A5 A26-A33 A34-A41 
Months 
Jan. X X X 
Feb. X X X 
Mar. X X X 
April X X X 
May X X 
June X X X X 
July X X X X 
Aug. X X X X 
Sept. X X X X 
Oct. X X X X 
Nov. X X X^ X X 
Dec, X X X 
U^ses land in November only when crop is grown with mule power 
Table 4.8 (Continued) 
Months activity uses land 
Activities 
Sesame Sorgo 
Seasonal Irrigated Seasonal Irrigated 
summer winter summer winter 
Activity designation A42-A49 A50-A57 A58-A65 A66-A67 A68-A71 A72-A75 
Months 
Jan. X X 
Feb. X X 
Mar. X X 
April X X 
May X X 
June X X X X 
July X X X X 
Aug. X X X X 
Sept. X X X X 
Oct. X X X X 
Nov. X 
Dec. 
Table 4.9. Tractor requirements by months for all activities^''' 
Hours/hectare/month 
Activities 
Cantaloupe Corn Cotton Rice 
Irrigated Seasonal Irrigated Irrigated Irrigated 
winter summer winter summer summer winter 
Activity designation A1 A6-A7 A10-A13 A18-A21 A2-A3 A26-A29 A34-A37 
Months 
Jan. 16.46 4.67 1.60 
Feb. 2.67 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 7.83 10.12 11.72 9.82 
July 6.96 4.67 4.96 1.60 
Aug. 4.67 
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 10.12 4.68 9.82 
W^hen the tractor used is owned by the farm firm each hour of tractor use in a given month 
requires .13 iomal of labor in that month in addition to the labor requirements specified for 
each crop in Table 4.16 through Table 4.20 
W^hen the tractor used is owned by the farm firm each hour of tractor use in a given month 
requires $4.46 of capital in that month in addition to the capital requirements specified for 
each crop in Table 
Table 4.9 (Continued) 
Hours/hectare/month 
Activities 
Sesame Sorgo 
Seasonal Irrigated Seasonal Irrigated 
summer winter summer winter 
Activity designation A42-A45 A50-A53 A58-A61 A66 A68-A69 A72-A73 
Months 
Jan. 7.83 7.83 
Feb. 4.96 6.96 
Mar. 2.00 
April 
May 
June 7.83 7.83 7.83 7.83 
July 6.96 4.96 6.96 6.96 
Aug. 2.00 
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
Table 4.10. Mule or horse team requirements by month for all activities. 
Jornales/hectare/month 
Activities 
Corn* Cotton Rice 
Seasonal Irrigated Irrigated Irrigated 
summer winter summer summer winter 
Activity designation A8-A9 A14-A17 A22-A25 A4-A5 A30-A33 A38-A41 
Months 
Jan. 2.00 2.50 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 4.50 4.00 7.00 4.93 
July 3.00 2.50 2.00 2.50 
Aug. 1.00 2.00 
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 4.00 
Dec. 1.50 2.50 4.93 
*Corn uses less mule time than sorgo or sesame due to the fact it is planted in wide 
rows and hence takes less time to plant and cultivate 
Table 4,10 (Continued) 
Jornales/hectare/month 
Activities 
Sesame Sorgo 
Seasonal Irrigated Seasonal Irrigated 
summer winter summer winter 
Activity designation A46-A49 A54-A57 A62-A65 A67 A70-A71 A74-A75 
Months 
Jan. 4.50 4.50 
Feb. 3.34 5.00 
Mar. 1.67 
April 
May 
June 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 
July 5.00 3.34 5.00 5.00 
Aug. 1.67 
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
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Table 4.11. Labor requirements by month for cantaloupe and cotton 
activities 
Jornales/month/hectare 
Cantaloupe Cotton activities 
Activity designation A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used X 
Insecticide used X 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter X 
Seasonal land 
Month 
Jan. 3.76 
Feb. 12.85 
Mar. 63.32 
April 51.06 
May 
June 
July 
Aug. 
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X X X 
X X X X 
3.30 3.30 10.30 10.30 
1.00 1.00 4.00 5.00 
12.00 12.00 14.00 14.00 
10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 
8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
54.00 69.00 45.90 57.20 
*Labor requirements are listed for crops grown when tractor power 
is hired. For additional labor requirements used with owned tractor 
power see Table 4.9. 
Table 4.12. Labor requirements by month for corn activities 
Jornales/month/hectare 
Com activities 
Activity designation A6 A7 A8 A9 AlO All A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 
Tractor power* X X X X X X 
Mule power X X X X X 
Fertilizer used X X X X 
Insecticide used X X X X X X 
Irrigated land (summer) X X X X X X X X 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land X X X X 
Month 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 4.50 4.50 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 
July 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 
Aug. 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 
Sept. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Oct. 
Nov. .94 2.50 .67 1.90 1.12 3.00 1.50 4.00 1.00 2.25 1.12 3.00 
Dec. 
a^bor requirements are listed for crops grown when tractor power is hired. For additional 
labor requirements used with owned tractor power see Table 4.9. 
Table 4.12 (Continued) 
J omales /month/hectare 
Corn activities 
Activity designation A18 A19 A20 A21 A22 A23 A24 A25 
Tractor power^  X X X X 
Mule power X X X X 
Fertilizer used X X X X 
Insecticide used X X X X 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) X X X X X X X X 
Seasonal land 
Month 
Jan. 2.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 4.00 6.00 
Feb. 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 
Mar. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
April 
May 1.12 3.00 1.50 4.00 1.00 2.25 1.12 3.00 
June 
July 
Aug. 
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Dec. 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 4.50 4.50 5.50 5.50 
Table 4.13. Labor requirements by month for rice activities 
Activity designation 
Jornales/month/hectare 
A26 
Rice activities 
A27 A28 A29 A30 A31 A32 A33 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Herbicide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
Months 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
June 5. 40 5. 40 5. 55 5. ,55 10. ,33 10. ,33 10. 48 10, ,48 
July 65. ,00 57. ,00 65. ,00 57. ,00 67. 50 59. 50 67. ,50 59, ,50 
Aug. 16, ,00 11. 00 19. ,00 14. ,00 16. ,00 11. 00 19. 00 14, ,00 
Sept. 5. ,00 5. ,00 8. ,00 8. ,00 5. ,00 5. 00 8. 00 8, ,00 
Oct. 8, ,00 8. 00 8, ,00 8. ,00 8. ,00 8. ,00 8. ,00 8. ,00 
Nov. 2, .00 2. 00 2. ,00 2, .00 2. 00 2. 00 2, .00 2, .00 
Dec. 
L^abor requirements are listed for crops grown when tractor power is hired. For additional 
labor requirements used with owned tractor power see Table 4.9. 
Table 4.13 (Continued) 
Jornales/month/hectare 
Rice activities 
Activity designation A34 A35 A36 A37 A38 A39 A40 A41 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Herbicide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
Months 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 
July 
Aug. 
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
65.00 
16.00 
8.00 
8.00 
2.00 
X 
X 
57.00 
11.00 
8.00 
8.00 
2.00 
X 
X 
X 
65.00 
19.00 
11.00 
8.00 
2.00 
X 
X 
57.00 
14.00 
11.00 
8.00 
2.00 
67.50 
16.00 
8.00 
8-00 
2.00 
X 
X 
X 
59.50 
11.00 
8.00 
8-00 
2.00 
X 
X 
67.50 
19.00 
11.00 
8.00 
2.00 
X 
X 
X 
X 
,59.50 
14.00 
11.00 
8.00 
2.00 
5.40 5.40 5.55 5.55 10.33 10.33 10.48 10.48 
Table 4.14. Labor requirements by month for sesame activities 
J ornales/month/hectare 
Sesame activities 
Activity designation A42 A43 A44 A45 A46 A47 A48 A49 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
Month 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 
July 
Aug. 
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
4.00 
5.00 
9.00 
4.00 
6.00 
.50 
14.00 
X 
4.00 
5.00 
12.00 
X 
X 
4.00 
6.00 
.50 
19.00 
4.50 
11.33 
5.00 
8.50 
X 
4.50 
11.33 
6.00 
.50 
13.00 
X 
X 
4.50 
13.00 
5.00 
11.00 
X 
X 
X 
4.50 
13.00 
6.00 
.50 
17.00 
a^bor requirements are listed for crops grown when tractor power is hired. For additional 
labor requirements used with owned tractor power see Table 4.9. 
Table 4.14 (Continued) 
Jornales/month/hectare 
Sesame activities 
Activity designation A50 A51 A52 A53 A54 A55 A56 A57 
Tractor power* X X X X 
Mule power X X X X 
Fertilizer used X X X X 
Insecticide used X X X X 
Irrigated land (summer) X X X X X X X X 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
Month 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 4.50 4.50 4. 50 4.50 
July 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 11.67 11.67 13. 34 13.34 
Aug. 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 6.67 7.67 6. 67 7.67 
Sept. .50 .50 .50 .50 
Oct. 13.50 19.00 17.30 27.50 12.40 17.00 15. 70 25.00 
Nov. 
Dec. 
Table 4.14 (Continued) 
Jornales/month/hectare 
Sesame activities 
Activity designation A58 A59 A60 A61 A62 A63 A64 A65 
a 
Tractor power X X X X 
Mule power X X X X 
Fertilizer used X X X X 
Insecticide used X X X X 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) X X X X X X X X 
Seasonal land 
Month 
Jan. 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 
Feb. 6.00 6.00 6.00 6 .00 11.67 11.67 13.34 13.34 
Mar. 7.00 8.00 7.00 8 .00 8.67 9.67 8.67 9.67 
April 2.00 2.50 2.00 2 .50 2.00 2.50 2.00 2.50 
May 13.50 19.00 17.30 27 .50 12.40 17.00 15.70 25.00 
June 
July 
Aug. -
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
Table 4.15. Labor requirements by month for sorgo activities 
Jornales/month/hectare 
Sorgo activities 
Activity designation A66 A67 A68 A69 A70 A71 A72 A73 A74 A75 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
Month 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. , 
April I 
May 
June 
July 
Aug. 
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 1.00 
X 
X X 
X X 
X X X  
4.50 4.50 
6.00 6.00 13.33 14.33 
2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1,00 
4.50 4.50 4.50 
4.00 11.33 6.00 6.00 12.33 13.33 
1.00 
L^abor requirements are listed for crops grown when tractor power is hired for additional 
labor requirements used with owned tractor power, see Table 4.9 
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Table 4.16. "Partial" operating capital requirements by month for 
cantaloupe activity* 
Activity designation A1 
Tractor power X 
Mule power 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter X 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
January 
Seed 262.50 
Fertilizer 660.00 
Water 25.00 
Insecticides 94.17 
Application of insecticides 64.00 
Total cost 1105.67 
Cumulative cost 1105.67 
February 
Insecticides 188.34 
Application of insecticides 128.00 
Total cost 316.34 
Cumulative cost 1422.01 
March 
Insecticides 188.34 
Application of insecticides 128.00 
Transportation 180.00 
Total cost 496.34 
Cumulative cost 1918.35 
April 
Insecticides 118.34 
Application of insecticides 64.00 
Transportation 222.00 
Total cost 404.34 
Cumulative cost 2322.69 
Capital requirements do not include labor hiring, interest, or 
tractor hiring. For these costs per unit used see their respective 
section in the text. For capital requirements for operating an owned 
tractor see Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.17. "Partial" operating capital requirements by month for 
cotton activities® 
Cotton activities 
Activity designation A2 A3 A4 A5 
Tractor power X X 
Mule power X X 
Irrigated land (summer) X X X X 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
July 
Seed 66.00 66.00 66.00 66.00 
Fertilizer 573.13 573.13 
Permission to seed 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Defensa agrfcola 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Water 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 
Total cost 124.00 697.13 124.00 697.13 
Cumulative cost 124.00 697.13 124.00 697.13 
August 
Insecticides 142.95 142.95 142.95 142.95 
Application of insecticides 58.00 58.00 58.00 58.00 
Total cost 200.95 200.95 200.95 200.95 
Cumulative cost 324.95 898.08 324.95 898.08 
September 
Insecticides 285.92 285.92 285.92 285.92 
Application of insecticides 116.00 116.00 116.00 116.00 
Total cost 401.92 401.92 401.92 401.92 
Cumulative cost 610.17 1300.00 610.17 1300.00 
October 
Insecticides 285.92 285.92 285.92 285.92 
Application of insecticides 116.00 116.00 116.00 116.00 
Total cost 401.92 401.92 401.92 401.92 
Cumulative cost 1012.09 1701.92 1012.09 1701.92 
"^Partial" capital requirements do not include labor hiring, 
interest, or tractor hiring. For these costs see their respective 
section in the text. For capital requirements for operating an owned 
tractor see Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.17 (Continued) 
Cotton activities 
Activity designation A2 A3 A4 A5 
November 
Insecticides 142.95 142.95 142.95 142.95 
Application of insecticides 58.00 58.00 58.00 58.00 
Total cost 200.95 200,95 200.95 200.95 
Cumulative cost 1213.04 1902.87 1213.04 1902.87 
December 
Transportation 120.00 160.00 96.00 128.00 
Total cost 120.00 160.00 96.00 128.00 
Cumulative cost 1333.04 2062.87 1309.04 2030.87 
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Table 4.18. "Partial" operating capital requirements by month for 
corn activities^ 
Com activities 
Summer cycle 
Activity designation A6 A7 A8 A9 AlO All 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Irrigated land (sum­
mer) 
Irrigated land (win­
ter) 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
June 
Seed 
Fertilizer 
Insecticide 
Water 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 
July 
Insecticide 
Seed 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 
August 
Insecticide 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 
November 
Transportation 
Cargo 
Shelling 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 
X X 
X 
X X X  
15.50 
52.50 52.50 52.50 
52.50 68.00 52.50 
52.50 68.00 52.50 
7.75 
7.75 
52.50 75.75 52.50 
37.60 100.00 26.80 
9.40 25.00 6.70 
18.80 50.00 13.40 
65.80 175.00 45.90 
118.30 250.75 98.40 
X X 
X 
X X 
X 
52.50 52.50 
7.75 
25.00 25.00 
77.50 85.25 
77.50 85.25 
15.50 15.50 
52.50 
68.00 15.50 
68.00 77.50 100.75 
7.75 
7.75 
75.75 77.50 100.75 
76.00 42.50 120.00 
19.00 11.30 30.00 
38.00 22.60 60.00 
133.00 76.40 210.00 
218.75 153.90 310.75 
"Partial" capital requirements do not include labor hiring, interest; 
or tractor hiring. For these costs see their respective sections in the 
text. For capital requirements for operating an owned tractor see 
Table 4.9. 
Table 4.18 (Continued) 
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Com activities 
Summer cycle 
Activity designation A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Irrigated land (sum­
mer) 
Irrigated land (win­
ter) 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
June 
Seed 
Fertilizer 
Insecticide 
Water 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 
July 
Insecticide 
Seed 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 
August 
Insecticide 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 
November 
Transportation 
Cargo 
Shelling 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 
X X 
. X 
X X X 
52.50 52.50 52 .50 
691.05 691.05 
7.75 
25.00 25.00 25 .00 
768.55 776.30 77 .50 
768.55 776.30 77 .50 
15.50 
15.50 
768.55 791.30 77 .50 
768.55 791.80 77 .50 
60.00 160.00 32 .80 
15.00 40.00 8 .20 
30.00 80.00 16, .40 
105.00 280.00 57 .40 
873.55 1071.80 134. 90 
X X X 
X X X 
52.50 52.50 52.50 
691.05 691.05 
7.75 7.75 
25.00 25.00 25.00 
85.25 768.55 776.30 
85.25 768.55 776.30 
15.50 15.50 
15.50 15.50 
100.75 768.55 791.80 
100.75 768.55 791.80 
90.00 45.20 120.00 
22.50 11.30 30.00 
45.00 22.60 60.00 
157.50 79.10 210.00 
258.25 847.65 1001.80 
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Table 4.18 (Continued) 
Corn activities 
Winter cycle 
Activity designation A18 A19 A20 A21 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
X X 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) X X X X 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
December 
Seed 52.50 52.50 52.50 52.50 
Fertilizer 691.05 691.05 
Insecticide 7.75 7.75 
Water 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Total cost 77.50 85.25 768.55 776.30 
Cumulative cost 77.50 85.25 768.55 776.30 
January 
Insecticide 15.50 15.50 
Seed 
Total cost 15.50 15.50 
Cumulative cost 77.50 100.75 768.55 781.80 
February 
Insecticide 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 77.50 100.75 768.55 791.80 
May • • 
Transportation 45.20 120.00 60.00 160.00 
Cargo 11.30 30.00 15.00 40.00 
Shelling 22.60 60.00 30.00 80.00 
Total cost 76.40 210.00 105.00 280.00 
Cumulative cost 153.90 310.75 873.55 1071.80 
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Table 4.18 (Continued) 
Corn activities 
Winter cycle 
Activity designation A22 A23 A24 A25 
Tractor power 
Mule power X X X X 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) X X X X 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
December 
Seed 52.50 52.50 52.50 52.50 
Fertilizer 691.05 691.05 
Insecticide 
Water 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Total cost 77.50 85.25 768.55 776.30 
Cumulative cost 77.50 85.25 768.55 776.30 
January 
Insecticide 15.50 15.50 
Seed 
Total cost 15.50 15.50 
Cumulative cost 77.50 100.75 768.55 791.80 
February 
Insecticide 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 77.50 100.75 768.55 791.80 
May 
Transportation 32.80 90.00 45.20 120.00 
Cargo 8.20 22.50 11.30 30.00 
Shelling 16.40 45.00 22.60 60.00 
Total cost 57.40 157.50 79.10 210.00 
Cumulative cost 134.90 285.25 847.65 1001.80 
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Table 4.19. "Partial" operating capital requirements by month for 
rice activities* 
Rice activities 
Summer cycle 
Activity designation A26 A27 A28 A29 
Tractor power X X X X 
Mule power 
Irrigated land (summer) X X X X 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
June 
Seed 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 
Fertilizer 15.90 15.90 
Water 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 
Total cost 102.00 102.00 117.90 117.90 
Cumulative cost 102.00 102.00 117.90 117.90 
July 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 102.00 102.00 117.90 117.90 
Augus t 
Fertilizer 265.00 265.00 
Herbicide 39.65 39.65 
Total cost 39.65 265.00 304.65 
Cumulative cost 102.00 141.65 382.90 422.55 
September 
Fertilizer 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 102.00 141.65 382.90 422.55 
November 
Harves t 399.48 399.48 469.98 469.98 
Transportation 170.00 170.00 200.00 200.00 
Handling 42.50 42.50 50.00 50.00 
Total cost 611.98 611.98 719.98 719.9% 
Cumulative cost 713.98 753.63 1102.88 1142.53 
"^Partial" operating capital requirements do not include labor 
hiring, interest, or tractor hiring. For these costs see their 
respective sections in the text. For capital requirements for operating 
an owned tractor see Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.19 (Continued) 
Rice activities 
Summer cycle 
Activity designation A30 A31 A32 A33 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
June 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Seed 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 
Fertilizer 15.90 15.90 
Water 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 
Total cost 102.00 102.00 117.90 117.90 
Cumulative cost 102.00 102.00 117.90 117.90 
July 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 102.00 102.00 117.90 117.90 
Augus t 
Fertilizer 265.00 265.00 
Herbicide 39.63 39.65 
Total cost 39.65 265.00 304.65 
Cumulative cost 102.00 141.65 382.90 422.55 
September 
Fertilizer 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 102.00 141.65 382.90 422.55 
November 
Harves t 399.48 399.48 469.98 469.98 
Transportation 170.00 170.00 200.00 200.00 
Handling 42.50 42.50 50.00 50.00 
Total cost 611.98 611.98 719.98 719.98 
Cumulative cost 713.98 753.63 1102.88 1142.53 
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Table 4.19 (Continued) 
Activity designation 
Rice activities 
Winter cycle 
A34 A35 A36 A37 
Tractor power X X X X 
Mule power 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) X X X X 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
December 
Seed 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 
Fertilizer 15.40 15.90 
Water 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 
Total cost 102.00 102.00 117.90 117.90 
Cumulative cost 102.00 102.00 117.90 117.90 
J anuary 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 102.00 102.00 117.90 117.90 
February 
Fertilizer 265.00 265.00 
Herbicide 39.65 39.65 
Total cost 39.65 265.00 304.65 
Cumulative cost 102.00 141.65 382.90 422.55 
March 
Fertilizer 270.00 270.00 
Total cost 270.00 270.00 
Cumulative cost 102.00 141.65 652.90 692.55 
May 
Harvest 319.58 319.58 375.98 375.98 
Transportation 136.00 136.00 160.00 160.00 
Handling 34.00 34.00 40.00 40.00 
Total cost 489.58 489.58 575.98 575.98 
Cumulative cost 591.58 631.23 1128.88 1268.53 
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Table 4.19 (Continued) 
Activity designation 
Rice activities 
Winter cycle 
A38 A39 A40 A41 
Tractor power 
Mule power X X X X 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) X X X X 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
December 
Seed 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 
Fertilizer 15.90 15.90 
Water 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 
Total cost 102.00 102.00 117.90 117.90 
Cumulative cost 102.00 102.00 117.90 117.90 
January 
Total cost 
Cumulative cost 102.00 102.00 117.90 117.90 
February 
Fertilizer 265.00 265.00 
Herbicide 39.65 39.65 
Total cost 39.65 265.00 304.65 
Cumulative cost 102.00 141.65 382.90 422.55 
March 
Fertilizer 270.00 270.00 
Total cost 270.00 270.00 
Cumulative cost 102.00 141.65 652.90 692.55 
November 
Harvest 319.58 319.58 375.98 375.98 
Transportation 136.00 136.00 160.00 160.00 
Handling 34.00 34.00 40.00 40.00 
Total cost 489.58 489.58 575.98 575.98 
Cumulative cost 591.58 631.23 1128.88 1268.53 
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Table 4.20. "Partial" operating capital requirements by month for 
sesame activities 
Activity designation 
Sesame activities 
Summer cycle 
A42 A43 A44 A45 A46 
Tractor power X X X X 
Mule power X 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land X X X X X 
Costs/month 
July 
Seed 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 
Fertilizer 318.00 318.00 
Water 
Total cost 24.00 24.00 342.00 342.00 24.00 
Cumulative cost 24.00 24.00 342.00 342.00 24.00 
August 
Insecticides 49.60 49.60 
Application of insecticides 24.00 24.00 
Total cost 73.60 73.60 
Cumulative cost 24.00 97.60 342.00 415.60 24.00 
September 
Insecticide 24.80 24.80 
Application of insecticides 12.00 12.00 
Total cost 36.80 36.80 
Cumulative cost 24.00 134.40 342.00 452.40 24.00 
October 
Transportation 16.80 28.00 24.00 40.00 15.20 
Handling 4.20 7.00 6.00 10.00 3.80 
Total cost 21.00 35.00 30.00 50.00 19.00 
Cumulative cost 45.00 169.40 372.00 502.40 43.00 
"Partial" operating capital requirements do not include labor 
hiring, interest, or tractor hiring. For these costs see their 
respective sections in the text. For capital requirements for 
operating an owned tractor see Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.20 (Continued) 
Activity designation 
Sesame activities 
Summer cycle 
A47 A48 A49 A50 A51 
Tractor power X X 
Mule power X X X 
Irrigated land (summer) X X 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land X X X 
Costs/month 
July 
Seed 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 
Fertilizer 318.00 318.00 
Water 25.00 25.00 
Total cost 24.00 342.00 342.00 49.00 49.00 
Cumulative cost 24.00 342.00 342.00 49.00 49.00 
August 
Insecticides 49.60 49.60 49.60 
Application of 
insecticides 24.00 24.00 24.00 
Total cost 73.60 73.60 73.60 
Cumulative cost 97.60 342.00 415.60 49.00 122.60 
September 
Insecticide 24.80 24.80 24.80 
Application of 
insecticides 12.00 12.00 12.00 
Total cost 36.80 36.80 36.80 
Cumulative cost 134.40 342.00 452.40 49.00 159.40 
October 
Transportation 25.20 20.80 36.00 27.00 40.00 
Handling 6.30 5.20 9.00 6.75 10.00 
Total cost 31.50 26.00 45.00 33.75 50.00 
Cumulative cost 165.90 368.00 497.40 82.75 209.40 
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Table 4.20 (Continued) 
Sesame activities 
Summer cycle 
Activity designation A52 A53 A54 A55 A56 A57 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Irrigated land 
mer) 
Irrigated land 
ter) 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
July 
Seed 24. 00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 
Fertilizer 318. 00 318.00 318.00 318.00 
Water 25. 00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Total cost 367. 00 367.00 49.00 49.00 367.00 367.00 
Cumulative cost 367. ,00 367.00 49.00 49.00 367.00 367.00 
August 
Insecticides 49.60 49.60 49.60 
Application of 
insecticides 24.00 24.00 24.00 
Total cost 73.60 73.60 73.60 
Cumulative cost 367. 00 440.60 49.00 122.60 367.00 440.60 
September 
Insecticide 24.80 24.80 24.80 
Application of 
insecticides 12.00 12.00 12.00 
Total cost 36.80 36.80 36.80 
Cumulative cost 367. 00 477.40 49.00 159.40 367.00 477.40 
October 
Transportation 36. 00 60.00 24.40 36.00 32.40 54.00 
Handling 9. 00 15.00 6.10 9.00 8.10 13.50 
Total cost 45. 00 75.00 30.50 45.00 40.50 67.50 
Cumulative cost 412. 00 552.40 79.50 204.40 407.50 544.90 
X 
(sum-
(win-
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Table 4.20 (Continued) 
Sesame activities 
Winter cycle 
Activity designation A58 A59 A60 A61 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
February 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
Seed 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 
Fertilizer 318.00 318.00 
Water 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Total cost 49.00 49.00 367.00 367.00 
Cumulative cost 49.00 49.00 367.00 367.00 
March 
Insecticides 49.60 49.60 
Application of insecticides 24.00 24.00 
Total cost 73.60 73.60 
Cumulative cost 49.00 122.60 367.00 440.60 
April 
Insecticide 24.80 24.80 
Application of insecticides 12.00 12.00 
Total cost 36.80 36.80 
Cumulative cost 49.00 159.40 367.00 477.40 
May 
Transportation 27.00 40.00 36.00 60.00 
Handling 6.75 10.00 9.00 15.00 
Total cost 33.75 50.00 45.00 75.00 
Cumulative cost 82.75 209.40 412.00 552.40 
146 
Table 4.20 (Continued) 
Sesame activities 
Winter cycle 
Activity designation A62 A63 A64 A65 
Tractor power 
Mule power X X X X 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) X X X X 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
February 
Seed 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 
Fertilizer 318.00 318.00 
Water 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Total cost 49.00 49.00 367.00 367.00 
Cumulative cost 49.00 49.00 367.00 367.00 
March 
Insecticides 49.60 49.60 
Application of insecticides 24.00 24.00 
Total cost 73.60 73.60 
Cumulative cost 49.00 122.60 367.00 440.60 
April 
Insecticide 24.80 24.80 
Application of insecticides 12.00 12.00 
Total cost 36.80 36.80 
Cumulative cost 49.00 159.40 367.00 477.40 
May 
Transportation 24.40 36.00 32.40 54.00 
Handling 6.10 9.00 8.10 13.50 
Total cost 30.50 45.00 40.50 67.50 
Cumulative cost 79.50 204.40 407.50 544.90 
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Table 4.21. "Partial operating capital requirements by month for 
sorgo activities^  
Sorgo activities 
Activity designation A66 
Summer cycle 
A67 A68 A69 A70 A71 
Tractor power owned 
Tractor power hired X X X 
Mule power X X X 
Irrigated land (summer) X X X X 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land X X 
Costs/month 
July 
Seed 40. 00 40.00 40. 00 40. 00 40. 00 40. 00 
Water 25. 00 25. 00 25. 00 25. 00 
Fertilizer 472. 13 472. 13 
Total cost 40. 00 40.00 65. 00 537. 13 65. 00 537. 13 
Cumulative cost 40. 00 40.00 65. 00 537. 13 65. 00 537. 13 
October^  
Harvesting 140. 00 140.00 160. 00 180. 00 140. 00 180. 00 
Transportation 120. 00 90.00 140. 00 200. 00 110. 00 150. 00 
Handling 30. 00 24.75 35. 00 50. 00 27. 50 37. 50 
Total cost 290. 00 254.75 335. 00 430. 00 277. 50 367. 50 
Cumulative cost 330. 00 294.75 400. 00 967. 13 342. 50 904. 63 
"Partial" operating capital requirements do not include labor 
hiring, interest, or tractor hiring. For these costs see their 
respective sections in the text. For capital requirements for operating 
an owned tractor see Table 4.9. 
F^or activities using seasonal land, A66 and A67, this month should 
read November. 
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Table 4.21 (Continued) 
Activity designation 
Sorgo activities 
Winter cycle 
ÈJ1 A73 A74 A75 
Tractor power owned 
Tractor power hired 
Mule power 
X 
X X 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) X X X X 
Seasonal land 
Costs/month 
February 
Seed 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 
Water 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Fertilizer 472.13 472.13 
Total cost 65.00 537.13 65.00 537.13 
Cumulative cost 65.00 537.13 65.00 537.13 
May 
Harves ting 160.00 180.00 140.00 180.00 
Transportation 140.00 200.00 110.00 150.00 
Handling 35.00 50.00 27.50 37.50 
Total cost 335.00 430.00 277.50 367.50 
Cumulative cost 400.00 967.13 342.50 904.63 
Table 4.22. Yields, prices, gross revenues, sales taxes and net returns over "partial" operating 
capital requirements for cantaloupe, cotton, and sorgo activities 
Activities 
Cantaloupe Sorgo 
Activity designation A1 A66 A67 A68 A69 
X 
X 
X 
17.712 
$ 714.45 
$12654.34 
$ 637.63 
3.000 
$ 665.15 
$1995.45 
$ 72.00 
2.250 
$ 665.15 
$1496.59 
$ 54.00 
X 
3.500 
$ 665.15 
$2328.03 
$ 84.00 
X 
X 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
(1) Yield (metric tons/hectare) 
(2) Price (pesos/metric ton) 
(3) Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x (2) 
(4) Sales tax 
(5) Cotton ginning fees 
(6) Partial operating capital 
requirements* 
(7) Net returns over partial 
operating capital requirements, 
sales tax and cotton ginning 
fees^  
(7) = (3) - [(4) + (5) + (6)] $9694.02 $1593.45 $1147.84 $1844.03 $2238-62 
5.000 
$ 665.15 
$3325.75 
$ 120.00 
$2322.69 $ 330.00 $ 294.75 $ 400.00 $ 967.13 
S^ource; Tables 4.16, 4.17, and 4.21 
b. 
Value used in linear program objective function for each activity 
Table 4.22 (Continued) 
Activities 
Sorgo 
Activity designation A70 A71 A72 A73 A74 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
(1) Yield (metric tons/hectare) 
(2) Price (pesos/metric ton) 
(3) Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x (2) 
(4) Sales tax 
(5) Cotton ginning fees 
(6) Partial operating capital 
requirements^  
(7) Net returns over partial 
operating capital requirements, 
sales tax and cotton ginning 
fees^  
(7) = (3) - C(4) + (5) + (6)] 
X X 
X 
2.750 3.750 3.500 
$ 665.15 $ 665.15 $ 665.15 
$1829.16 $2494.31 $2328.03 
$ 66.00 $ 90.00 $ 84.00 
X 
X 
5.000 
$ 665.15 
$3325.75 
$ 120.00 
X 
2.750 
$ 665.15 
$1829.16 
$ 66.00 
$ 342.50 $ 904.63 $ 400.00 $ 967.13 $ 342.50 
$1420.66 $1499.68 $1844.03 $2238.62 $1420.66 
Table 4.22 (Continued) 
Activities 
Sorgo Cotton 
Activity designation A75 A2 A3 A4 A5 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
(1) Yield (metric tons/hectare) 
(2) Price (pesos/metric ton) 
(3) Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x (2) 
(4) Sales tax 
(5) Cotton ginning fees 
(6) Partial operating capital 
requirements^  
(7) Net returns over partial 
operating capital requirements', 
sales tax and cotton ginning 
fees^  
(7) = (3) - [(4) + (5) + (6)] 
X 
X 
3.750 
$ 665.15 
$2494.31 
$ 90.00 
X 
X 
3.000 
$2647.60 
$7942.80 
$ 72.00 
$1668.30 
X 
X 
X 
X 
4.000 
$ 2647.60 
$10590.40 
$ 83.98 
$ 2224.40 
X 
X 
2.400 
$2647.60 
$6354.24 
$ 57.60 
$1334.64 
X 
X 
X 
X 
3.200 
$2647.60 
$8472.32 
$ 76.82 
$1779.52 
$ 904.63 $1333.04 $ 2062.87 $1309.04 $2030.87 
$1499.68 $4869.16 $ 6219.15 $3652.96 $4585.11 
Table 4.23. Yields, prices, gross revenues, sales taxes, and net returns over "partial" operating 
requirements for corn activities 
Activity designation 
Com 
A6 A7 A8 A9 AlO 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
(1) Yield, (metric tons/hectare) 
(2) Price, (pesos/metric ton) 
(3) Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x 
(4) Sales tax? 
(5) Partialoperating capital 
requirements 
(6) Net returns over partial 
operating capital requirements 
and sales tax^  
(6) = (3) - [(4) + (5)] 
(2) 
X 
0.940 
$ 841.71 
$ 791.21 
2.500 
$ 841.71 
$2104.28 
X 
0.670 
$ 841.71 
$ 563.94 
X 
1.900 
$ 841.71 
$1599.25 
X 
1.130 
$ 841.71 
$ 951.13 
$ 118.30 $ 250.75 $ 98.40 $ 218.75 $ 153.90 
$ 672.91 $1853.53 $ 465.54 $1380.50 $ 797.23 
39.56 105.21 28.20 80.00 47.55 
C^orn has no sales tax 
S^ource: Table 4.18 
V^alue used in linear program objective function 
Table 4.23 (Continued) 
Corn 
Activity designation All A12 A13 A14 A15 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
(1) Yield, (metric tons/hectare) 
(2) Price, (pesos/metric ton) 
(3) Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x (2) 
(4) Sales tax® 
(5) Partial operating capital 
requirements^  
(6) Net returns over partial 
operating capital requirements 
and sales ta^ f 
(6) = (3) - [(4) + (5)3 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
3.000 1.500 4.000 
$ 841.71 $ 841.71 $ 841.71 
$2525.13 $1262.57 $3366.89 
X 
X 
0.820 
$ 841.71 
$ 690,00 
X 
X 
2.250 
$ 841.71 
$1893.85 
$ 310.75 $ 873.55 $1071.80 $ 134.90 $ 285.25 
$2214.83 $ 389.02 $2295.04 $ 555.10 $1608.60 
126.26 63.13 168.34 34.50 94.70 
Table 4.23 (Continued) 
Activity designation 
Corn 
A16 A17 A18 AI9 A20 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
(1) Yield, (metric tons/hectare) 
(2) Price, (pesos/metric ton) 
(3) Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x (2) 
(4) Sales tax® 
(5) Partial operating capital 
requirements 
(6) Net returns over partial 
operating capital requirements 
and sales tax^  
(6) = (3) - [(4) + (5)] 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1.130 3.000 1.130 
$ 841.71 $ 841.71 $ 841.71 
$ 951.13 $2525.13 $ 951.13 
X X 
X 
X 
X X 
3-000 1.500 
$ 841.71 $ 841.71 
$2525.13 $1262.57 
$ 847.65 $1001.80 $ 153.90 $ 310.75 $ 873.55 
$ 103.48 $1523.33 $ 797.23 $2214.83 $ 389.02 
47.56 126.26 
Table 4.23 (Continued) 
Corn 
Activity designation A21 A22 A23 A24 A25 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Yield, (metric tons/hectare) 
Price, (pesos/metric ton) 
Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x (2) 
Sales tax^  
Partial operating capital 
requirements 
Net returns over partial 
operating capital requirements 
and sales tax^  
(6) = (3) - [(4) + (5)] 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
2.250 4.000 0.820 
$ 841.71 $ 841.71 $ 841.71 
$3366.84 $ 690.20 $1893.85 
X 
X 
1-130 
$ 841.71 
$ 951.13 
X 
X 
X 
3.000 
$ 841.71 
$2525.13 
$1071.80 $ 134.90 $ 285.25 $ 847.65 $1001.80 
$2295.04 $ 555.10 $1608.60 $ 103.48 $1523.33 
Table 4.24. Yields, prices, gross revenues, sales taxes, and net returns over "partial" 
operating capital requirements for rice activities 
Rice 
Activity designation A26 A27 A28 A29 A30 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Herbicide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
(1) Yield (metric tons/hectare) 
(2) Price (pesos/metric ton) 
O") Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x (2) 
(4) Sales tax 
(5) Partial operating capital 
requirements ^ 
(6) Net returns over partial 
operating capital requirements 
and sales tax^  
(6) = (3) - [(4) + (5)] 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
4.250 4.250 5.000 
$ 939.95 $ 939.95 $ 939.95 
$3994.79 $3994.79 $4699.75 
$ 204.00 $ 204.00 $ 240.00 
X 
X 
X 
5.000 
$ 939.95 
$4699.75 
$ 240.00 
4.250 
$ 939.95 
$3994.79 
$ 204.00 
$ 713.98 $ 753.63 $1102.88 $1142.53 $ 713.98 
$3076.81 $3037.16 $3356.87 $3317.22 $3076.81 
S^ource; Table 4.19 
V^alue used in linear program objective function 
Table 4.24 (Continued) 
Rice 
Activity designation A31 A32 A33 A34 A35 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Herbicide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
(1) Yield (metric tons/hectare) 
(2) Price (pesos/metric ton) 
(3) Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x (2) 
(4) Sales tax 
(5) Partial operating capital 
requirements ^ 
(6) Net returns over partial 
operating capital requirements 
and sales tax^  
(6) = (3) - [(4) + (5)] 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
4.250 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
5.000 5.000 3..400 3.400 
$ 939.95 $ 939.95 $ 939.95 $ 939.95 $ 939.95 
$3994.79 $4699.75 $4699.75 $3195.83 $3195.83 
$ 204.00 $ 240.00 $ 240.00 $ 163.20 $ 163.20 
$ 753.63 $1102.88 $1142.53 $ 591.58 $ 631.23 
$3037.16 $3356.87 $3317.22 $2441.05 $2401.40 
Table 4.24 (Continued) 
Rice 
Activity designation A36 A37 A38 A39 A40 A41 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Herbicide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
(1) Yield (metric tons/hectare) 
(2) Price (pesos/metric ton) 
(3) Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x (2) 
(4) Sales tax 
(5) Partial operating capital 
requirement s ^ 
(6) Net returns over partial 
operating capital requirements 
and sales tax^  
(6) = (3) - C(4) + (5)] 
X 
X 
4.000 
X 
X 
X 
4.000 
X 
3.400 
X 
X 
X 
3.400 
X 
X 
4.000 
X 
X 
X 
4.000 
$ 939.95 $ 939.95 $ 939.95 $ 939.95 $ 939.95 $ 939.95 
$3759.80 $3759.80 $3195.83 $3195.83 $3759.80 $3759.80 
$ 192.00 $ 192.00 $ 163.20 $ 163.20 $ 192.00 $ 192.00 
$1128.88 $1268.53 $ 591.58 $ 631.23 $1128.88 $1268.53 
$2438.92 $2299.27 $2441.05 $2401.40 $2438.92 $2299.27 
Table 4.25. Yields, prices, gross revenues, sales taxes, and net returns over "partial" 
operating capital requirements for sesame activities 
Sesame 
Activity designation A42 A43 A44 A45 A46 A47 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Seasonal land X X X X X X 
(1) Yield (metric tons/hectare) 0.420 0.700 0.600 1.000 0.380 0.630 
(2) Price (pesos/metric ton) $2324.96 $2324.96 $2324. 96 $2324.96 $2324. 96 $2324.96 
(3) Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x (2) $ 976.48 $1627.47 $1394. 98 $2324.96 $ 883. 48 $1464.72 
(4) Sales tax $ 40.32 $ 67.20 $ 57. 60 $ 96.00 $ 36. 48 $ 60.48 
(5) Partial operating capital 
requirements® $ 45.00 $ 169.40 $ 372. 00 $ 502.40 $ 43. 00 $ 165.90 
(6) Net returns over partial 
operating capital require­
ments and sales tax^  
(6) = (3) - C(4) + (5)] $ 891.16 $1390.87 $ 965. 38 $1726.56 $ 754. 00 $1238.34 
S^ource: Table 4.20 
V^alue used in linear program objective function 
I 
Table 4.25 (Continued) 
Sesame 
Activity designation A48 A49 A50 A51 A52 A53 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
(1) Yield (metric tons/hectare) 
(2) Price (pesos/metric ton) 
(3) Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x 
(4) Sales tax 
(5) Partial operating capital 
requirements* 
(6) Net returns over partial 
operating capital require­
ments and sales tax^  
(6) = (3) - [(4) + (5)] 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
0.520 0.900 0.675 1.000 
X 
X 
X 
0.900 
X 
X 
X 
1.500 
$2324.96 $2324.96 $2324.96 $2324.96 $2324.96 $2324.96 
(2) $1208.98 $2092.46 $1569.35 $2324.96 $2092.46 $3487.44 
$ 49.92 $ 86.40 $ 64.80 $ 96.00 $ 86.40 $ 144.00 
$ 368.00 $ 497.40 $ 82.75 $ 209.40 $ 412.00 $ 552.40 
$ 791.06 $1508.66 $1421.80 $2018.86 $1594.06 $2791.04 
a\ 
o 
Table 4.25 (Continued) 
Sesame 
Activity designation A54 A55 A56 A57 A58 A59 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
(1) Yield (metric tons/hectare) 
(2) Price (pesos/metrie ton) 
(3) Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x 
(4) Sales tax 
(5) Partial operating capital 
requirements* 
(6) Net returns over partial 
operating capital require­
ments and sales tax^  
(6) = (3) - [(4) + (5)] 
X X 
X 
0.610 
X 
X 
0.900 0.810 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1.350 0.675 
X 
X 
1.000 
$2324.96 $2324.96 $2324.96 $2324.96 $2324.96 $2324.96 
(2) $1418.23 $2092.46 $1883.22 $3138.70 $1569.35 $2324.96 
$ 58.26 $ 86.40 $ 77.76 $ 129.60 $ 64,80 $ 96.00 
$ 79.50 $ 204.40 $ 407.50 $ 544.90 $ 82.75 $ 209.40 
$1280.47 $1801.66 $1397.96 $2464.20 $1421.80 $2018.86 
Table 4.25 (Continued) 
Sesame 
Activity designation A60 A61 A62 A63 A64 A65 
Tractor power 
Mule power 
Fertilizer used 
Insecticide used 
Irrigated land (summer) 
Irrigated land (winter) 
Seasonal land 
(1) Yield (metric tons/hectare) 
(2) Price (pesos/metric ton) 
O) Gross revenue, (3) = (1) x 
(4) Sales tax 
(5) Partial operating capital 
requirements ^ 
(6) Net returns over partial 
operating capital require­
ments and sales tax^  
(6) = (3) - [(4) + (5)] 
X 
X 
0.900 
X 
X 
1.500 0.610 
X 
X 
X 
0,900 
X 
X 
0.810 
X 
X 
X 
1.350 
$2324.96 $2324.96 $2324.96 $2324.96 $2324.96 $2324.96 
(2) $2092.46 $3487.44 $1418.23 $2092.46 $1883.22 $3138.70 
$ 86.40 $ 144.00 $ 58.56 $ 86.40 $ 77.76 $ 129.60 
$ 412.00 $ 552.40 $ 79.50 $ 204.40 $ 407.50 $ 544.90 
$1594.06 $2791.04 $1280.47 $1801.66 $1397.96 $2464.20 
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services or costs of operating and maintaining an owned tractor, costs of 
feeding the mules or horses, nor interest costs. These "other" costs, 
when needed to bring an activity into production, are automatically 
subtracted from gross revenue by the linear program in order to give a 
true net revenue over variable costs. The capital requirements other than 
for consumption and livestock operations are discussed below. 
Product Prices 
The product prices are assumed to be the same for all representative 
farm firms. It is assumed that each farmer used a simple price expecta­
tions model where the expected price of a given product was equal to an 
average of this product's precio rural (rural price) over the last five 
years, 1960-61 through 1964-65. Table 4.26 gives these prices in the zone 
as reported by the Secretary of Water Resources. 
The Federal Government guarantees the price of corn at $940 per 
metric ton. Data in the table shows, however, that the rural price does 
not average this high. This is because the government has a quota for 
purchasing corn at this price and all farmers cannot expect to receive the 
fixed price. Secondly, deductions are made for less-than-standard quality 
27 
corn and this also can keep the farmer from receiving the fixed price . 
Therefore the average price is assumed. 
The above prices are not reported by seasons or months. It is 
27 These two reasons were generally conveyed through conversations 
with farmers and other knowledgable persons during the field investiga­
tion. 
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Table 4.26. Rural prices of crops studied in the region of Apatzing^ n 
by year, 1960-61 through 1964-65* 
Pesos/metric ton 
Year Crop 
Cantaloupe Com Cotton Rice Sesame Sorgo 
1960-61 643.36 788.91 2888.00 844. 78 2457.79 630.30 
1961-62 -b 803.70 3000.00 1000. 00 1173.08 _b 
1962-63 -b 800.00 2350.00 900. 00 _b _b 
1963-64 750.00 909.55 2500.00 955. 00 2719.00 700.00 
1964-65 750.00 906.41 2500.00 1000. 00 2950.00 _b 
Mean^  714.45 841.71 2647.60 939. 75 2324.96 665.15 
S^ource; Secretaria de Recursos Hidr^ ulicos. Departamento de 
Estadistica (56). 
P^rices not reported for these years 
'^ eans computed on basis of years price reported 
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assumed that seasonal variation is not significant and that crops grown 
in the summer or winter cycles can be sold at the same price. In the 
case of cantaloupe the date of harvest is planned to coincide with the 
strong demand for cantaloupe imports by the United States. Not all 
melons are suitable for export. Those that do not meet the standards are 
sold on the local market. The price used represents an average price for 
28 
both the national and export markets . 
Factor Prices 
The factor prices for almost all resources in the region are well 
established by law or competition. The prices the representative 
farmers must pay for the factors of production are assumed to be uniform 
for all farmers except in the case of interest charges. Interest costs 
depend upon the particular lender under consideration. It is further 
assumed that the farmer has complete knowledge of the factor prices and 
expects that these prices will not change during the year. Therefore 
current 1966 factor prices are used. 
Seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, fungicides and herbicides 
These resources are available from the several local merchants and 
dealers in the zone. Some seeds are sold through the Federal Govern­
ment's improved seed program. Competition has established uniform 
precios pdblicos (public prices) among the dealers. It is assumed that 
28 This procedure was judged to be satisfactory by local persons 
interviewed in 1966 during the field investigation. 
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these are the prices paid by all of the representative farmers for these 
resources. The Banco Eiidal and Banco Aerfcola and the cotton gins 
purchase the materials at lower price in bulk quantities and then can 
lend them to their borrowers as credit in kind at a price different from 
the public price. Transactions for cash can also receive a discount. Any 
deviations such as these from the public price are eliminated by the above 
assumption. Where the farmer's creditor lends him the merchandise valued 
at less than public price the demand for credit and marginal value 
productivity of credit will be overstated and where his price is higher 
the demand and marginal value productivity will be understated. 
Table 4.27 shows the cost per hectare of the various resources as 
determined in the field investigation through interviews with local 
merchants and dealers, in the city of Apatzing^ n.^  ^
Irrigation water 
The Irrigation Commission has fixed fees which the farmer must pay 
in order to irrigate a hectare of each crop he grows under irrigation. 
These fees are determined on the basis of the estimated amount of water 
that will be used in growing the crop. The basic charge is $25.00 per 
30 
hectare for one liter of water per second. It is assumed that all 
29 
Prices were obtained from at least three dealers for each resource 
whenever possible. The price actually employed was the mode, if one 
existed, or the highest price. The prices reported were found to be very 
uniform among dealers. 
^^ Ing. C^ sar Castilla P^ rez, Gerente del Distrito, de Riego 
Tepalcatepec, Comision del Rio Balsas, Apatzing^ n, Michoacin. Costos de 
riego. Private communication. 1966. 
Table 4.27. Cost of seed, fertilizer, insecticide, herbicide, and fuqgicide by crop in the region 
of Apatzing^ n in 1966 
Item and Crop Cost/hectare Quantity/hectare 
Seeds 
cantaloupe 
corn 
cotton 
rice transplanted 
sesame 
sorgo 
Fertilizer 
cantaloupe 
com 
cotton 
rice (summer) 
rice (winter) 
sesame 
sorgo 
Insecticide, furgicides, 
and herbicides 
cantaloupe 
com 
cotton 
rice 
sesame 
$ 262.50 
52.50 
66.00 
27.00 
24.00 
40.00 
$1024.38 
691.05 
573.13 
265.00 
530.00 
318.00 
472.13 
565.00 
23.25 
875.00 
39.65 
74.40 
7 lbs. La Imperial 
15 Kgs. H-507 
30 Kgs. Delta Fine L. S. 
4.33 Kgs. Jojulla me1orado 
4 Kgs. Instituto #71 + $8.00 Clorana (seed treatment) 
10 Kgs. DeKalb 50-A 
48-98-48 and 275 Kgs. of amonimun nitrate 33.5% 
120-80-0 
80-80-0 
200 Kgs. of amonium nitrate 33.5% + 80-0-0 for almacigo^  
The summer dosage plus 150 Kg. of urea 
80—0—0 
80-60-0 
17 applications of various insecticides and fungicides 
15 Kgs. DDT 10% 
18 applications of various insecticides 
1 liter Estam 50 
60 Kgs. Folidol 2% 
C^ost/hectare incorporates 1/20 cost of one hectare of the almacigo (seedbed) because each 
hectare of the almacigo transplants 20 hectares of rice 
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Table 4.28. Irrigation water costs per cycle for selected crops in the 
region of Apatzingin in 1966® 
pesos/ha. 
Crop Cost 
Cantaloupe $25.00 
Corn $25.00 
Cotton $50.00 
Rice $75.00 
Sesame $25.00 
Sorgo $25.00 
S^ource; Ing. C^ sar Castilla P^ rez, Gerente del Distrito de Riego 
Tepalcatepec, Comisfon del Rjfo Balsas, Apatzing^ n, Michoac^ n. Costos 
de riego. Private communication. 1966. 
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representative fanners with irrigation pay the fixed costs per hectare 
of crop as shown in Table 4.28. 
The farmer also must assume responsibility for the maintenance of 
irrigation ditches on his premises. The Irrigation Commission assumes 
responsibilities for all main irrigation canals. 
Transportation 
It is assumed that the representative farmers hire the transportation 
of their crop to the market. The distance from the farm to the market 
is assumed to be of medium length for the area. Based upon information 
gained in the field study the cost of trucking services is figured at 
$40.00 per metric ton of material hauled and an additional $10.00 per 
metric ton for loading and unloading. 
Crop insurance 
Although the Federal Government has established a crop and livestock 
insurance program it is assumed that the representative farmers do not 
take part in it for the following reasons. The insurance program covers 
only certain crops that are specified by the Secretary of Agriculture. 
All of the crop activities in this study are not covered and therefore 
the results of the linear programming could easily contain a mixture of 
insured and non-insured crops. This result would have definite implica­
tions on the individual farmer's aversion to uncertainty but it would be 
hard to separate the money spent on insured crops and non-insured crops 
in order to say anything about uncertainty aversion. Secondly, because 
premiums must be paid on the insured crops the program would be biased 
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against them because of their additional costs. 
Table 4.29 lists the premiums for crop insurance for the eiidatarios 
and peauencB propietarios in the two municipios for the winter and summer 
31 
cycles of 1966-67 and 1967 respectively. Inasmuch as the farmers want 
to purchase or are required to purchase crop insurance as in the case of 
loans from the Banco Ejidal or Banco Aerfcola, the farmer's demand for 
credit will be understated. In addition, the marginal value product of 
the credit will be overstated without taking account of uncertainty 
aversion. 
Labor 
The representative farmers are assumed to be able to hire additional 
day labor at the rate of $18.50 per iornal (eight hour working day). 
This is the minimum wage fixed by law for agricultural labor in the 
zone (51). In the field investigation it was observed that this is more 
or less the going wage in the region for day laborers. In some instances 
they are paid by piece work but it would appear to average out about the 
same for an eight hour day. 
The representative farm of the pegueno propietario has two regular 
employees. It is assumed that these two men each work 12 months a year 
and receive a salary of $1,110 per month and a bonus at Christmastime 
of $500. These men receive higher wages than the daily help because they 
can operate the tractor and serve as foremen in addition to doing the 
31 
The premiums for summer cycle of 1967 are used as proxies of the 
1966 summer cycle. 
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Table 4.29. Crop insurance premiums for selected crops in the region 
of Apatzing^n 1966-1967* 
y With Without 
Crop fertilizer fertilizer Premium (pesos) paid by: 
elidatario p'ropietario 
1966/67 Aeaas cycle 
Corn X $ 37.50 $ 45.00 
Corn X 22.00 27.00 
Rice transplanted X 104.00 130.00 
Rice transplanted X 76.00 95.00 
1967/67 Aguas cycle 
Corn X $ 57.50 $ 69.00 
Com X 30.00 36.00 
Corn seasonal X 37.50 45.00 
Com seasonal X 22.50 27.00 
Cotton X 185.00 222.00 
Rice transplanted X 73.50 94.50 
Rice transplanted X 54.25 69.75 
Sesame X 22.00 27.50 
Sesame seasonal X 25.00 35.00 
Sorgo seasonal X 38.25 46.75 
Sorgo seasonal X 24.75 30.25 
^Source: Aseguradora Nacional Agricoleky Ganadera, S. A. (3) 
'All 
specified 
^ crops are assumed to be irrigated by gravity unless otherwise 
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regular farm work. 
Machinery 
Tractors The representative farms are assumed to be able to hire 
tractor services to supplement their own tractor power or horse and mule 
team power. Table 4.30 shows the standard rates per hectare in the zone 
for hiring tractor services to do specific operations as determined in the 
field investigation. It was determined that the average cost per hour of 
32 
hiring services was $32.45 . The farmer does not need to furnish any 
labor for tractor operation because the tractor owner furnishes the 
tractor, equipment, operator and fuel and oil. 
The pequeno propietario owns a 46 horsepower tractor. The operating 
costs per hour were determined to be $2.34 to cover oil and gasoline. 
Costs for repairs and regular lubrication were also computed on the basis 
of expected hours of operation because it is assumed that the farmer will 
have to make these repairs and services more or less as he uses the 
tractor. These accounted for an additional average expense of $2.12 per 
hour, The total of these costs and operating costs is $4.46 which is 
assumed to be the hourly cost of operation. The fixed costs of ownership 
33 
are due to depreciation and are assumed to be $6,050.00 
32 
This cost was determined by summing the hours of tractor use per 
hectare for all crops and then dividing this sum by the total cost per 
hectare of hiring tractor services. 
33 
These figures were determined on the basis of information obtained 
in an interview in 1966 with Ing. David Pena Guzman, Gerente, Centro de 
Administramiento 2 Instructores en Maquinaria Agrfcola, Chapingo, Mexico. 
To compute hourly costs, it was assumed the tractor was operated about 
1,000 hours a year. 
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Table 4.30. Costs of hiring tractor and related equipment services for 
various operations in the region of Apatzingin 1966 
Pesos/hectare 
Operation Cost/hectare 
Barbecho (disk plowing) $ 120.00 
Cruza (cross disk plowing) $ 120.00 
Rastreo (disk harrowing) $ 60.00 
Siembra (planting with or 
without fertilizer) $ 80.00 
Cultivo (cultivation) $ 50.00 
Escadada (lay by 
cultivation) $ 50.00 
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Application of insecticides It is the custom in the zone to apply 
insecticides and funicides to cotton, sesame and cantaloupe by airplane 
except where they are grown in small plots. This is the manner of applica­
tion assumed in this study. For small fields it is assumed that the farm­
er could spray at approximately the same cost with a hand sprayer or 
tractor operated sprayer. The costs of application by plane are $.60 per 
kilogram of dust and $.50 per kilogram of liquid spray. The dust is 
usually applied in the form purchased but the liquid spray concentrate is 
mixed with about 60-70 liters of water in order to formulate the proper 
dosage of spray per hectare. 
The herbicides applied to rice are assumed to be applied by hand with 
a hand pump and the insecticides for corn are also assumed to be applied 
by hand. 
Planting, fertilizing, and cultivating Planting, fertilization 
and cultivation operations are assumed to be done by tractor mounted 
machinery when associated with activities using machinery power. For 
activities using mule or horse team power these operations are done by 
hand. 
Harvesting Harvesting operations are done by hand except in the 
cases of rice and sorgo where a combine is assumed to be used. For the 
rice harvest the cost is assumed to be ten percent of the value of the 
harvest valued at rural prices. Sorgo is harvested at charges of $140 
to $180 per hectare depending on the size of harvest. Corn is assumed 
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to be shelled before it is sold at a cost of $20.00 per ton^^. 
Interest costs The representative farmers are assumed to pay the 
interest costs charged by the particular lender under consideration. 
These rates are specified in the following chapter dealing with agricul­
tural credit in the two municipios. 
Special costs associated with cotton 
The representative farmer must secure permission from the Federal 
Government to plant cotton if he chooses to grow this crop. There is a 
fee assessed of $5.00 per hectare. This fee is used to offset the costs 
of the Defensa AgrjCcola to insure that serious infestations of insects and 
diseases are not permitted to develop so as to become a danger to other 
35 farmers . In addition they must pay a fixed fee per hectare to the 
Asociacfon de Aleodoneros (Cotton Growers Association) to which they 
belong. The propietarios have their own association and the fee is $6.00 
per hectare. The eiidatarios have another and the fee is $3.00 per 
^ ^ 36 
hectare . 
At the time of delivery of the crop to the gin a fee of $830.00 per 
^^This information on harvesting and shelling was obtained during the 
field investigation by visits with farmers and other knowledgable persons. 
35 
This information was obtained in an interview in 1966 with Ing. 
Hector Montez, Gerente, Agencia de la Secretarfa de Agricultura ^  
Ganaderia, Apatzingin, MichoacZn. 
^^This information was obtained in an interview in 1966 with Don 
Roberto Ruiz del Rio, Prèsidente Asociacion del Algodoneros, Apatzing^n, 
Michoac^n. 
176 
37 
metric ton of fiber is paid for ginning . 
Taxes 
The representative farmer as a producer is subject to three taxes. 
The first is the impuesto de compra de venta (sales tax), assessed him at 
the time of sale of his produce. These taxes listed by the product sold 
are shown in Table 4.31. It is assumed in this study that the farmer pays 
this tax on all of his production since it is assumed that he sells all 
of his produce. 
The second tax is the impuesto a la propiedad raiz (real estate tax). 
The pedueno propietario pays this tax on the basis of a fixed rate per one 
38 
thousand peso value of the valor catastral of his land . The rate 
applicable for a representative farm of the pequeno propietario is $18.00 
per $1,000.00 valor catastral. Land that is farmable but is not cultivat-
39 
ed or used without a just cause can be assessed a 25 percent higher rate . 
It is assumed in this study, however, that this penalty is not applicable 
for any land left idle. 
The eiidatario does not own his land but is expected to pay an 
37 
This information was obtained in an interview in 1966 with Dr. 
Alfonso Hernandez V., Gerente, Despepitadora ApatzingAi, S.A., Apatzingin, 
Michoac^n. 
38 
The valor catastral is 40 percent of the actual value of the land. 
^^Ing. Hector Langarita, Gerente de la Oficina de Rentas, Apatzingin, 
Michoacin. Ley de ingresos que regirin en el ano de 1966. Private 
communication. 1966. 
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Table 4.31. Tax rates for sales taxes on agricultural products in the 
region of Apatzing^n in 1966* 
pesos/metric ton 
Product Tax per ton 
Cantaloupe $ 36.00 
Corn none 
Cotton $ 36.00 
Rice $ 48.00 
Sesame $ 96.00 
Sorgo $ 24.00 
Milk none 
Cows, steers, etc. $ 24.00/head 
^Source: Information obtained in an interview in 1966 with Ing. 
Hector Langarita, Gerente, Oficina de la^ Rentas, ApatzingAi, Michoac^n 
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equivalent of a real estate tax. This tax is figured at 5 percent of the 
market value of production of the crops from his land^^. It is assumed 
that the real estate taxes for both the pequeno propietario and eiidatario 
are paid in February for the preceding year. 
The third tax is the impuesto de ingreso (income tax). This tax is 
based upon gross income. A tax base is determined by taking a specified 
percentage of gross income from each source of income. In the cases of 
cattle sold and the crops of cantaloupe and cotbon this rate is 15 per­
cent of the gross income derived from these sources. All other crops 
included in this study and milk have a base that is 5 percent of gross 
income from these sources. The tax is progressive and the amount paid is 
determined by the size of the tax base (55). Table 4.32 shows the 
figures utilized in this study. The income tax is also paid in February. 
Fixed Costs 
Fixed costs are defined to represent "farming expenses of an 'over­
head' nature that do not change with output" (41, p. 65). In this study 
they are considered to be depreciation of the farm buildings, 
depreciation of farm machinery, and only in the case of the pegueffo 
propietario, real estate taxes. The farmer is assumed to have no debt 
of an intermediate or long-term nature which would give rise to 
interest charges or payments of the principle. He has no long-term 
insurance. The salaries of the farmer's regular employees are not 
considered as part of fixed costs because it is assumed 
^^Information obtained in interview in 1966 with Ing. Hector 
Langarita 0£. cit. 
179 
Table 4.32. Income tax rates for given levels of tax base en Apatzing^n 
in 1966* 
pesos 
Tax rate as percent of Interval upon which tax 
tax base Size of 
Lower limit 
of tax base 
tax base 
Upper limit 
of tax base 
rate applies 
0% $ 0.00 $ 2000.00 $ 2000.00 
5 2000.01 3500.00 1500.00 
6 3500.01 5000.00 1500.00 
7 5000.01 8000.00 3000.00 
8 8000.01 11000.00 3000.00 
9 11000.01 14000.00 3000.00 
10 14000.01 20000.00 6000.00 
11 20000.01 26000.00 6000.00 
13 26000.01 32000.00 6000.00 
16 32000.01 38000.00 6000.00 
18 38000.01 50000.00 12000.00 
^Source: Secretarfa de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Direccion del 
Impuesto Sobre la Renta (55) 
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that the farmer would let them go if he did not undertake production in 
any year. 
Table 4.6 shows the eiidatarios in both Zaragoza and Apatzing^fn 
have virtually no cause for fixed costs except those associated with 
their meager supply of farm machinery and equipment. Assuming straight 
line depreciation, an average life of ten years for this machinery and 
equipment of an average age of 5 years, and an initial value of $2,000, 
these farmers would have fixed costs totaling $200 per year. 
The pequeno propietario's fixed costs would be considerably higher 
because they have farm buildings and more machinery. His depreciation 
expense is determined on a straight-line basis. The tractor and equip­
ment are assumed to be three years old and the other machinery and a 
car are assumed to be five years old. Their expected life is ten years 
and the initial cost was $145,500. The annual depreciation is $14,550. 
The farm buildings are assumed to be ten years old. Their expected life 
is 25 years and their initial value was $41,667. The annual depreciation 
on the buildings is $1,667. The total fixed cost due to depreciation is 
$16,217. Real estate taxes are $2,448. Therefore total fixed costs for 
this representative farmer are $18,665. 
These fixed costs are subtracted from the annual income over 
variable costs to give net income. 
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CHAPTER V. SHORT-TERM CREDIT IN THE TWO MUNICIPIOS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the lenders of short-
term credit in the two municipios.^ Particular attention is given to 
those characteristics of the lenders' operations which might give rise 
to external credit rationing. The characteristics developed here will 
be quantified in the empirical examination of credit rationing. 
Seguro Agrjfcola (crop insurance) is closely related to agricultural 
credit. A brief description of this relationship is presented in a later 
section of this chapter. Some of the possible effects of crop insurance 
on reducing uncertainty are discussed in the last section. 
The Banco Eiidal and the Banco Agricola^ 
The 1955 Lev de Crédito Agricola (Agriculture.Credit Law) defines 
the National System of agricultural credit to be composed of the Banco 
Nacional de Crédito Eiidal (National Eiido Credit Bank), and the Bancos 
Régionales de Crédito Eiidal (Regional Eiido Credit Banks) to serve the 
eiidatarios; the Banco Nacional de Crédito Agrfcola, ^ .A. (National 
Agricultural Credit Bank), and the Bancos Régionales de Crédito Agricola 
Unfortunately, data for the two municipios are not always 
separated from the rest of the zone. In these cases, data for the zone 
are used to give an approximation of the situation in the municipios. 
2 
These two banks are similar in organization, structure, and 
operations and hence will be covered together so as to avoid unnecessary 
duplication. 
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(Regional Agriculture Credit Banks) to serve the pequenos propietarios. 
The Sociedades de Crédite Eiidal and the Sociedades de Crédite Aerfcola 
(local credit societies of eiidatarios and pequen^os propietarios 
respectively) are also defined to be an auxiliary part of the system 
(49, Arts. 1-3).3*4 
The system is represented in the zone by the Regional Banks of both 
national banks and by the local credit societies. The Banco Agrario de 
Z amor a, S_.A. is the Regional Bank serving the eiidatarios and the Banco 
Regional Agrjfcola Michoacano. S_.A. serves the propietarios.^ 
The regional banks 
The regional bank is a decentralized feature of the National System 
in that it is organized autonomously from the national bank. Each 
The first version of the Lev de Crédite Agrfcola was passed in 1926 
when, in the post revolution era, it was evident that some form of 
credit was necessary to go along with land reform. This version made both 
the eiidatarios and pequencs propietarios credit subjects of the Banco 
Agrfcola. In 1936 the law was amended to split off the eiidatarios and 
make them credit subjects of the Banco Eiidal. The law has been revised 
several times with 1955 being the latest. 
4 
The banks also have auxiliary institutions in the zone which are 
designed to help their clientele in providing markets, resources, and 
education. These institutions are administered separately from their 
credit operations in that they are not administered by the local lending 
authorities. In 1966 in the two municipios the Banco Agrfcola had a 
cotton gin. The Banco Ejidal had a gin, lime processing plant and a rice 
mill. It was building an insecticide mixing plant to serve the area. It 
has encouraged the development of a livestock improvement society in 
Nueva Italia and a livestock improvement station in Antunez. 
^Although it is not technically correct, these banks will be referred 
to as the Banco Eiidal and Banco Agrfcola so as to be consistent with 
common nomenclature. 
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regional bank is organized as a corporation which has basically the same 
overall objectives of its respective national bank. Their capital is 
subscribed in part by the national bank and the rest freely (49, Art. 
26-37). The regional bank receives the majority of its loanable funds 
by loans and discounts from the national bank in accordance with the Law 
(49, Art. 75). 
The Apatzing^n office of each regional bank is one of several local 
offices each bank has in its territorial jurisdiction, but each is the 
largest local office in terms of volume of credit a year. The local 
office of the Banco Eiidal accounted for 60 percent of the Regional 
Bank's total credit in the summer of 1964^. In the summer of 1966 the 
local office of the Banco Agricola accounted for about one-half of the 
funds lent by its regional bank^. Although both banks lend over a large 
area, the municipio of Apatzing^n receives a large portion of both 
banks' funds and Zaragoza receives a large portion of the credit of the 
q * 
Banco Eiidal . 
Each office has several inspectores del campo (field inspectors) 
who work directly with the local credit societies and farmers. They 
^Departmento de Cr^dito, Banco Nacional de Cr^dito Ejidal, Mexico, 
D.F. Produccicfn agrfcola financiado por el Banco. Private communica­
tion. 1967. 
^Information obtained in an interview in 1966 with Ing. Benito 
Gazares Rios, Gerente Agencia, Banco Regional Agrfcola Michoacano, S^.A., 
Apatzing^n, Michoacan. 
g 
Information obtained in interviews in 1966 with Ing. Hector Gémez 
Romero, Gerente Agencia, Banco Agrario de Zamora, S^.A., Apatzing^n, 
Michoacin and Ing. Benito Gazares Rios, o£. cit. 
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supervise the use of credit, making sure that the funds or goods are 
properly employed in accordance with plans established by the bank. 
They also offer technical assistance as much as time and their capabili­
ties allow. 
The local credit society 
The local credit society is made up of a group of farmers who have 
joined together for purposes of borrowing funds. The banks loan directly 
to the society and hence the society, rather than its members, is 
considered as the "borrower" from the bank. The ejido societies are 
formed within an ejido but an ejido may have more than one society, as 
long as each society has at least the minimum of 10 members. The 
societies working with the Banco Agrfcola are composed of owners or 
renters who farm land in a small enough geographical area that the 
members can oversee each other's operations (49, Arts. 45-46). 
A collective spirit prevails in the society organization. It is 
designed so that the members work together for the total betterment of 
the society. The society can work the members' lands in common. It 
also has the responsibility to provide the bank with guarantees for its 
loans. The society can also serve as a link between the individual 
borrower and the bank. In this role it receives credit from the bank 
and in turn loans these funds to its members. Under this system the 
society still must serve as the bank's guarantor of the loans to the 
individual members (49, Art. 38). 
This is the system employed in theory in the zone. In the field 
investigation it was pointed out, however, that the banks tend to work 
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closely with the individual farmer and that the society, although 
operational, is not effective in the true cooperative spirit of the 
law. The Banco Eiidal has experienced success in reducing their 
financial losses with a variation of this. They form groups of four to 
six members of a credit society and make them responsible for each 
other's loans. They believe this system puts more responsibility on the 
9 
individual and permits him to oversee his colleague's operations . 
At the time it is formed the society establishes a constitution 
which covers the organization and operations of the society (49, Art. 52). 
This constitution must be approved by its respective bank (49, Art. 51). 
The society also must select one of three forms of liability under which 
it will operate. These forms are limited, unlimited or joint limited. 
The societies in the ejido system usually select the joint limited form 
where each member is responsible for the obligations of the society to 
include his portion of its social capital and up to an additional amount 
of this capital as specified in the constitution (44, p. 214). 
In order to accumulate the society's social capital, members are 
expected to pay into the fund three percent of the value of their loans 
each cycle until the social capital is of sufficient size to maintain 
normal operations without credit with additional payments if the society 
wants to add to its capital (49, Art. 43). 
The supreme authority in the society is the general assembly of 
^Information obtained in an interview in 1966 with Ing. Hector Gemmez 
Romero, 0£. cit. 
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members composed of all members. Every three years the assembly elects 
an administrative council to represent and direct the society in its 
matters. A vigilence council is elected by the minority in the election. 
This council polices and reviews the work and financial records of the 
administrative council so as to serve as a check on the administration. 
A socio delgado (member's delegate) is elected by the assembly from the 
members of the administrative council to represent the society. This is 
the person with whom the bank works directly in respect to society 
business (49, Art. 47). 
The assembly must meet at least once each crop cycle to review the 
last cycle's operations and to plan operations for the coming cycle. A 
representative of the society's bank must be present at the meeting with 
the opportunity to speak but not vote (49, Art. 47). 
The profits earned by the society are distributed according to law 
(49, Art. 48). Up to 15 percent is paid to the leaders of the society. 
The rest is put into the society's social capital fund. In the case of 
losses, the reserve fund is used first. If this is not sufficient, the 
individual members are assessed in accordance with the form of liability 
(49, Art. 48). 
The Banco Agrfcola can work with individual pegueno propietarios or 
groupos soldarios (groups of three or more persons) in addition to the 
credit societies. In the zone about 80 percent of this banks' loans are 
with societies and the rest with individuals^^. 
^^Information obtained in an interview in 1966 with Ing. Benito 
Gazares Rios, op. cit. 
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Credit operations 
Credit operations in the two banks are similar. The cr^dito de avfo 
or short-term loans are by far the most common type of loan made in the 
11 
zone. The term of this loan may not exceed 18 months and it is to be 
guaranteed with the primary materials acquired and/or with the harvested 
products that will be obtained through the use of the credit. The size 
of the loan cannot exceed 70 percent of the probable value of the 
12 
harvests or annual products the famer can obtain (49, Art, 55). 
These loans are made in accordance with crop budgets and credit 
quotas for the region that are prepared by each bank. The budget and 
quota are to be the same for each individual borrower and includes almost 
all of the current production expenses, including seed, fertilizers, 
insecticides, water, crop insurance, machinery services, hired labor, and 
transportation of the crop to the market. Table 5.1 gives an example of 
such a budget prepared by the Banco Ejidal for cotton in the zone. 
The banks can also make commercial loans, intermediate-term and 
long-term loans (49, Arts. 54, 56, 62) but these type of loans are not 
nearly so voluminous. For example, the most recent annual report of the 
Banco Ejidal (7, p. 160) shows that from 1953 to 1961 the short-term 
loans of the complete Banco Ejidal system averaged 78.5 percent of the 
total loans. The latest annual report of the Banco Agrfcola (6, p. D.3) 
shows the average from 1958 to 1962 to be 74.4 percent for their system. 
The author's impression is that these averages would probably be a little 
low for the zone due to the high inflow of operating capital for cotton 
operations. 
12 
In reality the banks have imposed an upper limit on a loan of 
about 70 percent of the value of the costs or production according to 
information received in interviews in 1967 with officials of the credit 
departments of the Banco Nacional de Cr^dito Agrfcola, S.A. and the Banco 
Nacional de Cr^dito Ejidal, S_.A., Mexico, D.F. 
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Table 5.1. Crop budget, estimated yield, and credit quota prepared for 
one hectare of cotton using fertilizer in the region of 
Apatzing^n summer 1956® 
Operation or material Estimated Quota of Month(s) 
cost credit 
(pesos) (pesos) 
Plowing $ 120.00 $ 100.00 May 
Disking 100.00 100.00 June 
Leveling 50.00 50.00 June-July 
Seed 72.00 72.00 May 
Fee-permission to seed 7.00 7.00 July 
Fertilizer 544.50 544.50 July 
Seeding 50.00 50.00 July-August 
Application of fertilizer 60.00 45.00 July-August 
Initial irrigation 40.00 30.00 July-Augus t 
Water fee 50.00 50.00 August 
Cultivation 100.00 75.00 Augus t-September 
Weeding 70.00 40.00 Augus t-September 
Insecticide 718.50 718.50 July-December 
Application of insecticide 364.50 364.50 July-December 
Irrigations 180.00 120.00 Augus t-November 
Hoe weeding 500.00 
Thinning 80.00 45.00 September 
Hand weeding 150.00 
Weeding 75.00 60.00 August-September 
Harves ting 600.00 349.50 November-December 
Transportation 200.00 170.00 November-December 
Clearing land 60.00 30.00 January 
Plowing 125.00 100.00 January 
Interest 431.65 312.10 May-January 
Crop insurance 222.66 222.66 May 
Totals $4970.81 $3655.76 
Estimated yield and price 2300 Kgs @ 2.30 = $5290.00 gross 
^Source: Departamento de Crédite, Banco Nacional de Cre'dito 
Ejidal, S.A., Mexico, D.F. Costos de produccidn y quotas por hectare 
de cultivos financiados por el banco. Private communication. 1967. 
Table 5.2. Estimated costs, estimated value of production, and credit quotas for selected crops 
for which credit was available from the Banco Regional Michoacano, ^ .A. in the summer 
cycle 1967 and the winter cycle 1966-67^ 
Crop and cycle Resources used 
Seasonal Irrigated Fertilizer Improved seed 
Summer cycle 1967 
Com X X X 
Corn X X 
Cotton X X X 
Rice X X X 
Sesame X X 
Sorgo X X X 
Sorgo X X 
Sorgo X X X 
Winter cycle 1966-67 
Cantaloupe X X X 
Corn X X X 
Sorgo X X X 
Mean percentage 
^Source: Departamento de Gr^dito, Banco Nacional de Cr^dito Agrfcola, Mexico, D.F. 
Costos de produccirfn y quotas por hectare de cultivos financiados por el banco. Private 
communication. 1967. 
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
(pesos/hectare) 
Crop and cycle Estimated Quota Credit Average Price/ Estimated Credit as 
costs of as yield Ton value of percent of 
credit percent (Tons/Ha) crop at estimated 
of costs harvest value 
Summer cycle 1967 
Corn $1000 $ 700, 00 70. ,0 1. ,5 $ 940 $ 1610. ,60 43. 5 
Corn 642. ,85 450. ,00 70. ,0 ,8 940 752. ,00 59. 8 
Cotton 5142. 85 3600, ,00 70, ,0 2. ,5 2300 5750. ,00 62. .6 
Rice 2858. ,00 2000, ,00 70. ,0 4. ,0 2200 8800. ,00 22, 3 
Sesame 857. ,15 600, .00 70, .0 ,7 2500 1750, ,00 34, 3 
Sorgo 1009. ,00 700, ,00 69, 4 4. ,0 800 3200. ,00 21, 9 
Sorgo 760, 00 500, .00 65, .8 3. 0 800 2400, .00 20. ,8 
Sorgo 1320. 50 900, .00 68, 2 5, 0 800 4000, ,00 22. 5 
Winter cycle 1966-67 
Cantaloupe 4457, .00 3709, .00 83, .2 25, .0 1200 30000, .00 12. 4 
Com 1918, .00 1657, .00 86. 4 . 3, 0 940 2820, .00 58. 7 
Sorgo 1417, .90 1163, .00 82, .0 3, .5 650 ' 2275, .00 51. 1 
Mean percentage 73. 2 37. 3 
Table 5.3. Estimated costs, estimated value of production, and credit quotas for selected crops 
for which credit was available from the Banco Agrario de Zamora, S^.A. in the summer 
cycle 1966 and the winter cycle 1966-67® 
Crop and cycle Resources used 
Seasonal Irrigated Fertilizer Improved seed 
Summer cycle 1966 
Com X X 
Corn X XX
Corn XX  
Cotton  X 
Rice XXX
Rice X 
Sesame X 
Sesame X 
Sorgo X XX 
Winter cycle 1966-67 
Corn X X 
Corn X X 
Rice X 
Rice X X 
Mean percentage 
^Source: Departamento de Credito, Banco Nacional de Credito Ejidal, Mexico, D.F. 
Costos de produccfon y quotas por hectare de cultivos financiados por el banco. Private 
communication. 1967. 
Table 5.3 (Continued) 
Crop and cycle 
(pesos/hectare) 
Es timated Quota 
costs of 
credit 
Quota 
as 
percent 
of costs 
Average 
yield 
(Tons /Ha) 
Price/ 
Ton 
Es timated 
value of 
crop 
Credit as 
percent of 
es timated 
value 
Summer cycle 1966 
Corn $ 687.22 $ 472.73 68.8 1.2 $ 940 $1128.00 41.9 
Corn 1475.85 1079.85 73.2 2.0 940 1880.00 57.4 
Com 1157.45 866.20 52.0 2.0 940 1880.00 46.1 
Cotton 4970.81 3655.76 73.5 2.3 2300 5290.00 69.1 
Rice 2938.77 2245.12 76.4 4.0 900 3600.00 62.4 
Rice 2539.86 1691.76 66.6 3.0 900 2700.00 62.7 
Sesame 833.23 607.73 72.9 2000 1200.00 50.6 
Sesame 852.01 582.51 68.4 .7^ 2000 1400.00 41.6 
Sorgo 1326.63 1002.13 75.5 3.0 700 2100.00 47.7 
Winter cycle 1966-67 
Com 818.74 559.46 68.3 1.2 940 1128.00 49.6 
Corn 1087.94 850.67 78.2 2.4 940 1880.00 45.2 
Rice 2555.50 2093.50 81.9 3.0 1000 3000.00 69.8 
Rice 3585.83 2594.00 72.3 5.0 1000 5000.00 51.9 
Mean percentage 71.8 54.6 
Yield estimate of Banco Regional Michoacano, S.A., see Table 5.1 
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Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the quotas per hectare both banks were lending in 
the summer of 1967 for crops considered in this study. These tables show 
both banks' quotas were considerably less than the maximum of 70 percent 
of the value of the crop in this year. The mean percent lent compared 
with the estimated value of the crop is 37.3 percent for the Banco 
Agr£cola with the range being from 12.4 percent for cantaloupe to 62.6 
percent in the case of cotton. The Banco Eiidal has a range of 45.2 
percent for corn to 69.9 percent for rice with a mean of 55.4 percent. 
Both banks have a general policy of lending about 70 percent of the value 
of the costs of production, although the percentages in the tables show 
there is some variation from this standard. 
In accordance with the crop budgets, it is expected that the 
farmer will undertake certain operations during certain months. The 
banks accordingly lend the farmer the money at this time and interest 
charges are assessed from this point to when the crop is sold. In many 
cases materials such as seed, fertilizer and insecticides are given as 
credit in kind. In such cases the banks usually have purchased the 
materials in bulk quantity at lower than the stated market prices and 
hence are able to pass on the savings to the farmer. In addition, this 
system comes closer to insuring that the farmer spends his money for the 
purposes intended than does that of giving him money outright from which 
to purchase the resources. To enforce this a representative of the bank 
checks on the borrowing societies to see that the resources are used 
properly. 
A member of a society cannot receive more than 10 percent of the 
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society's credit without consent of at least two-thirds of the society's 
members, nor can be receive, at the most, more than 20 percent of the 
society's credit (49, Art. 83). 
Usually the banks require that the farmers process their cotton 
crop in the banks' gins and, in the case of the Banco Elidal, their 
rice crops in the bank's rice mill. By so doing, they have control 
over the harvested crops. In addition they can assure the farmer of 
selling his crop at the market price. The farmer ean sell his other 
13 
crops to CONOSUPO or private buyers 
The current discount rates on the loans made are shown in Table 5.4. 
The Banco Eiidal has uniform rates for all loans whereas the Banco 
Agr^cola has different rates based on the type of loan, the type of 
borrower, and the crop. Local societies and basic food crops have 
preferential short-term rates. The farmer is charged interest in the 
form of a discount, so the true rate of interest is higher than the 
stated figure. The interest is assessed, however, only for the time the 
credit is utilized, i.e., from the time the money is spent on a given 
operation until the time the harvest is sold. 
All farmers working with the Banco Eiidal and Banco Agrfcola are 
required to use crop insurance if it is offered for the crop being 
grown (1, p. 183). A discussion of these operations is deferred until a 
^^GONOSUPO, ^  Gompania Nacional de Subistencias Populares, S.A., 
is the government agency which sets guaranteed prices for certain 
agricultural commodities. For further elaboration, see Rao (58) or 
Alvaro de Albornoz (1). 
Table 5.4. Rates of discount Banco Regional Michoacano. S^.A. and Banco Agrario de Zamora, S^.A. 
in the Region of Apatzingàn 1966 
SL 
Institution and type Banco Regional Michoacano. S..4» Banco Agrario ds. Zamora^ S..4.. 
of loan Local credit Grupos Individuals Local credit societies 
societies soldarios 
Basic food crops; 9.5 10.5 11.5 10.0 
corn, wheat, rice 
beans 
Other crops, livestock, 10.5 11.0 12.0 10.0 
poultry, and inter­
mediate term credit 
Long-term 6.0 7.0 8.0 10.0 
^Source: Ing. Benito Gazares Rios, Gerente Banco Regional Michoacano, S.A., Apatzing^n 
Michoac^n. Tazas de interes para los pr^stamos del Banco Régional Michoacano, S.A. Private 
communication. 1966. 
^Source; Interview in 1966 with Ing. Hector Gomez Romero, Gerente Banco Agrario de Zamora, 
S.A., Apatzingan, Michoacan. 
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later section in this chapter. 
Loanable funds and the "credit sanction" 
The local offices of the banks in Apatzingài reported that they had 
enough funds to satisfy only 12 percent of the credit needs of the 
eildatarios and 20 percent of the needs of the pedueno propietarios in 
the zone^^. Those who do not receive credit from these sources prefer 
to or are forced to work with other lenders, go without credit, or rent 
out their land. 
The banks therefore can be quite selective among their prospective 
borrowers. Although they do have a social mission of trying to serve 
their respective clientele, they tend to work with farmers who previously 
have demonstrated their ability to manage loans successfully, who are 
15 
honest, and who are, in general, farming on irrigated land . 
The volumes of short-term loans made by the various crops for each 
bank are shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. These, tables indicate the four 
crops of corn, cotton, rice, and sesame that have the "credit sanction", 
16 
i.e., that receive most of the short-term credit . Cotton has received 
^^Information obtained in interview in 1966 with Ing. Hector Gdmez 
Romero, 0£. cit. and Ing. Benito Gazares Rios, o£. cit. 
^^Barkin (8, p. 118) agrees with this view with respect to the 
Ejldo sector. 
^^Anderson (34) developed this very appropriate phrase to describe 
the selective use of credit as a development tool in Mexico. In the case 
of agriculture, those crops that are important for national development 
as determined by the Federal Government are likely to receive credit 
under the "credit sanction". 
Table 5.5. Volumes of credit and hectares of crops planted with short-term crop loans made by 
the Banco Regional Michoacano, S^.A. , in the Agency of Apatzing^n in the summer cycle 
1965 through the summer cycle 1966®»'' 
Summer 1965 
Hectares Credit 
planted (pesos) 
Winter 1965-66^ 
Hectares Credit 
planted (pesos) 
Summer 1966 
Hectares Credit 
planted (pesos) 
Bananas 
Cantaloupe 
Coconuts 
Corn 
Cotton 
Rice 
Sesame 
Sorgo 
Watermelon 
Total 
1543.00 $ 709145.00 
2459.00 9505209.00 
462.00 
595.00 
168582.00 
168750.00 
5059.00 $10551686.00 
200.00 
255.00 
25.00 
480.00 
$ 775000.00 
235000.00 
63750.00 
$1073750.00 
2159.00 
2276.00 
64.00 
1294.00 
1012.00 
$ 973426.00 
10279869.00 
37717.00 
341734.00 
214544.00 
6805.00 $11847290.00 
^Source: Departamento de Cr^dito, Banco Nacional de Cr^dito Agrfcola, Mexico, D.F. 
Produccion finaciada por el banco 1965-65 y 1966-66. Private communication. 1967. 
^In Winter 1965-66 571,000.00 additional credit was authorized for coconuts, bananas and 
pasture, however, it is not clear that these are short-term loans. 
^Based upon funds authorized rather than actual use of funds. 
Table 5.5 (Continued) 
Credit 1965-66 
Total by Crops as 
crop (pesos) percent of total 
Land 1965-66 
Total by Crop as 
crop (hectares) percent of total 
Bananas 
Cantaloupe $ 775000.00 3.302 $ 200.00 1.620 
Coconuts 
Com 1917571.00 8.169 3957.00 32.056 
Cotton 19785078.00 84.290 4735.00 38.359 
Rice 37717.00 .161 64.00 .518 
Sesame 510316.00 2.174 1756.00 14.226 
Sorgo 383294.00 1.633 1607.00 13.018 
Watermelon 63750.00 .272 25.00 .203 
Total $23472726.00 100.000 $12344.00 100.000 
X 
Table 5.6. Volumes of credit and hectares of crops planted with short-term crop loans made by 
the Banco Agrario de Zamora, S^.A., in the Agency of Apatzing^n in the summer cycle 
1963 through the summer cycle 1966^ 
Summer 1963 Winter 1963-64 Summer 1964 
Hectares Credit Hectares Credit Hectares Credit 
planted (pesos) planted (pesos) planted^ (pesos) 
Beans 58.50 $ 35993.25 
Corn 1324.50 $ 481176.85 62.50 18473.95 1432.00 $ 482007.13 
Cotton 8168.00 28745517.00 11732.50 46396390.69 
Rice 642.50 681773.64 1079.75 1815614.87 431.25 277868.13 
Sesame 1845.00 752129.01 1606.00 447836.74 
Sugar Cane 
Total 11980.00 $30660596.50 1200.75 $1870082.07 15201.75 $47604102.69 
^Source: Departamento de Gredito, Banco Nacional de Credito Ejidal, Mexico, D.F. 
Produccion financiada por el Banco 1963-1966. Private communication. 1967. 
^Refers to hectares covered by credits. 
Table 5.6 (Continued) 
Winter 1954-65 
Hectares Credit 
planted (pesos) 
Sumner 1965 
Hectares Cred it 
planted (pesos) 
Winter 1965-66 
Hectares Credit 
planted (pesos) 
Beans 73. 50 $ 63420.27 81. 75 $ 68324. 72 
Corn 115. 50 52972.57 1334.00 $ 528113.15 660. 50 313514. 45 
Cotton 10777.50 36254145.72 
Rice 782. 25 1516309.82 504.25 453850.79 1510. 75 3537146. 17 
Sesame 2000.45 836035.31 
Sugar Cane 10. 00 26583.63 
Total 981. 25 $1659286.29 14616.20 $38072144.97 2253. 00 $3918985. 34 
Table 5.6 (Continued) 
Summer 1966 Credit 1963-66 Land 1963-66 
Hectares Credit Total by Crop as Total by Crop as 
planted* (pesos) crop (pesos) percent of crop percent c 
total (hectares) total 
Beans $ 167738.24 .096 213.75 .342 
Corn 1379.50 $ 488013. 17 2364271.27 1.348 6308.50 10.092 
Cotton 10816.00 48764927. 53 160160980.94 91.342 41494.00 66.378 
Rice 771.50 799228. 39 9081791.81 5.179 5722.25 9.154 
Sesame 3311.50 1503803. 05 3539804.11 2.019 8762.95 14.018 
Sugar Cane 26583.63 .015 10.00 .016 
Total 16278.50 $51555972. 14 $175341170.00 100.000 62511.45 100.000 
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the large majority of funds for the years covered for each bank but has 
covered a considerably lesser proportion of the land covered by crops 
grown under credit. 
These tables reflect the government's agricultural policy in that 
they show that the cultivation of cotton, corn, and rice is encouraged 
by the federal government. Each year, about a year in advance of a 
given crop cycle, the regional bank makes up a plan for short-term crop 
credit in its jfègiea. This plan is in accordance with the overall 
development plans of the Comité Directiva discussed earlier. This plan 
is submitted to the national bank for revision and approval. The board 
of directors of both national banks is chaired by the Secretary of 
Agriculture (49, Art. 13). Six of the nine members of each bank's 
Board of Directors are appointed by the Federal Government (49, Art. 11). 
Therefore, the Federal Government and the Secretary of Agriculture have 
virtual control over the banks. In accordance with national goals, they 
designate the crops and the quantities of these crops that each bank will 
finance and by having the authority to approve each regional b^k's 
plans, they can determine where and how much of each crop will be grown^^. 
To the farmer who is working with one of these banks this process 
clearly limits the choice of crops to those which have received the 
"credit sanction". If these crops are not those he would choose as a 
^^This linkage between the national and regional bank is further 
strengthened by the fact that the national bank appoints five of the 
seven members of the regional bank's board of directors (49, Art. 32). 
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profit maximizer, then the farmer is sacrificing some of his income, 
at least in the short-run, for the national goals of Mexico, ceteris 
paribus. The farmer's set of choices may be further diminished by the 
local bank's method of allocating the most profitable crops included in 
the "sanction" among farmers. 
There are arguments in favor of this system aside from national 
development objectives. First, the system provides credit that otherwise 
would not be available to the famer. Hence, the farmer probably 
operates at a position where he is able to earn more income, albeit less 
than optimal, than he could without credit. Second, the highly regi-
mentized operation may be the only feasible way the National System can 
operate with their limited funds and personnel because they do not have 
time to treat the credit society and the farmer as individual cases. 
Third, because the banks have definite time tables for uses of funds, 
they are able to shift funds around the country during the year so as to 
make use of them the year around. On balance it is difficult to say 
what is optimal, considering all aspects of the problem, but is possible 
to say that in the short-run the individual farmer could be forced to 
accept a less than optimal position, i.e., be a subject of external 
credit rationing due to the "credit sanction". 
External credit rationing 
Assuming that the prospective client of either of the two banks 
has a profit optimization plan for his farm, such as is derived in the 
empirical problem, the bank could impose external credit rationing in 
several ways. 
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First, the farmer could be a victim of the "shut-out" where he 
gets no credit at all. This could come about because his crop plan does 
not include the "sanctioned" crops, or because the bank in allocating 
their loanable funds for these crops does not select him to receive 
credit. With the case of a farmer who was not an optimizer but who 
would accept any bank-designated farm plan in order to receive credit, 
the "shut-out" could still occur because of the bank's general shortage 
of loanable funds or because he was not determined credit worthy. 
Secondly, the optimizer may be subject to rationing due to "collec­
tive decision making". That is, as a member of a credit society he may 
be forced to accept what is, in his opinion, a non-optimal plan in order 
to receive credit for crops the society wants to grow or will permit him 
to grow since they must be partially responsible for the guarantee 
associated with them. In addition, as a member of the society he is 
limited to receiving, at the most, 20 percent of the society's credit 
in a year. 
Thirdly, the optimizer may be subject to the "upper limit". That 
is, he may want to borrow more funds than the legal limit of 70 percent 
of the estimated value of the crop because his costs exceed this limit 
or the bank doesn't use the same expectation model for price and/or 
yield estimates as does the farmer. The "upper limit" could also cause 
rationing where the bank has a house rule of not loaning more than 
their fixed crop quotas specify. 
Therefore, due to these three things — the "shut-out", "collective 
decision making", and the "upper limit" — an eiidatario or pequeno 
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propietario could be subject to external credit rationing by the Banco 
18 
E.iidal or Banco Agrjtcola. 
Commercial Bank Credit 
There are three branch offices of commercial banks in the city of 
Apatzing^n: EJL Banco de Comercio de Michoacan, S_.A., El Banco Nacional 
de Mexico, S.A., and El Banco de Zamora, S_.A. The latter two also have 
small offices in the municipio of Zaragoza in the city of Nueva Italia. 
These banks carry on all of the traditional functions of commercial banks, 
although it would appear that they are not presently very active in 
19 20 21 
making loans to agriculture ' ' . Only 533 hectares of cotton were 
Because the interest rate is constant there are no service charges 
associated with the credit, the farmer is not subject to external credit 
rationing in the form of price rationing. 
19 
Barkin (8, p. 128) came to the same conclusion. 
20 
Alvaro de Albomoz (1, p. 270) states that in Mexico commercial 
banks tend to prefer commercial loans to agricultural loans because 
agricultural loans are more risky and there is a slower turnover of 
money in agricultural lending. 
^^The Fondo de Garantfa % Fomento para la Agricultura % Ganaderia ^  
la Avicultura is making a concerted effort to break this tradition. They 
have their own funds, World Bank funds, and Alliance for Progress funds 
which they can lend to the private banks on discount at low discount 
rates. These funds are to cover intermediate-term loans that the banks 
make with the help of a field technician from the Fondo. The interest 
rates to the farmer are as low as six percent annually on the Alliance for 
Progress money. In cases where the loans require short-term supplementary 
credit it is also given on similar terms. The Fondo only deals with small 
farmers who do not have sufficient capital to work with the banks without 
the Fondo aid. This program is designed to encourage both the small 
farmer and the commercial bank to consider each other as business partners 
and has had considerable success in the zone in recent years. They do not 
loan money for cotton growing. Information obtained in interviews in 1966 
with Ing. Carlos Cintura del Cortez, Gerente, Fondo de Garantjfa Estado de 
Michoacan, Morelia, Michoacan and Ing. Victor de Leon, Technico, Fondo de 
Garantfa, Morelia, Michoacan. 
206 
22 
financed by the three banks in 1964 in the two municipios under study . 
In interviews with officials of each bank it appeared that lending 
practices among institutions were very similar. The banks work entirely 
with propietarios or arendatarios. They cannot easily work with the 
eiidatario because this farmer seldom has sufficient mortgagable property 
to put up as guarantee because he cannot mortgage his land. The banks 
carefully screen their prospective clients and usually accept only those 
with more than the minimum collateral and those that have a good credit 
rating. They can loan up to 70 percent of the value of the investment 
with the farmer supplying at least 30 percent. The rates of interest are 
quoted at 12 percent annually for the Banco de Commercio and the Banco 
23 
Nacional and at 10 percent annually for the Banco de Zamora . In addi­
tion the banks make charges for servicing the loan, and usually require 
the lenders to keep minimum balances in their checking account at the 
bank. This, of course, raises the cost of borrowing. The amounts 
charged and required on balance vary with the customer. 
The loan contract requires collateral of at least two times the size 
of the loan.^^ This factor in itself limits the clientele to farmers who 
^^La Agencia de la Secretaria de Agricultura y Ganaderfa, Apatzing^n, 
Michoac^n. Productores de algodon, refaccionados y independientes 
registrados durante el ciclo 1964/65, municipios de Apatzing^n y 
Zaragoza. Private communication. 1966. 
23 
Many farmers in the zone suggested the going bank rate was 18 
percent. Barkin (8, p. 129) agrees with this rate. 
^^Many farmers in the zone suggested the requirement was usually 
more like a pledge of collateral of three or four times the size of the 
loan. 
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have sufficient collateral or to those who wish to put their property up 
as collateral, and perhaps is another reason that banks don't lend 
heavily to fanners. 
The banks generally will lend money for all of the crops in the 
zone, but they tend to be wary of melons due to the uncertainties 
associated with them. The banks do not provide much technical advice to 
the farmers in that they do not have personnel working as agricultural 
field technicians. 
The "credit sanction" and the commercial banks 
The Mexican Central Bank, El Banco de Mexico, has the authority to 
control credit in a quantitative and qualitative sense in the commercial 
banking system. Although the Central Bank has utilized the discount 
mechanism to control the quantity of funds directed to agriculture, its 
discretionary authority to determine reserve requirements is their main 
instrument (62, pp. 118, 151, 169; 11, pp. 86-87). The required cash 
reserves must be between 15 and 50 percent of the outstanding deposits. 
Marginal reserve requirements can be raised up to 100 percent on increases 
in deposits from their level on a certain date. Since 1949 the Central 
Bank has kept these requirements at this maximum level. It has in 
general required that 15 percent of the reserves is to be held in cash 
and 85 percent, after deducting vault cash, is directed to three other 
principal groups in which the assets of banks may be distributed in 
accordance with current Central Bank policy. The groups are: 
1) securities approved by the Central Bank and the Secretary of Finance, 
2) credit for productive purposes including agriculture, and 3) credit 
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that can be extended freely according to the individual bank's wishes. 
The banks overall investment portfolio is also limited by the fact that 
at least 70 percent of its credit must be related to production (including 
agriculture) and no more than 30 percent to trade (62, pp. 152-172; 
11, pp. 84-92). The Central Bank also has the power to set the maximum 
and minimum rates of interest that they commercial banks may charge 
(10, p. 23). 
The Federal Government owns at least 51 percent of the stock of the 
Central Bank and it appoints five of the nine-man board of directors. 
The director of the Bank must inform the Secretary of Finance of action 
taken by the board that affects, among other things, the amount of money 
in circulation and reserve requirements. The Secretary of Finance has 
the power to suspend or veto this action (62, pp. 75, 80, 85, 94). It 
is clear that the Federal Government can use the Central Bank and its 
control over the individual banks to carry out its policy and that in this 
manner agriculture can be directly affected. 
Credit rationing by the commercial banks 
The individual farmer may be subject to the "shut-out" if the 
Central Bank chooses to place limits on the amount or type of loanable 
funds available to agriculture through its monetary controls. Even if 
funds are available the local bank may not determine the farmer credit 
worthy. 
The "upper-limit" plays an important role in rationing credit. The 
amount of mortgagable property appears to be the basic requirement as 
to the size of the loan once the decision is made to loan money. The 
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size of the minimum balance and service charges also serve as rationing 
devices but are used in the sense of price rationing in that they can 
raise the true rate of interest. 
The Agricultural Credit Union 
La Union de Cr^dito Agricola, Ganadera e Industrial de Los Reyes, 
S.A. ^  £.V. is a prominent lender in the region. The Union is organized 
along traditional lines in that members buy shares and then are eligible 
for loans. There were 196 members in 1965 (63). About 60 percent were 
propietarios and the rest eiidatarios. They have no members in the 
municipio of Zaragoza but many in Apatzingan^^. 
The sources of loanable funds are the members' paid-in capital and 
26 
loans and discounts from other financial institutions . At the end of 
1965 the members had paid-in capital of $2,589,000.00 (63). One of the 
biggest sources of outside financing is the Banco Agrfcola. This Bank 
works with this union, as with other unions in the country, as an 
additional means of carrying out its mission to serve the pequenos 
propietario. The credit unions usually receive their funds at about an 
25 
Information obtained in interview in 1966 with Dr. Alfonso 
Hernandez V., Gerente, Despepitadora Apatzingan, S.A., Apatzingin, 
Michoac^n. He also explained that Union's home office is located in 
Los Reyes, Michoac^n, and that their membership is not confined to 
farmers in the Tierra Caliente but encompasses a greater part of 
Michoac^n. 
^^In 1965 these institutions included Banco de Mexico, El^ Banco 
Nacional de Credfto Agrfcola, La Financiera Michoacana, La Financiera 
de Morelia, and ^  Banco de Comercio de MichoacAn (63). 
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eight percent discount (58, p. 74). They can borrow funds up to five 
times the value of their capital stock (58, p. 73). 
The criteria for receiving credit are that the borrower must be a 
member of the Union and must be a farmer using the credit for agricultural 
purposes. He also must be creditworthy and have sufficient guarantees. 
The Lev General de Instituciones de Crédite % Organizaciones Auxilares 
(the General Law of Credit Institutions and Auxiliary Organisations) 
states the provisions under which the Union was formed and sets the 
standards for its operations. The Third Title, Chapter V of this law 
states the limits to the size of loans the Union may make. No member can 
own more than 15 percent of the paid-in capital of the Union (48, 
Art. 87). The amount any member can borrow cannot exceed ten times the 
value of his paid-in capital if he does not put up real guarantees. If 
he puts up a real guarantee he may borrow up to 20 times the value of 
his subscribed capital but not yet paid-in under specific terms specified 
by the Union (48, Art. 88). In cases where the guarantees are land, 
buildings, and machinery the size of the loan can't be more than 50 percent 
I. 
of the value of the guarantees, nor more than 30 percent of this value 
when more than 50 percent of the guarantee is made up of buildings and 
machinery (48, Art. 36). The local union also imposes a loan limit of 
70 percent of the estimated costs of the investment for which credit 
,27 
is used 
The rate of discount for short-term loans is 12 percent and for 
27 
Information obtained in an interview in 1966 with Dr. Alfonso 
Hernandez V., 0£. cit. 
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intermediate-term loans is 9 to 10 percent. Crop insurance is not 
28 
required . The Union lends funds for almost all crops grown in the 
region. In 1965 it made $23,918,572.55 in short-term loans for corn, 
beans, chickpeas, wheat rice, sesame, sorgo, alfalfa, cotton, sugar 
29 
cane, cantaloupe, watermelon and avocados (63) . An indication of the 
relative importance of these crops in the zone is given in Table 5.7 
showing the lines of credit the Union had with the Banco Agricola. 
Cotton, rice, and corn were the crops receiving the most funds from this 
source. 
The Union has two affiliated businesses. The members own a 
distributor of insecticides, fertilizers and seeds and also a cotton 
gin. Both are located near the city of Apatzingan. Members buy the 
above resources at favorable prices. They are required to gin their 
cotton at their own gin and usually sell their cotton as a group in an 
30 
attempt to secure a higher price . 
Apparently the union has met with financial success. In 1964 
their rate of profit out of earnings was 6.28 percent and in 1965, 7.80 
percent (63). 
^®ibid. 
29 
They also loaned $3,490,000 for intermediate-term credit, 
$206,820.30 for other agricultural oriented loans, and $2,497,060.15 in 
personal loans to its members. Almost all of the intermediate-term 
loans were made with funds discounted from the Alliance for Progress 
through the Fondo de Garantfa (63). 
30 
Information obtained in an interview in 1966 with Dr. Alfonso 
Hernandez V., 0£. cit. 
Table 5.7. Lines of credit to the Credit Union Los Reyes from The Banco Agrfcola in the summer 
cycle 1966 and the winter cycle 1965-66®^ 
Cycle and crop Fertilizer Irrigated Seasonal Quota/ 
hectare 
(pesos) 
Hectares 
planned 
Total credit 
(pesos) 
Winter cycle 1965-66 
Beans X X $ 375 $ 400 $ 150000 
Cantaloupe X X 1725 300 517500 
Chickpeas X 300 150 45000 
Corn X X 525 1000 525000 
Rice X X 1164 1300 1513200 
Watermelon X X 1725 200 345000 
Wheat X X 855 800 684000 
Total 4150 3779700 
Summer cycle 1966 
Beans X X 375 500 187500 
Corn X X 600 1000 600000 
Cotton X X 2250 5004 11259000 
Rice X X 1153 1000 1153000 
Sesame X 336 300 100800 
Sorgo X X 412 800 329600 
Total 8604 13629900 
^Source: Departamento de Gr^dito, Banco Nacion^l de Cr^dito Agrjfcola, S.A. 
Mexico, D.F. Produccirfn financiada por el banco 1965-1966. Private communication. 1967. 
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Credit rationing 
Assuming that a farmer is a member of the Union it is not likely 
that he will be a victim of the "shut-out", so long as he has proven to 
be a capable manager, is honest, and plans to use the funds for agri­
cultural purposes. However, due to the limited funds it has available 
to it, (no more than five times the value of its capital plus its 
capital), the Union may find it necessary to ration the credit among 
its members. In addition it may not be able to get funds for certain 
crops. For example, the Banco Agrfcola may only lend the Union funds 
for crops that are approved. Hence the farmers, to a certain extent, 
may suffer from the "credit sanction" of the Federal Government. 
It is conceivable that the farmer could be subject to "collective 
decision making" in that he must abide by the local ground rules of the 
Union and that he can finance only those crops that they approve. 
The "upper limit" can affect the farmer in several ways. First, he 
can't hold more than 15 percent of the Union's stock which imposes a 
limit on amount of funds borrowed. Second, the amount of funds that he 
can borrow depends upon the value of his shares held, the type of 
guarantee and the value of the guarantee that he can use as collateral. 
Merchant Credit 
The merchants and dealers in seeds, fertilizer, and insecticides 
make short-term loans to the individual farmer. Their sources of funds 
are lines of credit furnished to them by the companies they represent. 
Usually they deal with successful propietarios or arendatarios who have 
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sufficient operating capital to cover their other expenses and are good 
31 
managers . 
In interviews with dealers in Apatzing^n it appeared that there was 
almost complete uniformity among them as to their credit practices. 
Generally, they select their clients based upon a credit investigation 
which oftentimes is nothing more than their personal knowledge of the 
client. Usually the farmer signs a credit contract pledging a certain 
portion of his crop as a guarantee, but sometimes a pledge of physical 
property is required. The loan is for the length of time he has the 
merchandise and is repayable within a month or two after harvest, depending 
on contract terms. The dealers often put a limit of one-third of the 
estimated total expenses on the amount they will lend for their merchan­
dise. Generally they do not require the farmer to sell his product to 
any particular buyer or at any particular price, but in some cases 
require him to gin his cotton at a particular gin. 
The stated rate of interest is one percent a year on fertilizer 
and nothing on insecticides. The real rate of interest is much higher, 
however, in that a farmer with cash can buy the merchandise from 10 - 15 
percent below the precio publico (stated public price). When credit 
is given the full precio publico is charged. 
These companies have technicians who assist their clients by 
31 
All merchants interviewed seemed to express a bias against 
working with the eiidatario because they consider him, in general, to be 
less reliable and less attentive to his crops, and besides they believe 
the Banco Ejidal is set up to work with him. 
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giving "on the farm" technical advice. In the process they check on the 
use of the materials secured with credit. 
In addition to lending to individual farmers, these dealers make 
contracts with other lenders such as the Banco Eiidal. Banco Agr^cola, 
some cotton gins and the credit union to sell them materials in quantity. 
These lenders receive a discount of about 10 - 20 percent and are able 
to pass this saving on to their borrowers. 
External credit rationing 
The "shut-out" can occur because the lender does not deem his 
prospective client credit worthy or because the individual farmer does 
not want to mortgage his property (if this is required) nor his crop. 
The "upper limit" can come into effect when merchants will only lend 
up to 70 percent of the cost of materials purchased with credit. It 
might be said, however, if the farmer does not have the 30 percent to 
put down, he is suffering from the "shut-out". 
Other Lenders 
The cotton gins provide a large portion of the credit not provided 
by the official banks. In accordance with Table 4.3 at least 5 thousand 
hectares were grown under credit from gins not including those of the 
Banco Eiidal, Banco Agrfcola or the Union de Cr^dito los Reyes in 1966. 
These gins extend credit as a means of insuring a minimum supply 
of raw cotton for their ginning operations as well as a means for 
expanding their business. They lend to all classes of farmers but 
primarily to arendatarios and propietarios. They make loan contracts 
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with the fanner to buy his materials from the gin and to gin his cotton 
with them. Based on interviews with farmers it is understood that these 
gins sometimes require that the farmer sell them his cotton at a lower 
price than the going market price. They charge an interest rate of one 
percent on materials purchased but charge at least the precio piiblico for 
the materials. They have their own suppliers which supply them with 
these materials at a considerably lower price. In addition, they have a 
flat charge per hectare of about $15 for inspectors fees which is 
supposed to defray the cost of technical assistance. But they fill in 
the gap with respect to the cotton growing that the official banks and 
private banks aren't filling. 
Some of the melons are grown under local credit but as a general 
rule the crops are financed by packers or persons outside the zone or 
by local farmers who are good managers and have sufficient capital to 
stand a large loss if it should occur. 
The farmer on temporal land or the one who doesn't have access to 
other credit sources must rely on the money lender or small merchant. 
These lenders make credit available on very unfavorable terms to the 
borrower but it must be realized that they are usually lending money for 
crops that are not grown with irrigation and hence are more subject to 
failure and that the clientele is generally not experienced in good 
management techniques. Therefore these lenders have a high loss rate 
and high interest rates are one means of protecting themselves against 
this. Barkin (8, p. 133) reports they often charge 1% percent interest 
per month plus a discount on the prevailing market price. Farmers 
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interviewed in one e1ido reported paying one-fifth of their harvest for 
the use of improved corn seeds. 
External credit rationing 
The gins apparently loan sufficient funds for cotton but limit their 
credit to this crop. Hence the amount the farmer receives at this time 
must be sufiEicient to provide for his needs for consumption and produc­
tion the year around in terms of its income generating capability. It 
is difficult to say, based upon the sketchy information, how the other 
lenders could ration credit. Of course, in any case, the farmer could 
be "shut-out" if he were not determined credit worthy. 
Crop Insurance 
In 1961 the Lev de Seguro Agricole Integral ^  Ganadero (Agriculture 
and Livestock Insurance Law) was passed and the Aseguradora Nacional 
Agr£cola ^  Ganadera, S_.A. (National Crop and Livestock Insurance Corpora­
tion) was established as a corporation to administer the Mexican crop and 
32 33 . 
livestock insurance program ' . This program is designed to complement 
the agricultural credit programs by guaranteeing to the farmer that if he 
follows certain prescribed procedures he can recoup most of his operating 
32 
At least 51 percent of the stock is owned by the Federal 
Government and hence it controls the operation of the crop insurance 
program. 
Since 1927 Mexico has had some form of crop insurance but the 
various systems did not prove to be satisfactory. The Law of 1961 was 
carefully designed to correct these deficiencies (1, p. 183). 
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expenses if the crop is damaged or destroyed. Lie. Gonza^les Dias 
Lombard0 states: 
". . . if the growing season is bad, the insurance will cover 
the costs of investment and the farmer has the possibility to 
pay off his debts and obtain new debts for the coming season. 
In this form, the insurance gives the expected harvest the 
quality of a real guarantee for credit and therefore the policy 
of the insurance program constitutes the best guarantee for 
agricultural credits." (35) 
In the zone under study the program is administered by the Mutualidad 
Michoac^n which hdâ tÊïïitorial jurisdiction over most of the state of 
Michoacan and part of the state of Guerrero. This Mutual operates under 
the provisions of the above mentioned law. These provisions as they 
affect the farmer are discussed below. 
Crops covered and premiums 
The Law states that crops are to be insured against draught, frost, 
hail, strong winds, fires, disease, pests, excess humidity and floods 
(50, Art. 24). The Mutual insures crops in the region that are approved 
for insurance by the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of 
Treasury (50, Reglamento Art. 2). The two municipios under study are 
included, along with several others in the zone of Apatzing^n, in a 
sub-territory within the Mutual's overall territory. This sub-territory 
was so formed because of the common ecological and economical charac­
teristics . 
Eiidatarios and propietarios and arendatarios can be covered by the 
insurance program. The Banco Ejidal and Banco Agrfcola require their 
borrowers to take out the insurance when insurance is offered for the 
particular crop being grown (1, p. 187). Borrowers from other lending 
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institutions may also take out the insurance but it is not usually 
required by the lender. The official banks have an arrangement with 
Aseeuradora Nacional whereby they automatically act as agent for their 
clients and take out the insurance for them. Where the "borrower" is 
a credit society, the policy is made out in the name of the society but 
the members of the society are to be treated as individual cases in the 
event of damages (50, Reglamento Art. 27). 
Uniform premiums are charged in the sub=territory for any given 
crop. The eiidatarios are given a preferential rate and pay a smaller 
premium than the propietarios and arendatarios^^ (50, Reglamento Arts. 
3-4; 3, Ciclos 1966/67 and 1967/67). Coverage begins and premiums are 
paid when the growing plant, or in the case of rice, the transplanted 
plant is visably growing (50, Art. 41). 
Coverages and indemnities 
The purpose of the insurance program is to cover the necessary 
operating costs of production that the farmer has undertaken when he 
suffers a total or partial loss due to the risks covered in the law. 
(50, Art. 2). Those costs covered are defined to be those of preparing 
the land for seeding; risks in irrigated crops; fertilizers, insecticides 
and their application; seeds, seeding and transplanting; cultivation; and 
The premiums are only part of the amount needed to cover the 
calculated risk. The rest is covered by a government subsidy to the 
Aseguradora Nacional. As noted above, the government more heavily 
subsidizes the eiidatario than the propietario (15). 
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harvesting and transporting the crop to storage (50, Reglamento Art. 8). 
For each insured crop in the zone a schedule of these costs is prepared 
by technicians of the Mutual in accordance with how the crop is grown, 
i.e., with or without improved seed, fertilizer, etc. This schedule is 
used as the basis for making indemnizations. Limits are defined as to 
how much of the cost can be covered. For crops grown on seasonal land no 
more than 50 percent of the estimated value of the harvested crop may­
be covered. In the case of irrigated crops using fertilizer, no more 
than 70 percent can be covered and for irrigated crops without fertilizer 
no more than 60 percent. In case, however, of a partial loss, these 
limits may be exceeded at the judgement of the Aseguradora Nacional 
(50, Reglamento 10-11). 
A total loss is considered to take place when the remaining estimated 
costs of growing the harvesting the crop are greater than the estimated 
value of the crop. In such a case the amount of indemnity will be equal 
to the amount of expense incurred as listed on the schedule up to the 
moment of the disaster. Indemnities paid for partial losses will be 
equal to the sum of 1) the expenses at the time of the damage, and 2) the 
necessary expenses to continue to grow and harvest the crop less the value 
of the crop at harvest (50, Reglamento 56-57). In order to claim the 
indemnities the farmer must have met certain requirements in managing 
his crop as well as in reporting the damages when they occurred as set 
forth in the Law. In the cases of the official banks, the payment is 
made directly to the bank without passing through the farmers hands. 
This practice automatically decreases his debt as well as the banks' 
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loans outstanding. 
Crop insurance and uncertainty 
Crop insurance is designed to reduce the farmer's uncertainty 
(hence decrease his aversion to uncertainty) by permitting him to pay a 
small fee to avoid the possibility of a large loss. Although it is not 
possible to probe this in depth, some observations can be made on how the 
crop insurance program may accomplish this objective. 
First, the insurance program does not provide a hedge aginst low 
35 
product prices. Therefore, any uncertainty from this source would 
still be present. Second, there are some crops grown in the zone in any 
one cycle that are not insurable because they were not specified as such 
by the Secretary of Agriculture. Growers of these crops are subject to 
all their uncertainties arising from yield or price fluctuations. 
Third, the indemnities in cases of disasters do not repay the farmer 
for all of his own or family labor time, nor his management. The only 
thing it insures is that he is relatively out of debt on the crop covered. 
The lost earnings may not leave enough to provide for his family's needs 
and force him to borrow elsewhere, possibly from a money lender at 
unfavorable terms. This possibility still creates uncertainties for 
the farmer. 
These three points illustrate that the crop insurance program will 
not erase the uncertainties associated with growing the crops, but they 
35 
CONOSUPO does provide some degree of rigidity along with other 
Mexican attempts to control prices through agricultural policy. 
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would suggest that the program should greatly reduce the uncertainties, 
for it reduces the possibilities of a farmer suffering complete ruin 
36 
or leaving him with a nearly unsurmountable debt . 
Why borrowers working with private lending institutions don't use 
crop insurance is a difficult question to answer. It would suggest, 
however, that the cost of the premium doesn't compensate them for the 
uncertainty or busy-work in joining the program. 
Because the Federal Government contributes so heavily to the 
premiums it is clear that this is another social welfare program of 
the government. 
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CHAPTER VI. TESTS OF HYPOTHESES AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The hypotheses of this study were set forth in Chapter I. The 
purpose of this chapter is to test these hypotheses, to review the 
results, and to draw conclusions from the tests. The chapter is 
organized in sections. Each section deals with one hypothesis with a 
statement of the hypothesis, the test(s) used to test it, and the 
interpretation of the results. At the end of the chapter is a section 
presenting conclusions and a summary. 
All tests are made assuming a given lender-representative farm firm 
combination. Table 6.1 presents the various combinations studied. The 
results for each test are obtained directly or indirectly from the 
linear programming model specified in Chapter III. The criteria 
utilized in the tests for external credit rationing are presented in 
Chapter V. These results must be viewed in terms of the assumptions of 
the model as well as the assumptions concerning the prices, products, 
factors, and the supply of credit that were stated in Chapters III and 
IV. The farm year is assumed to begin in June and end in May because no 
crop activities were carried over from May to June and because the 
summer cycle is the major cycle in the region. If the year was started 
at another time the credit profile might be expected to change because 
the flow of receipts has an important effect on the monthly credit 
needs. 
This chapter is written in terms of the short-term credit used and 
the marginal value products of credit. Because a discount mechanism is 
Table 6.1. Lender-representative farm firm combinations tested 
Borrower 
Ejidatario Ejidatario Ei idartario Propietario Assumed annual rate of 
Apatzingàh Apatzingati Zaragoza Apatzingah discount of lender 
Lender 20 hectares 10 hectares 
Banco Agrfcola X 10% 
Banco Eiidal XXX 10% 
Commercial bank X 18% 
Credit union 10% 
Dealers and 
merchants X 18% 
Other lenders X 18% 
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assumed these figures differ from those of the amounts of operating 
capital employed as outlined at the end of Chapter III.^ The assumed 
discount rates of the various lenders are presented in Table 5.1. Only 
two were selected in order to save computing expense. 
The farmers are assumed to be profit maximizers to have no savings 
or debt at the beginning of the year. This assumption causes the farmer 
to employ all operating capital as borrowed capital or credit. If the 
farmer began the year with net savings the demand for borrowed capital or 
credit would be reduced by T^(l + r'). This reduction represents the 
amount of the saving, T^, plus the saving, T^r', on the borrowing costs. 
On the other hand, if the farmer began the year with debt of T^ and had 
to refinance this debt his demand for short-term credit would be 
increased by the same amount, T^ (1 + r'). 
The hypotheses are tested under the conditions of the four levels of 
living expenditures outlined in Chapter IV in. order to view their effect 
on credit requirements. In the following text these four levels are 
referred to as high, medium, low, and zero levels of living expenditure. 
These terms are associated with monthly expenditures of $1,816.63, 
^The credit figures can be converted to operating capital by 
multiplying the credit by (1 - M) where M is the size of the discount. 
The marginal value product of capital is higher than the marginal value 
ôx 
product of credit in any month by the amount of (r' + M where r' is 
the rate of interest on the capital employed, M is the size of the 
ôx 
discount, and is the marginal value product of operating capital in 
the month. 
226 
$1,191.00; $621.31, and $0.00 respectively. It is not the intent of the 
study to say which is the level of living expenditure of the farmers but 
rather to indicate the results if the various levels of expenditures are 
assumed. 
These results are derived from data representing a good management 
level, complete technical knowledge and no aversion to uncertainty. To 
the extent the fanner is a poorer manager or lacks technical knowledge 
he would likely earn less income with the sàme levels of credit. If he 
has aversion to uncertainty he would use less credit. 
Hypothesis A 
The hypothesis 
That for each representative farm firm and for a given lender 
there is a range which defines the boundaries of the farmer's demand for 
short-term credit within which the farmer can profitably use credit 
because the marginal productivity of a unit of credit is greater than 
the cost of the unit of credit. 
The test 
Using the linear program model outlined in Chapter III, and given a 
representative farm firm-lender combination specified in Table 6.1, and 
an assumed level of living expenditure, parameterize the line of credit 
from a high level down to the last feasible solution as the line of credit 
approaches zero in order to determine the upper and lower bounds of the 
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2 
potential "demand" schedule if it exists. Repeat for other levels of 
living expenditures. It is assumed the farmer is a completely rational 
maximizer, has no aversion to uncertainty, has complete technical 
knowledge and has a zero level of savings. 
The results 
The hypothesis was accepted for all representative farm firms 
because all had ranges where the marginal value product of credit was 
positive. The "demand" schedules for each representative farm firm are 
presented and discussed individually. At the outset, however, several 
general comments are made that apply to each farm firm in order to avoid 
unnecessary repetition. 
The upper bound of the "demand" schedule is the optimum use of 
credit. As an example, this bound for the eiidatario of Apatzing^n with 
20 hectares is shown in Table 6.2 as the first entry of $22,056. The 
marginal value product of the last peso of credit invested is greater 
than zero due to the linearity assumption. An additional peso of credit 
would return nothing to the firm assuming the 10 percent rate of discount 
and hence would not be employed. The lower bound to the schedule is 
determined as the level of credit that the farmer must employ in order to 
start-up operations. This level is determined by the size of predeter­
mined expenditures and receipts such as the level of living, milking 
activities, mule feeding activities, and in the case of the propietario, 
2 
As was pointed out in Chapter III these "demand" schedules are not 
true demand schedules so they are enclosed in quotation marks. 
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real estate taxes. In Table 6.2 this limit is $10,921. Because of the 
important effect of level of living expenditures on the size of predeter­
mined expenditures the lower bound of the "demand" schedule is higher as 
the level of living expenditures is higher. 
The marginal value products of credit in the center column of 
Table 6.2 are the net returns over the assumed interest costs per month. 
These marginal value products are those associated with basis changes in 
the linear program in the parameterization process^  The range over which 
these marginal value products hold is interpreted as follows. The 
marginal value product of credit does not change over the interval of 
$3,004 from credit level $19,051 to $22,056. Over this range the 
marginal value product is $.0152 per additional unit of credit over 
interest costs or a 1.52 percent return to a unit of credit. Over the 
interval of $18,972 to $19,052 the marginal value product of credit is 
$.223. The constant marginal value products over the intervals are due 
to the linearity assumptions of the program as outlined in Chapter III. 
The third column in Table 6.2 shows net income after fixed costs 
and level of living expenditures. Below a level of $16,704 of credit 
employed the basis changes show that the net income is negative indi­
cating dissavings. The "demand" schedule below the break-even level 
is relevant because in the short-run the farm firm would continue to 
produce so long as variable costs are covered. In terms of the present 
analysis however, the main interest is where positive levels of saving 
occur, i.e., above the break-even point. Therefore this is the range 
given the most emphasis. The results showing net dissaving illustrate 
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an important point, however. Unless the farmer has enough operating 
capital to maintain his level of consumption he will be perpetually in 
debt. Table 4.7 shows Mexican farmers with the lowest two levels of 
living expenditures have, on the average, net dissaving. The lack of 
sufficient operating capital may be one reason why this condition exists. 
The ejidatario of Apatzing^ n with 20 hectares 
This ejidatario has only seasonal land and therefore is restricted 
to the corn, sesame, and sorgo activities presented in Chapter IV for 
seasonal land. Tables 6.2 through 6.5 show the "demand" schedules for 
short-term credit associated with the four levels of living expenditures 
for this representative farm firm. Aside from the amount of credit 
required the schedules have a similar pattern reflecting the fact that the 
mix of activities does not change significantly with the level of living 
expenditure. Rather, the level of credit changes. As the level of living 
expenditure decreases less credit is required at the lower bound and the 
marginal value product of credit increases. This is because less 
operating capital is required to start-up the operation. As a result 
fewer hectares need to be brought under cultivation at lower levels of 
living. At the highest level of living through the low he needs to farm 
9.1, 5.6, and 3.5 hectares respectively in order to start-up the farming 
operation. At a zero level of living and without credit he can farm 2.5 
hectares with only his income from his milking operation. The higher 
marginal value products of credit indicate that the farmer reaps large 
returns from additional capital by using it is a means to further utilize 
redundant land, labor, and mule power. When the extensive margin of these 
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Table 6.2. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for eiidatario 
Apatzingin with 20 hectares 
1) Assumed living expenditures $21780/year or $1816.63/month 
2) Assumed fixed costs $200/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$22056® 
19052 
18971 
18498 
18471 
18245 
18168 
17823 
16704 
16535 
15716 
14739 
13763 
12196 
11300 
ill97 
11000 
10921 
$ .01520 
.22300 
.23383 
.46055 
.46204 
.51209 
.55171 
.91272 
.92129 
1.44198 
1.45552 
1.46918 
1.48297 
1.49823 
1.51363 
2.29914 
2.9857 
2.9857 
$ 2832 
2787 
2769 
2650 
2628 
2441 
2371 
1975 
-1596 
-3345 
-5111 
-7970 
-9621 
-9814 
-10508 
-11059 
136 
144 
O^ptimal level 
231 
Table 6.3. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for ejidatario 
Apatzingin with 20 hectares 
1) Assumed living expenditures $14292/year or $1191/month 
2) Assumed fixed costs $200/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$18238 
15537 
15396 
14999 
14392 
14423 
14310 
8616 
8014 
7737 
7565 
7269 
6927 
6727 
6618 
$ .01690 
.04380 
.21703 
.22036 
.64481 
.66500 
1.42857 
1.44198 
1.45552 
2.87206 
2.89902 
4.44712 
4.49182 
4.53693 
4.53693 
$10452 
10406 
10400 
10291 
10272 
10043 
9741 
-267 
-1136 
-1832 
-2415 
-3054 
-4894 
-5270 
-6309 
O^ptimal level 
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Table 6.4. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for ejidatario 
Apatzingin with 20 hectares 
1) Assumed level of living expenditures $7456/year or $621.3l/month 
2) Assumed fixed costs $200/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$15308® 
12607 
12316 
12010 
11851 
11314 
11179 
4740 
4317 
4000 
3501 
3498 
3430 
3368 
3365 
3325 
3254 
3216 
3194 
$ .01690 
12.07756 
12.19094 
12.31137 
12.43294 
12.43294 
.04380 
.21708 
.22036 
.64481 
1.38376 
1.42857 
2.17059 
3.35188 
4.28398 
6.52228 
6.58351 
6.64531 
6.73041 
$17402 
17357 
17344 
17260 
17216 
16515 
16536 
5217 
3815 
2633 
-250 
-268 
-761 
-1225 
-1260 
-1763 
-2648 
-3135 
-3459 
O^ptimal level 
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Table 6.5. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for eiidatario 
Apatzing^ n with 20 hectares 
1) Assumed level of living expenditures $0/year 
2) Assumed fixed costs $200/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$12113* 
9412 
8956 
8750 
8492 
8047 
7679 
1471 
1171 
1110 
1050 
1000 
955 
323 
279 
233 
89 
69 
68 
38 
16 
$ .01690 
.04380 
.21703 
.22036 
.64481 
1.38376 
1.42857 
2.17509 
2.82878 
2.94004 
3.48774 
4.46682 
4.69120 
8.96081 
9.08641 
7.01630 
9.32431 
9.55177 
22.70814 
22.72914 
16.31486 
$24983 
24937 
24917 
24860 
24788 
24412 
24334 
12885 
11886 
11682 
11482 
11224 
10996 
7718 
7209 
6747 
4823 
4561 
4534 
3884 
3292 
2866 0 22.70814 
O^ptimal level 
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Table 6.6. Marginal value products of credit at extensive margin of 
selected resources for the elidatario of Apatzing^ n with 
20 hectares 
Level of 
living 
expenditure credit mvp 
(pesos/month) level 
Marginal value product of credit (pesos) 
when mule power is only 
source of power for last 
time 
credit mvp next mvp 
level 
when all of land is under 
cultivation for first time 
next mvp 
1. $1816,63 $17823 $ .91272 $.55171 $11197 $2.29914 $1.51363 
2. $1191.00 14310 1.42857 .66500 7737 2.87206 1.45552 
3. $ 621.31 11314 1.38376 .64481 4740 2.17509 1.42857 
4. $ 0.00 8047 1.38376 .64481 1471 2.17509 1.42857 
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Table 6.7. Resource and product profiles for selected levels of credit 
associated with a high level of living expenditure for the 
ejidatario of Apatzing^ n with 20 hectares 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 1816.63 
Net income $ 2832 
Level of credit $22056 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
.01520 1114.47 19.86 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May 6.0 
June 6374 20.0 16.3 
July 15132 20.0 88.9 
Aug. 17417 20,0 37.5 
Sept. 19499 20.0 7.1 
Oct. 21620 20.0 45.0 
Nov. 22056 17.7 50.3 
Dec. 6.0 
34.84 
10.3 
11.5 
138.6 
123.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTMI (17.71) 
PATBX ( 2.29) 
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Table 6.7 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $ 2775 
Level of credit $19000 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
.22300 934.48 23.71 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May 6.0 
June 4740 20.0 45.0 
July 12521 20.0 114.7 
Aug. 14784 20.0 37.7 
Sept. 16843 20.0 7.2 
Oct. 18953 20.0 45.7 
Nov. 19000 17.7 46.4 
Dec. 6.0 
41.97 
39.0 
43.3 
88.7 
78.9 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTMI (11.33) 
PMTBI ( 6.33) 
PATBX ( 2.33) 
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Table 6.7 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $ 2178 
Level of credit $18000 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
,59804 338.13 41.96 60.12 73.61 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May 6.0 
June 4510 20.0 51.0 
July 11548 20.0 113.9 
Aug. 13822 20.0 39.2 
Sept. 15833 20.0 7.3 
Oct. 18000 20.0 46.6 
Nov. 18000 17.4 44.4 
Dec. 6.0 
45.0 
50.0 
78.3 
69.6 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTMI (8.94) 
PMTBI (8.43) 
PATMX (1.06) 
PATBI (1.57) 
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Table 6.7 (Continued) 
Level of living 
exp end i ture/mo. 
Net income $ 136 
Level of credit $16704 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
.91229 52.03 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May- 6.0 
June 4091 18.4 51.0 
July 10290 18.4 114.2 
Aug. 12565 18.4 39.5 
Sept. 14629 18.4 7.5 
Oct. 16704 18.4 45.4 
Nov. 16704 15.3 40.2 
Dec. 6.0 
95.13 91.26 
45.0 
50.0 
78.3 
69.6 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTMI (8.37) 
PMTBI (6.97) 
PATBI (3.03) 
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Table 6.8. Resource and product profiles for optimum levels of credit 
use at medium, low, and zero levels of living expenditures 
for the eildatario of Apatzlngin with 20 hectares 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income 
Level of credit 
$ 1191 
$10452 
$18238 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
.01690 1116.87 19.71 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May 6.0 
June 5710 20.0 16.3 
July 13798 20.0 88.9 
Aug. 15406 20.0 37.5 
Sept. 16806 20.0 7.1 
Oct. 18238 20.0 45.0 
Nov. 17978 17.7 50.3 
Dec. 6.0 
34.90 
10.3 
11.5 
138.6 
123.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTMI (17.71) 
PATBX ( 2.29) 
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Table 6.8 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 621.31 
Net income $17402 
Level of credit $15308 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
.01690 1116.87 19.71 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May 6.0 
June 5135 20.0 16.3 
July 12634 20.0 88.9 
Aug. 13665 20.0 37.5 
Sept. 14474 20.0 7.1 
Oct. 15308 20.0 45.0 
Nov. 14446 17.7 50.3 
Dec. 6.0 
34.89 
10.3 
11.5 
138.6 
123.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTMI (17.71) 
PATBX ( 2.29) 
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Table 6.8 (Continued) 
Level of living 
exp end i tur e /mo. 
Net income 
Level of credit 
$ 0 
$24983 
$12113 
Credit 
(pesos) 
Land 
(hectares) 
Labor 
(jornales) 
Mule team 
(jornales) 
Tractor 
(hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
.01690 1116.87 19.71 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May 6.0 
June 4508 20.0 16.3 
July 11382 20.0 88.9 
Aug. 11766 20.0 37.5 
Sept. 11930 20.0 7.1 
Oct. 12113 20.0 45.0 
Nov. 10594 17.7 50.3 
Dec. 6.0 
34.89 
10.3 
11.5 
138.6 
123.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTMI (17.71) 
PATBX ( 2.29) 
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Table 6.9. Resource and product profiles for "break-even" levels of 
credit use at medium and low levels of living expenditures 
for the eildatario of Apatzlng^ n with 20 hectares 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $1191 
Net income $ 407 
Level of credit $9000 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 1.42857 53.70 99.15 94.19 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May 6.0 
June 1774 11.9 51.0 
July 4970 11.9 89.7 
Aug. 6401 11.9 27.1 
Sept. 7699 11.9 6.9 
Oct. 9000 11.9 29.8 
Nov. 9000 10.1 26.3 
Dec. 6.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTMI à. 92) 
PMTBI (8.17) 
PATBI (1.83) 
45.0 15.0 
50.0 13.4 
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Table 6.9 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 621.31 
Net income $2633 
Level of credit $4000 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
4.28398 115.01 155.12 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May 6.0 
June 594 7.3 38.8 
July 1953 7.3 61.1 
Aug. 2687 7.3 18.1 
Sept. 3343 7.3 6.5 
Oct. 4000 7.3 18.5 
Nov. 4000 6.3 18.0 
Dec. 6.0 
32.8 
36.4 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTBI (6.32) 
PATBI ( .96) 
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resources is reached the marginal value product falls significantly 
because of the additional outlay to hire labor or tractor services or to 
deepen the capital use per hectare of land. Table 6.6 substantiates this 
by showing the significant drops in the marginal value product of credit 
as the extensive margin of mule team power and land is reached. The 
table also shows the rather consistent patterns in the marginal value 
products of credit at the extensive margins of land and mule power for 
the various levels of living expenditures. 
The changes in the farm plans associated with each of the four 
levels of living expenditures follow a consistent pattern as more credit 
is employed. Table 6.7 illustrates this pattern for selected levels of 
credit associated with the highest level of living expenditures beginning 
with the "break-even" through the optimum. At the "break-even" level 
the farmer doesn't have all of his land under cultivation and relies 
extensively on mule power. The fact that he borrows no money over the 
winter indicates that his summer earnings on crop and milk activities are 
sufficient to carry him through the winter. As the level of credit is 
increased he reaches the extensive land margin and begins to substitute 
tractor power for mule power as is indicated by the corn activities 
undertaken. His monthly credit needs expand correspondingly. The shadow 
prices associated with land, labor, mules, and tractors show that those 
of the latter three decrease after they have ceased being redundant. On 
3 • 
The break-even point used is the first basis change or parameter 
change showing saving and therefore is not the true break-even point. For 
this reason the quotation marks are used. 
The crop activities listed are coded by five letters. The meaning of each letter is explained 
as follows: 
Letter 1 
Constant 
P 
Examples : 
Letter 2 
Name of crop 
M = corn 
G = cotton 
A = sesame 
R = rice 
Q = cantaloupe 
S = sorgo 
Letter 3 
Cycle 
A = summer 
S = winter 
T = temporal 
Letter 4 
Power 
M = tractors 
B = mules 
Letter 5 
Insecticides and 
fertilizers 
0 = no fertilizer or 
insecticide 
F = fertilizer 
1 = insecticide 
X = both fertilizer and 
insecticide 
(1) PAAMX 
sesame, summer cycle, with tractor and both fertilizer and insecticide 
(2) PMSBO 
corn, winter cycle, mules, no fertilizer or insecticide 
Figure 6.1. Code for reading crop activities in the tables in Chapter 
o^r complete listing of crops by code name see Appendix A 
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the other hand the shadow price on land follows the general pattern of 
increasing as more credit is employed. This is attributable to the 
fact that land becomes more valuable to the farmer as more capital 
permits its intensive margin to be reached given the set of activities 
with which it may be employed. 
The optimum in Table 6.7 may be compared with optimums associated 
with the other three levels of living expenditures in Table 6.8. The 
activity mix is the same £ôï all of the optimums. 
The "break-even" levels for the medium and low levels of living 
expenditures are presented in Table 6.9. As the farmer went from these 
"break-even" levels to the optimums he would follow the same pattern as 
set forth in Table 6.7. The "break-even" levels of credit use indicate 
how the farmer could subsist at these income levels, not cultivate all 
of his land, in general have redundant labor, and rely extensively on 
mule power. This may be a reason why so much land of the eiidatarios in 
Apatzing^ n was left idle according to the 1960 census data presented 
in Table 4.4. To the extent that this is true more short-term credit 
4 
could be used to bring more land in production. 
The effect of aversion to uncertainty would tend to decrease the 
farmer's employment of credit. Table 6.2 shows that he doesn't gain 
much income for additional units of credit employed after $17,823 units 
are employed. The ejidatario does not have much equity to lose but he is 
This argument agrees with one of the reasons set forth by Gonzales 
Santos (36) concerning as to why so much farm land is not in production. 
247 
aware that if he suffers losses that he will have the burden of carrying 
old debts into future crop cycles or may lose his chance for credit in 
future cycles due to his lack of success in the current cycle. 
The ejidatario on seasonal land is not assured of sufficient rain­
fall and he may have a rather high aversion to uncertainty discount 
factor due to this fact. This may indicate that he would prefer to 
employ less than the optimal amounts of credit shown in the tables. 
At all levels of living expenditures the farmer generates savings. 
These savings can be used for more consumption expenditures at the end of 
the year, to purchase farm equipment or make capital improvements, to 
invest in non-farm purposes or to offset the needs for borrowed capital 
in the following year. The level of savings is inversely related to the 
level of living expenditure. The farmer would want to assume a level of 
monthly living expenditures so as to equate the level of monthly 
consumption with the possibility of saving in order to have funds 
available for any of the above purposes. Therefore it is not certain that 
he would prefer a higher level of living to a lower level of living. 
The ejidatario of Apatzine^ n with 10 hectares 
This representative farm firm was defined to be exactly the same as 
the ejidatario of Apatzing^ n just studied with the exception of the size 
of the land base. The results may be interpreted in a similar manner. 
Therefore in this section the analysis is concerned with discussing those 
results which are different from those just presented. 
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show the "demand" schedules for short-term 
credit associated with the low and zero levels of living expenditures. 
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Table 6.10. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for eiidatario 
Apatzing^ n with 10 hectares 
1) Assumed living expenditures $7456/year or $621.31/month 
2) Assumed fixed costs $200/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$9044* 
8780 
5471 
5010 
4740 
4317 
4000 
3500 
3498 
3430 
3368 
3365 
3325 
3254 
3216 
3191 
$ .01436 
12.07756 
12.19094 
12.31137 
12.43294 
12.43294 
.02820 
.22726 
.66500 
1.42857 
3.35188 
4.28398 
6.5228 
6.58351 
6.64531 
6.73041 
$ 5757 
5753 
5604 
5511 
5217 
3815 
2233 
-250 
-268 
-761 
-1225 
-1260 
-1763 
-2648 
-3135 
-3459 
O^ptimal level 
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Table 6.11. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for eiidatario 
Apatzing^ n with 10 hectares 
1) Assumed living expenditure $0/year 
2) Assumed fixed costs $200/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$5568* 
5357 
2109 
$ .01627 
.02882 
.22726 
.66500 
2.17500 
2.82878 
2.94004 
3.48774 
4.46682 
4.69120 
8.96081 
9.08641 
7.01630 
9.32431 
9.55177 
$13336 
13333 
13535 
13044 
13179 
11886 
11682 
11482 
11224 
10996 
7718 
7209 
6747 
4823 
4561 
4534 
3884 
3292 
2866 
1648 
1471 
1171 
1110 
1050 
1000 
955 
323 
279 
233 
89 
69 
68 
38 
16 
0 
16.31486 
22.72914 
22.70814 
22.70814 
O^ptimal level 
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Table 6.12. Resource and product profiles for selected levels of credit 
associated with a low level of living expenditure for the 
ejidatario of Apatzing^ n with 10 hectares 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 621.31 
Net income $5757 
Level of credit $9044 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .01436 1167.81 19.66 34.81 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May 6.0 
June 2928 10.0 10.1 
July 6560 10.0 45.0 
Aug. 7355 10.0 20.5 
Sept. 8052 10.0 6.5 
Oct. 8764 10.0 21.3 
Nov. 9044 9.1 28.8 
Dec. 6.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTMI (9.10) 
PATBX ( . 90) 
4.1 71.3 
4.5 63.3 
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Table 6.12 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $5702 
Level of credit $7000 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
.02882 1148.03 20.25 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May 6.0 
June 1841 10.0 29.1 
July 4837 10.0 62.3 
Aug. 5619 10.0 20.8 
Sept. 6302 10.0 6.5 
Oct. 7000 10.0 22.3 
Nov. 7000 9.0 26.1 
Dec. 6.0 
35.85 
23.1 
25.7 
38.1 
33.8 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTMI (4.86) 
PMTBI (4.18) 
PATBX ( .96) 
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Table 6.12 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $5451 
Level of credit $5000 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
.66500 565.09 37.02 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May 6.0 
June 706 10.0 51.0 
July 2902 10.0 81.3 
Aug. 3662 10.0 20.5 
Sept. 4324 10.0 6.4 
Oct. 5000 10.0 21.0 
Nov. 5000 9.1 23.3 
Dec. 6.0 
40.58 64.93 
45.0 
50.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTBI (9.11) 
PATBI ( .05) 
PATBX ( .84) 
Table 6.12 (Continued) 
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Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $2633 
Level of credit $4000 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jomales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 4.28398 
product (highest 
mo.) 
115.01 155.12 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May- 6.0 
June 594 7.3 38.8 
July 1953 7.3 61.1 
Aug. 2687 7.3 18.1 
Sept. 3343 7.3 6.5 
Oct. 4000 7.3 18.5 
Nov. 4000 6.3 18.0 
Dec. 6.0 
32.8 
36.4 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTBI (6.32) 
PATBI ( .96) 
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Table 6.13. Resource and product profiles for optimum level of credit 
use at the zero level of living expenditure for the 
eiidatario of Apatzing^ n with 10 hectares 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 0 
Net income $13336 
Level of credit $ 5568 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .01627 1178.77 16.51 34.87 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 6.0 
May 6.0 
June 2301 10.0 10.0 
July 5300 10.0 45.0 
Aug. 5456 10.0 20.5 
Sept. 5508 10.0 6.5 
Oct. 5568 10.0 21.3 
Nov. 5592 9.1 28.8 
Dec. 6.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMTMI (9.10) 
PATBX ( . 90) 
4.1 71.3 
4.5 63.3 
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Those associated with the highest and medium levels of living expenditures 
are not presented because at the optimum levels of credit use the farmer 
is still a net dissaver by considerable sums. At the highest level of 
living his optimum use of credit is $16,554 but he dissaves $9,064. At 
the medium level his optimum use of credit is $12,576 but he digsaves 
$1,203. This indicates that under the best of conditions this farmer 
could not expect to maintain a level of living as high as that associated 
with these two levels. In general the pattern of employment of resources 
and the mix of activities is the same for both schedules as more credit 
is employed. The noticeable drops in the marginal value products of 
credit from $.66500 to $.22726 in both tables occur when the farmer 
begins to introduce machine power. The sharp drop immediately before that 
down to $.66500 from $1.42857 and $2.17500 respectively results from 
having reached the extensive margin of land. 
Table 6.12 shows the profiles of resources and products as the 
farmer moves from the "break-even" level of credit use to the optimum 
level at the low level of living expenditures. The pattern noted with 
respect to the eiidatario with 20 hectares repeats itself. The farmer 
can "break-even" and farm with only mules and less than all of his land 
at this level of credit. As he employs more credit he reaches the 
extensive margin of his land and then begins to substitute tractor power 
for mule power in his corn growing activities until he reaches the 
optimum. Again the shadow price on land tends to rise as capital is 
deepened. The shadow prices for labor, mules, and tractors decrease 
after they cease being redundant. Table 6.13 shows that the optimum 
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level of credit use at a zero level of living expenditures gives rise to 
the same product and resource mix as the optimum of Table 6.12. 
Table 6.12 also shows that there is a considerable range where the 
gain from employing additional capital is not very large. If the 
farmer had limited capital or had some degree of aversion to uncertainty 
he would not use his credit to the optimum level. This may explain why 
this farmer would not want to employ tractor services, but rather farm 
his land with mule power either using all or less than all of his landi 
The ejidatario of Zaragoza 
In contrast with the ejidatario from Apatzing^ n the ejidatario from 
Zaragoza has all irrigated land for both the summer and winter cycles. 
This permits him to operate with a wider range of activities and higher 
revenue producing activities such as cotton. These activities for 
irrigated land were specified in Chapter IV. Generally the ejidatarios 
do not grow cantaloupe. Therefore this activity was deleted from the 
set of alternatives available to this farmer. However, in order to see 
how the results would differ if cantaloupe were a possible activity, 
an optimal solution was obtained using this alternative. The results are 
presented at the end of this section. 
Tables 6.14 through 6.17 show the "demand" schedules for short-term 
credit associated with the four levels of living expenditures and without 
the cantaloupe activity. As was observed with the ejidatarios of 
Apatzingin the four schedules have a similar appearance except that those 
associated with lower levels of living expenditures have lower bounds 
associated with the employment of less credit and with higher marginal 
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Table 6.14. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for the eiidatario 
Zaragoza with 10 hectares 
1) Assumed living expenditures $21780/year or $1816.63/month 
2) Assumed fixed cost 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$55459 
55026 
53312 
50043 
42278 
36509 
36211 
32698 
30877 
26580 
26429 
25816 
25075 
22417 
22295 
21356 
21052 
18916 
17221 
16780 
14918 
14695 
14595 
14577 
14282 
14238 
14108 
14039 
13899 
13735 
13686 
13554 
$ .02617 
.18171 
.18341 
.18561 
.18735 
.18691 
.18897 
.18602 
.18777 
.26171 
.37474 
.38089 
.38296 
.38290 
.39413 
.44174 
.48781 
.49248 
.80863 
.81700 
.85881 
.86895 
.96620 
1.37863 
1.50344 
1.96226 
2.19417 
2.64394 
2.77031 
3.72432 
4.02713 
4.09731 
$24420 
24409 
24097 
23498 
22056 
20975 
21009 
20247 
19889 
19037 
18978 
18686 
18330 
17042 
16983 
16460 
16267 
14801 
13626 
13270 
11298 
11557 
11470 
11453 
10920 
10810 
10453 
10230 
9719 
9080 
8811 
8036 
O^ptimal level 
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Table 6.14 (Continued) 
1) Assumed living expenditures $21780/year or $1816.63/month 
2) Assumed fixed cost 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$13545 $4.47340 $ 7984 
13515 4.49731 7792 
13402 4.60539 7076 
12303 4.67078 -128 
12067 4.67522 -1698 
12046 4.77942 -1838 
12000 5.98025 -2242 
11910 7.14123 -3015 
11909 7.50830 -3027 
11890 9.02418 -3234 
11879 9.55489 -3378 
11858 10.47281 -3675 
11805 12.8552 -4616 
11687 15.94980 -6806 
11602 38.31172 -11399 
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Table 5.15. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for eiidatario 
Zaragoza with 10 hectares 
1) Assumed living expenditures $14292/year or $1191/month 
2) Assumed fixed costs $200/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$50679 $ .02592 $32136 
50247 .18002 32125 
45264 .18217 31227 
36181 .18388 29573 
32658 .18345 28925 
31597 .18547 28729 
29038 .18258 28248 
23860 .25448 27250 
23672 .31222 27178 
20279 .37287 25589 
20128 .40412 25517 
19653 .39019 25281 
18789 .39382 24834 
18330 .39482 24594 
18000 .39572 24417 
17691 .47457 24282 
16845 .47821 23686 
15301 .48278 22647 
15049 .51874 22476 
15000 .79271 22437 
13760 .79366 21454 
13398 .80187 21167 
12433 .80625 20393 
12353 .84271 20329 
12010 .84372 20040 
11536 .88515 19640 
11213 .93769 19354 
10772 1.02940 18940 
10758 1.08776 18926 
10733 1.19602 18898 
O^ptimal level 
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Table 6.15 (Continued) 
1) Assumed living expenditures $14292/year or $1191/month 
2) Assumed fixed costs $200/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$10712 $ 1.45717 $18870 
10455 1.47085 18461 
10345 1.59350 18284 
10148 1.76278 17945 
9843 2.11193 17366 
9364 2.42439 16262 
9222 2.48907 15865 
8950 2.95891 15064 
8631 3.37970 13668 
8603 3.51076 13542 
8505 3.57804 13085 
8449 3.8407 12822 
8426 4.80057 12705 
8392 4.90627 12479 
8381 4.92119 12405 
8245 4.92470 11483 
7983 4.94215 9682 
7869 5.00628 8898 
7556 5.13470 6723 
7443 5.16159 5929 
7325 5.23049 5095 
7302 5.30350 4929 
7301 6.67479 4919 
7186 7.99662 3856 
7179 10.19021 3778 
7172 10.73002 3689 
7163 10.99887 3556 
7159 11.26988 3493 
7152 12.44798 3375 
7141 15.22714 3172 
7000 27.51260 -1589 
6985 65.85894 -2071 
6980 213.80357 -2503 
6962 215.93103 -6529 
6960 227.80946 -7161 
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Table 6.16. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for eiidatario 
Zaragoza with 10 hectares 
1) Assumed level of living expenses $7456/year or $621.3l/month 
2) Assumed level of fixed costs $200/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$46538 
46106 
41123 
29322 
27601 
25857 
21504 
21284 
21000 
17880 
17142 
15725 
14894 
14516 
13179 
13170 
13168 
13000 
12330 
10468 
9500 
8606 
8283 
8051 
7843 
7784 
7679 
7593 
7450 
7374 
7205 
$ .02592 
.18002 
.18217 
.18174 
.18375 
.18088 
.25211 
.30931 
.36795 
.39481 
.39870 
.38564 
.38740 
.46287 
.46921 
.47433 
.51013 
.77815 
.78628 
.79441 
.82810 
.86876 
.92033 
.92897 
1.01982 
1.07765 
1.18490 
1.44362 
1.56400 
1.57679 
1.74429 
$39124 
39113 
38171 
36066 
35750 
35428 
34594 
34512 
34380 
32932 
32643 
31879 
31445 
31255 
30381 
30375 
30374 
30243 
29722 
28258 
27489 
26749 
26468 
26254 
26061 
26001 
25888 
25773 
25548 
25421 
25132 
a. 
Optimal level 
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Table 6.16 (Continued) 
1) Assumed level of living expenses $7456/year or $621.31/month 
2) Assumed level of fixed costs $200/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$ 6826 $ 2.08979 $24419 
5542 2.21254 21491 
5419 2.21519 21195 
5129 2.56505 20497 
4900 2.62123 19825 
4837 2.80425 19636 
4633 2.88445 19008 
4420 2.94150 18289 
4220 3.91197 17324 
4187 4.07925 17161 
4185 4.37977 17147 
4159 8.51409 16932 
4150 8.97459 16790 
4069 18.38423 15974 
4068 26.88024 15949 
3895 36.30494 10998 
3873 48.38313 10086 
3867 55.88913 9786 
3858 68.37588 9276 
3797 76.53156 4329 
3753 94.93461 724 
3733 225.56496 -3884 
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Table 6.17. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for ejidatario 
Zaragoza with 10 hectares 
1) Assumed level of living expenditures $0/year 
2) Assumed fixed costs $200/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$42203® 
41591 
36608 
25684 
23242 
22409 
18934 
18680 
15428 
13781 
11441 
11160 
11121 
11066 
10484 
9135 
7563 
7273 
5411 
5088 
4647 
4540 
4349 
4237 
4192 
3996 
3535 
2812 
2372 
1959 
$ .02592 
.18002 
.18217 
.18174 
.18375 
.18088 
.25211 
.36795 
.39481 
.39870 
.38564 
.48260 
.57644 
.75674 
.77091 
.77897 
.81234 
.82040 
.86068 
.91177 
1.00094 
1.05770 
1.24087 
1.44824 
1.53504 
1.69811 
2.03446 
2.05356 
2.17418 
2.20819 
$46747 
46736 
45838 
43848 
43400 
43225 
42582 
42486 
40977 
40177 
39130 
38886 
38865 
38833 
38391 
37351 
36126 
35891 
34363 
34085 
33683 
33576 
33373 
33228 
33359 
32833 
31990 
30384 
29398 
28424 
Optimal level 
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Table 6.17 (Continued) 
1) Assumed level of living expenditures $0/year 
2) Assumed fixed costs $200/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$ 1873 $ 2.36236 $28216 
1011 2.40083 274-95 
1002 2.53367 27470 
961 2.59670 25899 
888 4.92433 25534 
833 14.04558 24794 
778 15.54955 23947 
713 16.07391 22908 
564 21.38372 20475 
509 25.04723 20167 
472 32.79227 18153 
395 40.27288 15499 
368 42.24276 14320 
360 49.53816 13999 
348 72.35485 13157 
344 120.17926 12790 
292 135.15642 5311 
288 135.98950 4845 
285 136.82503 4374 
284 169.68431 4193 
274 384.70524 206 
272 409.15989 72 
Table 6.18. Marginal value products, of credit at the extensive margin of selected resources for 
the eiidatario of Zaragoza 
Level of 
living 
expenditure 
(pesos/month) 
Marginal value product of credit (pesos) 
when all of winter land is when all of summer land 
under cultivation for is under cultivation for 
first time first time 
Credit MVP Next MVP Credit MVP Next MVP 
level level 
when mule power is only 
source of power for last 
time 
Credit MVP Next MVP 
level 
1. $1816.63 $13402 $ 4.60539 $ 4.49731 $13545 $4.47340 $4.09731 no feasible solution 
2. $1191.00 8426 4.80057 3.8407 9843 2.11193 1.76278 $7141 $15.22714 $12.44798 
3. $ 621.31 4068 26.88024 18.38423 6826 2.08979 1.74429 3895 36.30494 26.88024 
4. $ 0.00 472 32.79227 25.04723 3535 2.03446 1.69811 395 40.27288 32.79227 
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Table 6.19. Resource and product profiles for selected levels of 
credit associated with a high level of living expenditures 
for the eiidatario of Zaragoza 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 1816.63 
Net income $24420 
Level of credit $55459 
Credit Land Labor Mule teams Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
,02617 2582.44 20.07 35.87 
Months 
Jan. 10.0 45.0 14.1 51.6 
Feb. 10.0 83.5 9.5 46.1 
Mar. 10.0 45.0 4.7 
April 10.0 11.4 
May- 5556 10.0 78.6 
June 5611 10.0 36.9 2.7 110.9 
July 15772 10.0 41.7 1.4 46.9 
Aug. 22790 10.0 121.1 44.2 
Sept. 29852 10.0 103.7 
Oct. 36540 10.0 80.0 
Nov. 41111 10.0 38.9 
Dec. 55459 10.0 658.2 2.7 44.3 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX 
PRABX 
PASBX 
PSSMF 
PRSBH 
(9.46) 
( .54) 
(2.84) 
(6.62) 
( .54) 
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Table 6.19 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $21629 
Level of credit $40000 
Credit Land Labor Mule teams Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .18735 1838,02 23.57 42.12 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 10.0 45.0 14.1 51.9 
Feb. 10.0 83.5 9.3 46.1 
Mar. 419 10.0 45.0 4.7 
April 2444 10.0 11.4 
May 8346 10.0 78.6 
June 7344 10.0 36.0 2.6 107.4 
July 15896 10.0 45.0 1.3 46.3 
Aug. 21633 10.0 97.4 33.3 
Sept. 27275 10.0 78.9 
Oct. 32638 10.0 61.1 
Nov. 37360 10.0 39.0 
Dec. 40000 7.7 497.0 2.7 33.3 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX (7.12) 
PMAMX (2.36) 
PRABX ( .52) 
PRSBH ( .54) 
PSSMF (6.62) 
PASBX (2.84) 
Table 6.19 (Continued) 
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Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $19715 
Level of credit $30000 
Credit Land Labor Mule teams Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jomales) (jomales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
,18777 1844.22 23.96 42.83 
Jan. 10.0 45.0 14.1 51.9 
Feb. 169 10.0 83.5 9.5 46.1 
Mar. 2297 10.0 45.0 4.7 
April 4341 10.0 11.4 
May 10261 10.0 78.6 
June 5551 10.0 45.0 4.4 100.6 
July 13156 10.0 45.0 2.9 43.9 
Aug. 18051 10.0 83.4 1.0 26.1 
Sept, 22734 10.0 61.7 
Oct. 27489 10.0 62.2 
Nov. 30000 10.0 33.5 
Dec. 30000 6.1 390.5 2.7 26.1 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMBX ( .59) 
PCAMX (5.58) 
PMAMI (3.48) 
PRABX ( .36) 
PRSBH ( .54) 
PSSMF (6.62) 
PASBX (2.84) 
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Table 6.19 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $15545 
Level of credit $20000 
Credit Land Labor Mule teams Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .48781 1394.52 33.53 21.5 59.36 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 10.0 45.0 18.1 27.8 
Feb. 1273 10.0 65.8 13.3 
Mar. 3498 10.0 45.0 6.7 
April 5596 10.0 10.4 
May 10485 10.0 117.8 
June 3860 10.0 45.0 25.0 44.5 
July 9994 10.0 50.9 16.3 19.1 
Aug. 13024 10,0 72.9 6.9 14.6 
Sept. 16381 10.0 38.4 
Oct. 20000 10.0 55.4 
Nov. 20000 10.0 25.8 
Dec. 17967 9.1 234.8 .3 74.9 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAABX (1.21) 
PCAMX (3.14) 
EMAMI (0.77) 
PMABI (4.89) 
PKSBH ( .05) 
PMSMI (5.95) 
PASBX (4.00) 
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Table 6.19 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $11815 
Level of credit $15000 
Credit Land Labor Mule teams Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .81700 1394.62 36.00 31.17 63.74 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 10.0 45.0 18.1 27.8 
Feb. 4900 10.0 65.8 13.3 
Mar. 7159 10.0 45.0 6.7 
April 9291 10.0 10.4 
May 14215 10.0 117.8 
June 3927 10.0 39.3 25.0 41.0 
July 7893 10.0 58.7 16.5 - 18.6 
Aug. 10287 10.0 48.5 7.1 2.9 
Sept. 12607 10.0 11.7 
Oct. 15000 10.0 45.0 
Nov. 13722 10.0 22.5 
Dec. 1854 6.6 60.6 .3 63.1 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAABX 
PCAMX 
PMAMI 
PMABI 
PRSBH 
PMSME 
PASBX 
(1.60) 
( .61) 
(3.34) 
(4.45) 
( .05) 
(3.95) 
(3.99) 
271 
Table 6.19 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $ 4435 
Level of credit $13000 
Credit Land Labor Mule teams Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jomales) (hours) 
Marginal value 4.60539 781.03 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 1209 8.7 
Feb. 5064 8.7 
Mar. 7167 8.7 
April 9219 8.7 
May 13000 8.7 
June 3528 9.2 
July 6550 9.2 
Aug. 8737 9.2 
Sept. 10828 9.2 
Oct. 13000 9.2 
Nov. 13000 10.0 
Dec. 3.7 
148.15 468.05 262.30 
45.0 25.0 12.6 
73.8 22.7 
28.9 3.1 
5.5 
45.0 
34.1 25.0 28.1 
49.1 15.6 14.3 
43.2 6.3 2.9 
8.7 
29.6 
23.2 3.1 
22.8 1.7 28.3 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMX a. 02) 
PCAMI ( .19) 
PMAMI (1.77) 
PMABI (6.25) 
PKSBH ( .11) 
PMSBI ( .77) 
PMSMI (2.70) 
PSSBO (3.30) 
PASBI (1.86) 
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Table 6.20. Resource and product profiles for optimum levels of credit 
use at medium, low, and zero levels of living expenditures 
for the ejidatario of Zaragoza 
Level of living 
exp end i ture/mo. 
Net income/year 
Level of credit 
$ 1191 
$32136 
$50679 
Credit Land 
(pesos) (hectares) 
Labor Mule team Tractor 
(jornales) (jomales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
,02592 1589.24 19.89 35.54 
Months 
Jan. 10.0 45.0 14.1 51.6 
Feb. 10.0 83.5 9.5 46.1 
Mar. 10.0 45.0 4.7 
April 10.0 11.4 
May 10.0 78.6 
June 4947 10.0 36. 9  2.7 110.8 
July 14439 10.0 41.7 1.4 46.9 
Aug. 20779 10.0 121.1 44.2 
Sept. 27159 10.0 45.0 
Oct. 33158 10.0 45.0 
Nov. 37034 10.0 38.9 
Dec. 50679 10.0 658.2 2.7 44.3 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX 
PRABX 
PRSBH 
PSSMF 
PASBX 
(9.46) 
( .54) 
( .54) 
(6.62) 
(2.84) 
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Table 6.20 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 621 
Net income/year $39124 
Level of credit $46538 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
pEoduct (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
.02592 2558.43 19.89 35.54 
Jan. 10.0 45.0 14.1 51.6 
Feb. 10.0 83.5 9.5 46.1 
Mar. 10.0 45.0 4.7 
April 10.0 11.4 
May 10.0 78.6 
June 4372 10.0 36.9 2.7 110.8 
July 13283 10.0 41.7 1.4 46.9 
Aug. 19038 10.0 121.1 44.2 
Sept. 24827 10.0 103.6 
Oct. 30228 10.0 80.0 
Nov. 33502 10.0 38.9 
Dec. 46538 10.0 658.2 2.7 44.3 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX (9.46) 
PRABX ( .54) 
PRSBH ( .54) 
PSSMF (6.62) 
PASBX (2.84) 
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Table 6.20 (Continued) 
Level o£ living 
expenditure/mo. $ 0 
Net income/year $46747 
Level of credit $42203 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .02592 2558.43 19.89 35.54 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 10.0 45.0 14.1 51.8 
Feb, 10.0 83.5 9.5 46.1 
Mar. 10.0 45.0 4.7 
April 10.0 11.4 
May 10.0 78.6 
June 3745 10.0 36.9 2.7 110.8 
July 12023 10.0 41.7 1.4 46.9 
Aug. 17139 10.0 121.1 44.2 
Sept. 22283 10.0 103.6 
Oct. 27033 10.0 80.0 
Nov. 29649 10.0 38.9 
Dec. 42023 10.0 658.2 2.7 44.3 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMK (9.46) 
PRABX ( .54) 
PRSBH ( .54) 
PSSMF (6.62) 
PASBX (2.84) 
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Table 6.21. Resource and product profiles for "break-even" levels of 
credit use at medium and low levels of living expenditures 
for the eiidatario of Zaragoza 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $1191 
Net income $3172 
Level of credit $7141 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 15.22714 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 491 6.7 
Feb. 2493 6.7 
Mar. 3769 6.7 
April 5058 6.7 
May 7141 6.7 
June 1688 6.1 
July 3087 6.1 
Aug. 4447 6.1 
Sept. 5780 6,1 
Oct. 7141 6.1 
Nov. 7141 9.8 
Dec. 3.7 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAABI (1.05) 
PMABI (5.02) 
PRABO ( .04) 
PMSBI (3.72) 
PASBO (2.95) 
99.39 1622.73 751.35 
35.6 20.7 
41.9 9.9 
29.3 4.9 
5.9 
45.0 
27.7 .5 
45.0 16.2 
33.7 6.8 
5.7 
18.2 
26.2 14.9 
16.7 5.6 
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Table 6.21 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 621.31 
Net income $ 724 
Level of credit $3753 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jomales) (hours) 
Marginal value 94.93461 156,55 998.69 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 377 3.6 16.3 16.3 
Feb. 1546 3.6 42.4 12.1 
Mar. 2238 3.6 31.5 6.1 
April 2936 3.6 7.3 
May 3753 3.6 45.0 
June 870 3.1 15.8 13.0 
July 1628 3.1 45.0 8.4 
Aug. 2321 3.1 20.6 3.3 
Sept. 3020 3.1 3.5 
Oct. 3753 3.1 13.8 
Nov. 3753 3.1 4.8 
Dec. 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAABO ( .89) 
PMABI (1.82) 
PRABO ( .35) 
PASBO (3.60) 
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Table 6.22. Resource and product profile at the optimum level of credit 
use associated with the high level of living expenditure 
and the alternative of a cantaloupe activity for the 
eiidatario of Zaragoza 
Living expenditures 
(pesos/month $ 1816.13 
Net income $75304 
Level of credit $59445 
Credit Land Labor Mule team Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 6420.73 19.94 35.62 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 10.0 37.6 164.6 
Feb. 8846 10.0 128.5 26.7 
Mar. 26839 10.0 633.2 
April 41784 10.0 510.6 
May-
June 5755 10.0 33.0 117.2 
July 16387 10.0 10.0 49.6 
Aug. 23415 10.0 120.0 46.7 
Sept. 30729 10.0 105.0 
Oct. 37645 10.0 80.0 
Nov. 41943 10.0 40.0 
Dec. 59445 10.0 690.0 46.8 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMK (10.00) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
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value products of credit. This is because it takes less capital to 
start up the farming operation at the lower levels of living expenditure. 
For example, for the four levels of living expenditures, from the 
highest to zero, it took 7.5, 5.8, 2.9, and .2 hectares of summer land 
respectively to start up operations. 
Each of the "demand" schedules has a large range where cotton is 
substituted for corn but only after almost all of the summer land is 
under production.^  In Table 6.14 this range runs from $12,304 to 
$55,459. This result follows the pattern of the employment of credit 
observed in the other farms. The farmer will go to the extensive margin 
of his land before going to the intensive margin of each hectare. 
Table 6.18 shows the marginal value products of credit as the 
extensive margins of summer land and winter land are reached as well as 
the last situation when the farmer uses only mule power. This table 
illustrates how at the lower three levels of living expenditures the 
farmer uses the summer land to generate income to be used in the winter 
cycle. In these cases the winter land is pushed to the extensive margin 
much more rapidly than the summer land because of the supply of generated 
capital from the summer operations. When the extensive margin of winter 
land is reached a noticeable drop in the marginal value product of 
credit occurs as the farmer begins to deepen the use of capital in this 
cycle. At the same time the summer land is expanded to the extensive 
O^nly with the highest level of living expenditures did the farmer 
begin to plant some cotton before he reached the extensive margin of 
land. 
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margin where another significant drop occurs in the marginal value 
product as the farmer begins to deepen the employment of the capital per 
hectare in this cycle too. The table also shows that at lower levels 
of living expenditures the extensive margin of winter land is more 
quickly reached due to the lower cumulative living expenditure require­
ments in the winter cycle. On the other hand the marginal value products 
associated with the extensive margin of the summer land are more nearly 
uniform because more or less the same mix of activities are used in the 
summer to reach this margin. 
In general, the critical credit months, those months where the 
highest marginal value products of credit occur, are summer months. The 
summer cycle is, therefore, subject to credit limits. The winter cycle 
always has the generated capital from the summer cycle with which to form 
a base of operating capital. 
The case of the highest level of living expenditures is somewhat 
different. Because of the high cumulative capital requirements for 
living in the winter cycle which compete with capital for productive 
purposes the firm employs more summer land than winter land until just 
before the extensive margin of the summer land is reached when the 
winter land increases rapidly and reaches its extensive margin first. 
The extensive margin of summer land is reached at a higher value of the 
marginal productivity of credit than for the lower levels of consumption 
because of this different relationship with the winter cycle. 
Table 6.19 shows how the above described process takes place as the 
farmer increases his credit from the "break-even" level to the optimum. 
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The highest level of living expenditure is assumed. At the "break­
even" solution the farmer has more summer than winter land under cultiva­
tion. His limiting capital months are in October, November and May, and 
he borrows heavily in the winter cycle in order to meet both the 
production and living capital requirements. As the extensive margin of 
both cycle's land is reached his capital requirements in the winter 
cycle decrease relative to those in the summer cycle, because through the 
capital deepening process in the summer he is able to generate more 
capital for use in the winter cycle. The mix of activities in the 
winter cycle stabilizes at its optimum long before the optimum in the 
summer cycle is reached. This occurs because at this point the credit 
limit is restrictive only on the summer cycle whereas it is only restric­
tive on the winter cycle when it restricts the flow of generated income 
via the summer cycle restraint into the winter cycle, and at low levels 
of capital use. 
The optimal solution contains small amounts of rice in both cycles. 
It is doubtful that the farmer would actually undertake these activities 
but rather would extend cotton production in the summer cycle and sorgo 
or sesame production in the winter cycle. 
Again the general trend of the shadow prjLce on land increasing with 
the amount of capital employed is evident, as is the decrease of the 
shadow process of labor, mules and tractors so long as they are not 
redundant. 
Table 6.20 compares the optimum of Table 6.19 with the optimum 
levels of credit use associated with the other three levels of living 
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expenditures. As was noted with the other farms the employment of 
resources other than credit and the product mix are identical. 
Table 6.21 compares the "break-even" levels of credit of the other 
three levels of living expenditures with the "break-even" level of 
Table 6.19. This comparison shows that at these levels of living 
expenditures the farmer can earn a sufficient income by employing less 
than his full amount of land and by employing only mule power. As with 
the elldatario on seasonal land a shortage of capital in the form of 
credit may be one reason why so much tillable land lays idle as shown in 
the census data reported in Table 4.4. 
The income figures of Tables 6.14 through 6.17 show the farmer is 
able to generate a large volume of savings over a considerable range of 
the "demand" schedules if he has sufficient credit. This would indicate 
that, given an ample supply of credit, the farmer could earn enough 
savings to significantly increase his level of consumption, to make 
investments, or to purchase machinery, make capital improvements on the 
farm, or to use in the following year as operating capital. Some might 
use the money to buy additional land. The impression gained in the field 
investigation is that the most successful ejidatarios who have had credit 
and are good managers have done these very things.^  
B^arkin (8, pp. 138-139) observed that since the introduction of 
cotton on a large scale in the region that the smaller farmers have begun 
to generate savings. It was his impression that these farmers do not tend 
to increase their level of living significantly but rather use their 
savings to make capital improvements on the farm to buy farm machinery. 
He found another indication of the increased tendency of the farmers to 
save in the significant rise in the number and volume of savings accounts 
at the local banks. Between 1960 and 1965 the number of savings accounts 
increased from 2,003 to 19,225 and the volume of savings rose from 
$1,400,000 to $11,700,000. 
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The cotton crop grown in the summer cycle is very capital intensive. 
If the farmer had aversion to uncertainty it is likely he would prefer to 
reduce his hectares of cotton and grow more corn. For example, at the 
high level of living expenditure, as shown in Table 6.19, the farmer could 
reduce his credit from the optimum level by $25,459 to $20,000 and reduce 
his income by only $8,875. 
Table 6.22 shows the tremendous increase in income available to this 
farmer if he could grow cantaloupe in the winter cycle^ . The farmer would 
need to borrow considerably more funds in the winter cycle so as to meet 
the high costs of insecticides and hiring labor. In any one month he 
would need to extend his line of credit by about $4,000 to earn about 
$51,000 more income. 
Clearly the opportunity to farm the second cycle a year is an 
important source of income to the farmer. He farms it to a large extent 
with his own savings from the summer cycle. This would likely have the 
effect of reducing his aversion to uncertainty associated with the winter 
cycle. Table 6.41 shows the resource profile at the optimum levels when 
cotton is the only crop grown in the year. Small differences exist in 
the resource profile except in the month of December when the credit 
needs rise considerably in order to harvest the additional cotton. The 
incomes for the year are considerably less. For example, at the high 
I^t should be remembered that it is assumed the farmer operates with 
no aversion to uncertainty. Since there is a large amount of uncertainty 
associated with cantaloupe it is likely the eiidatario would have a high 
degree of uncertainty aversion when growing cantaloupe if this assumption 
were to be relaxed. 
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level of living expenditure the farmer reduced his net income after 
fixed costs and living expenditures by $16,704 or the difference between 
$24,420 and $7,715. This would indicate that the opportunity to farm 
the winter cycle in addition to the summer cycle is a very important way 
of permitting capital formation among this group of farmers. 
The propietario of Apatzing^ n with a percent rate of discount 
This farm firm has all of its land under irrigation for both the 
summer and winter cycles. The farm does not have mule team power but 
owns a tractor. All of the irrigated crop activities specified in 
Chapter IV for the summer and winter cycles are applicable. However, the 
decision was made to limit the farmer to only ten hectares of cantaloupe 
because of its risky nature. In order to compare these results with 
those of the same farm without cantaloupe activity another problem was 
run without the cantaloupe. These results are presented at the end of 
this section. 
Tables 6.23 through 6.26 give the "demand" schedules for short-term 
credit associated with the four levels of living expenditures. As has 
been observed with other farms the four "demand" schedules are similar 
except in the magnitudes of credit required and the lower bound. As 
the level of living expenditures decreases the level of credit required 
at the lower bound decreases and the marginal value productivity of 
credit near the lower bound increases. This is because the farmer is 
able to begin production using less resources. Therefore the higher 
marginal value products of credit are those associated with the oppor­
tunity to bring more redundant resources into full production. 
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Table 6.23. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for propietario 
Apatzing^ n with 50 hectares 
1) Assumed living expenditures $21780/year or $1816.63/month 
2) Assumed fixed costs $18665/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$186449 $ .04624 $236120 
180000 .23750 234588 
91994 .23797 213687 
77287 .53241 207466 
75771 .53604 206442 
75081 .56948 205960 
69941 .63594 202304 
65886 .65135 199197 
56691 .66163 191972 
52401 .66821 188546 
47496 .67340 184589 
43350 .69195 181217 
39756 .71610 178205 
38331 .72141 176970 
37264 .74905 176039 
36009 .75608 174898 
35706 .90804 174620 
33009 .91541 171701 
29203 .92278 167552 
26666 2.17225 164765 
26222 2.30814 163677 
21405 2.30999 150832 
21383 3.91711 150773 
20507 4.44105 146202 
17870 4.44902 130239 
16274 5.21227 120558 
15837 8.57090 117517 
14953 9.17089 107916 
14489 9.17709 102756 
14334 11.18575 101043 
O^ptimal level 
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Table 6.23 (Continued) 
1) Assumed living expenditures $21780/year or $1816.63/month 
2) Assumed fixed costs $18665/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$ 14279 $ 11.20578 $100331 
14091 11.53332 97917 
13426 11.60042 89123 
13096 11.62116 84734 
12402 11.75633 75484 
11975 15.48720 69724 
11935 15.51453 69009 
11796 16.04558 66519 
11772 25.09052 66078 
11705 36.78275 64007 
11636 39.12010 61096 
11433 58.14481 51676 
11369 58.57481 47544 
11172 58.62001 34879 
11139 59.53491 32786 
11076 59.89669 28618 
10983 60.06944 22541 
10891 60.87489 16425 
10838 70.37376 12915 
10825 70.42803 11881 
10811 85.79181 10776 
10809 89.85809 10647 
10771 102.84229 6817 
10769 124.49913 6580 
10730 134.92164 1231 
10657 135.35654 -9717 
10575 139.62535 -22032 
10547 150.53191 -26361 
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Table 6.24. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for propietario 
Apatzingin with 50 hectares 
1) Assumed living expenditures $14292/year or $119l/month 
2) Assumed fixed costs $18655/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$183567 
180000 
88471 
73364 
71847 
71551 
65974 
62356 
53161 
43966 
40891 
40250 
36270 
34802 
33722 
32270 
29570 
26514 
25764 
23231 
21591 
17952 
16753 
15877 
13240 
13159 
12791 
12360 
11086 
11053 
$ .04624 
11.17844 
11.18575 
.23750 
.23797 
.53241 
.53604 
.56948 
.63594 
.65135 
.66163 
.66676 
.68515 
.69195 
.71610 
.72141 
.74905 
.89905 
.90635 
.91541 
.92278 
2.17225 
2.30814 
2.30999 
3.91711 
4.44105 
4.44902 
4.81763 
5.43552 
9.17089 
$243766 
242919 
221181 
214791 
213767 
213560 
209593 
206821 
199596 
192252 
189776 
189243 
185908 
184636 
183694 
182374 
179480 
176181 
175364 
172581 
168562 
158859 
155658 
151086 
135124 
134634 
132361 
129374 
115213 
114785 
O^ptimal level 
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Table 6.24 (Continued) 
1) Assumed living expenditures $14292/year or $1191/nionth 
2) Assumed fixed costs $18665/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$ 10575 $ 11.51270 $108674 
10267 11.53332 104597 
9088 11.53394 88996 
8614 11.62116 82707 
8486 15.30914 81002 
8425 15.83316 79909 
8211 16.01732 76016 
8112 23.80680 74209 
8072 23.84880 73169 
7934 37.29243 69645 
7913 38.87688 68794 
7889 58.14481 67771 
7579 58.31409 47947 
7454 58.74375 39902 
7449 58.78908 39623 
7395 59.70663 36133 
7344 60.06944 32787 
7225 60.87489 24888 
7145 61.13862 19551 
7127 69.88640 18339 
7112 70.37376 17206 
7105 70.42803 16623 
7075 85.79181 14347 
7073 89.85809 14148 
7036 102.84229 10479 
7034 124.49913 10251 
6994 134.92164 4744 
6931 135.35654 -4693 
6838 139.62535 -18699 
6810 150.53191 -23028 
288 
Table 6.25. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for propietario 
Apatzing^ n with 50 hectares 
1) Assumed level of living expenditures $7456/year or $621.31/mo. 
2) Assumed fixed costs $18665/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$179427® 
160000 
85883 
70869 
69353 
68493 
63546 
59298 
50103 
40908 
39386 
33250 
31745 
30654 
30080 
29294 
26591 
22785 
20255 
19370 
17579 
14961 
12743 
11870 
11630 
9757 
9365 
9332 
8272 
8092 
$ .04624 
11.14912 
11.15641 
.23750 
.23797 
.53241 
.53604 
.56948 
.63594 
.65135 
.66163 
.66676 
.68515 
.70906 
.71432 
.74209 
.74905 
.89905 
.90635 
.91366 
2.15205 
2.17225 
2.30814 
2.30999 
3.91711 
4.42940 
4.79639 
5.41155 
9.13046 
9.14684 
$250755 
246141 
288538 
222187 
221163 
220563 
217044 
213790 
206565 
199220 
197995 
192903 
191652 
190670 
190152 
189438 
186541 
182432 
179681 
177531 
173143 
166163 
160237 
155663 
154211 
142666 
139957 
139601 
127825 
125520 
a 
Optimal level 
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Table 6.25 (Continued) 
1) Assumed level of living expenditures $7456/year or $621.31/mo. 
2) Assumed fixed costs $18665/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$ 7583 $ 11.18575 $119008 
7530 11.51270 118338 
6796 11.53332 108637 
5618 11.55394 93036 
5515 12.43806 91682 
5458 15.74159 90876 
5236 23.39697 86844 
4906 23.53308 78559 
4844 23.57507 76999 
4836 23.84880 76777 
4703 29.64250 73365 
4691 38.87688 73003 
4650 58.14481 71238 
4630 58.31409 69983 
4226 58.35909 44080 
4153 59.57382 39381 
4112 60.05759 36748 
4049 61.13862 32568 
3913 69.88664 23386 
3883 69.94053 21079 
3840 85.84074 17788 
3837 89.88898 17529 
3802 102.24774 13999 
3800 123.50882 13786 
3759 134.90273 8128 
3704 135.33756 7 
3601 138.73508 -15463 
3573 173.27190 -24839 
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Table 6.26. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for propietario 
Apatzing^ n with 50 hectares 
1) Assumed level of living expenditures $0/year 
2) Assumed fixed costs $18665/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$174911 
160000 
83062 
68149 
66632 
65159 
60897 
55963 
46768 
37744 
37573 
29956 
28411 
27308 
26048 
23342 
20456 
19536 
17010 
13465 
13204 
11700 
9961 
8403 
7543 
6447 
6098 
5437 
5203 
4862 
4209 
3014 
$ .04624 
2.15205 
2.17225 
2.30814 
2.30999 
2.50138 
4.24165 
4.79639 
5.41155 
9.13046 
9.14684 
11.14912 
11.15641 
11.48251 
11.50308 
.23750 
.23797 
.53241 
.53604 
.56948 
.63594 
.65135 
.66163 
.68001 
.68515 
.70906 
.71432 
.74209 
.89015 
.89738 
.90635 
.91366 
$258377 
254836 
236563 
230255 
229231 
228202 
225170 
221391 
214166 
206958 
206817 
200497 
199172 
198218 
197083 
194212 
191127 
190134 
187387 
178780 
178140 
174119 
169464 
165199 
160611 
153857 
151444 
144118 
141520 
137168 
128810 
113041 
O^ptimal level 
Table 6.26 (Continued) 
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1) Assumed level of living expenditures $0/year 
2) Assumed fixed costs $18665/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$ 2790 $ 11.14093 $110076 
2377 13.30207 104428 
2301 13.19047 103187 
2233 13.69647 102058 
2214 15.25755 101631 
2045 15.28483 97230 
1851 12.66758 92149 
1644 12.71091 86696 
1515 12.75263 83261 
1431 12.77539 81035 
1301 12.92000 77573 
1295 16.07721 77432 
1269 21.16004 76550 
1232 31.62507 74903 
1094 32.74752 65572 
973 32.81695 57457 
845 32.84227 48805 
756 33.52588 42784 
729 33.79813 40924 
727 34.40649 40794 
557 38.43777 28736 
535 39.57704 26949 
516 39.60999 25380 
463 40.35193 21062 
423 62.83431 17744 
422 73.08830 17690 
421 88.28669 17480 
419 86.14302 17325 
368 96.43130 9716 
339 99.76613 5016 
332 101.05783 2246 
292 150.30603 -2762 
281 156.46331 -4645 
275 225.91679 -5903 
250 230.08613 -12043 
241 308.83675 -14526 
235 347.33008 -16324 
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Table 6.27. Marginal value products of credit at extensive margin of 
selected resources and products for the propietario of 
Apatzing^ n 
Level of Marginal value product of credit (pesos) 
living when all of land is under cultivation for the first time 
expenditure Winter cycle Summer cycle 
(pesos/month) Credit MVP Next MVP Credit MVP Next MVP 
1. $1816.63 $11772 
2. $1191.00 7934 
3. $ 621.31 4691 
4. $ 0.00 1295 
$25.09052 $16.04558 
34.29243 23.84880 
38.87600 29.64250 
21.16 16.07721 
$26666 $2.17225 $.92278 
23231 2.17225 .92278 
20255 2.15205 .91366 
17010 2.15205 .91366 
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Table 6.28. Resource and product profiles for selected levels of credit 
associated with a high level of living expenditure for the 
propietario of Apatzing^ n 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 1816.63 
Net income $236120 
Level of credit $186449 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .04624 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 12436 
July 43888 
Aug. 63485 
Sept. 88966 
Oct. 112819 
Nov. 125793 
Dec. 186449 
1851.02 20.66 36.24 
50.0 86.8 399.5 
50.0 357.0 234.8 
50.0 713.4 .7 
50.0 529.5 
40.0 70.0 50.6 
50.0 181.2 468.8 
50.0 83.8 198.4 
50.0 522.3 186.8 
50.0 438.0 
50.0 338.0 
50.0 178.0 
50.0 2802.3 187.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX (40.00) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PSSMF (29.66) 
PASMX ( .34) 
Table 6.28 (Continued) 
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Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $219828 
Level of credit $120000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .23750 2194.86 24.44 42.87 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 86.8 399.5 
Feb. 50.0 357.0 234.8 
Mar. 50.0 713.4 .7 
April 50.0 529.5 
May 40.0 70.0 50.6 
June 10499 50.0 147.4 428.9 
July 41235 50.0 135.0 198.4 
Aug. 56244 50.0 395.8 159.4 
Sept. 75491 50.0 330.4 
Oct. 94168 50.0 266.3 
Nov. 75009 39.8 137.0 
Dec. 120000 39.8 2089.2 139.3 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PSAMF (10.25) 
PCAMX (29.75) 
PQSMK (10.00) 
PSSMF (29.66) 
PASMF ( .34) 
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Table 6.28 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net Income $208613 
Level of credit $ 80000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .23797 1761.29 28.02 49.14 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 86.8 399.5 
Feb. 50.0 357.0 234.8 
Mar. 50.0 713.4 .7 
April 50.0 529.5 
May 40.0 70.0 50.6 
June 11691 50.0 159.4 429.3 
July 35503 50.0 133.5 195.2 
Aug. 47844 50.0 335.4 120.0 
Sept. 63129 50.0 262.6 
Oct. 80000 50.0 210.0 
Nov. 72920 44.4 144.5 
Dec. 80000 33.3 1639.9 109.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PSAMF ( 5.59) 
PCAMX (23.30) 
PMAMI (11.11) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PSSMF (29.66) 
PASMK ( .34) 
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Table 6.28 (Continued) 
Level of living 
exp end i ture/mo. 
Net income $194572 
Level of credit $ 60000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .65135 1757.46 35.01 61.40 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 153.7 346.6 
Feb. 50.0 275.1 119.1 
Mar. 50.0 694.5 
April 50.0 528.6 
May 40.0 111.1 50.6 
June 12376 50.0 163.3 421.0 
July 29620 50.0 143.3 192.2 
Aug. 38497 50.0 252.1 77.5 
Sept. 48726 50.0 176.6 
Oct. 60000 50.0 142.3 
Nov. 60000 46.5 142.6 
Dec. 43792 41.8 1141.5 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PSAMF ( 3.49) 
PCAMX (15.10) 
PMAMI (21.40) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PMSMX (16.73) 
PSSMF (13.27) 
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Table 6.28 (Continued) 
Level of living 
exp end i ture/mo. 
Net income $178409 
Level of credit $ 40000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .69195 1748.20 36.02 63.18 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 170.2 333.6 
Feb. 50.0 254.8 90.3 
Mar. 50.0 690.3 
April 10775 50.0 528.6 
May 40.0 123.5 50.6 
June 12643 50.0 160.8 406.9 
July 24021 50.0 160.5 189.6 
Aug. 29082 50.0 157.6 35.7 
Sept. 33889 50.0 82.9 
Oct. 40000 50.0 70.9 
Nov. 40000 46.6 133.9 
Dec. 37.0 538.3 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PSAMF ( 3.42) 
PCAMX ( 6.18) 
PMAMI (30.40) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PMSMX (20.86) 
PSSMF ( 9.14) 
298 
Table 6.28 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $167552 
Level of credit $ 29203 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .92278 1738,85 41.26 72.37 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 179.1 226.6 
Feb. 50.0 243.9 74.9 
Mar. 7684 50.0 688.1 
April 22187 50.0 528.6 
May 40.0 130.1 50.6 
June 12638 50.0 157.4 397.7 
July 19751 50.0 171.9 188.4 
Aug. 22993 50.0 114.0 14.6 
Sept. 25608 50.0 33.3 
Oct. 29203 50.0 70.0 
Nov. 29203 47.3 127.2 
Dec. 34.5 214.1 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMX ( 1.39) 
PSAMO ( 2.67) 
PCAMX ( 1.39) 
PMAMI (34.56) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PMSMX (23.07) 
PSSMF ( 6.93) 
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Table 6.28 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income 
Level of credit 
$143128 
$ 20000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
4.44105 806.12 137.95 241.98 
Jan. 50.0 180.3 321.4 
Feb. 50.0 138.5 72.0 
Mar. 6004 50.0 665.4 
April 20000 50.0 510.2 
May 40.4 108.7 50.6 
June 8161 39.9 130.6 295.9 
July 13273 39.9 134.0 140.2 
Aug. 15609 39.9 84,1 5.5 
Sept. 17610 39.9 18.9 
Oct. 20000 39.9 70.0 
Nov. 20000 39.0 99.4 
Dec. 33.7 120.3 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMX ( 1.86) 
PSAMO ( .88) 
PMAMI (27.12) 
PqSMX 
PMSMI 
PSSMO 
( 9.64) 
(23.72) 
( 6.65) 
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Table 6.28 (Continued) 
Level of living 
exp end i tur e /mo. 
Net income $97917 
Level of credit $14091 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (Jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 11.53332 804.60 277.25 102.88 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 161.0 277.1 
Feb. 50.0 206.2 94.0 
Mar. 7085 50.0 350.1 
April 14091 50.0 247.7 
May 45.5 113.8 50.6 
June 4627 29.8 95.3 194.9 
July 8027 29.8 97.0 93.3 
Aug. 10094 29.8 68.2 5.0 
Sept. 12067 29.8 19.2 
Oct. 14091 29.8 65.2 
Nov. 14091 29.8 70.0 
Dec. 33.7 120.3 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMI ( 2.49) 
PMAMI (17.33) 
PQSMX ( 4.50) 
PMSMI (23.72) 
PSSMO (11.79) 
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Table 6.28 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $ 1241 
Level of credit $10730 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 134»92164 176.05 722.62 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 2246 21.6 70.0 60.0 
Feb. 6680 21.6 47.6 3.5 
Mar. 8715 21.6 55.4 1.0 
April 10730 21.6 37.6 
May 10730 21.2 70.0 50.6 
June 2656 18.2 70.0 77.6 
July 5086 18.2 46.8 38.0 
Aug. 6939 18.2 45.0 4.3 
Sept. 8789 18.2 19.3 
Oct. 10730 18.2 49.1 
Nov. 10730 18.2 35.8 
Dec. 20.7 64.2 108.4 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMO (2.15) 
PMAMI (5.76) 
PFAMO ( .26) 
PQSMX ( .36) 
PMSMI (10.71) 
PASMO ( .52) 
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Table 6.29. Resource and product profiles for optimum levels of credit 
use at medium, low, and zero levels of living expenditures 
for the propietario of Apatzing^ n 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income 
Level of credit 
$ 1191 
$243766 
$183567 
Credit Land 
(pesos) (hectares) 
Labor 
(jornales) 
Tractor 
(hours) 
Marginal value ,04624 1851.02 20.66 36.25 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 86.8 399.5 
Feb. 50.0 357.0 234.8 
Mar. 50.0 713.3 .7 
April 50.0 529.5 
May 40.0 70.0 50.6 
June 11772 50.0 181.2 468.8 
July 42554 50.0 83.8 198.4 
Aug. 61475 50.0 522.3 186.8 
Sept. 86273 50.0 438.0 
Oct. 109437 50.0 338.0 
Nov. 121716 ,50.0 178.0 
Dec. 183567 50.0 2802.3 187.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX (40.00) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PSSMF (29.66) 
PASMX ( .34) 
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Table 6.29 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 621.31 
Net income $250755 
Level of credit $179427 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jomales) (hours) 
Marginal value .04624 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. -
April 
May 
June 11197 
July 41399 
Aug. 59734 
Sept. 83941 
Oct. 106507 
Nov. 118184 
Dec. 179427 
.02 20.66 36.25 
50.0 86.8 399.5 
50.0 357.0 234.8 
50.0 713.3 .7 
50.0 529.5 
40.0 70.0 50.6 
50.0 181.2 468.8 
50.0 83.8 198.4 
50.0 522.3 186.8 
50.0 438.0 
50.0 338.0 
50.0 178.0 
50.0 2802.3 187.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX (40.00) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PSSMF (29.66) 
PASMX ( .34) 
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Table 6.29 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expend iture/mo. 
Net income 
Level of credit 
$ 0 
$258377 
$174911 
Credit 
(pesos) 
Land 
(hectares) 
Labor 
(jornales) 
Tractor 
(hours) 
Marginal value .04624 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 10570 
July 40138 
Aug. 57835 
Sept. 81397 
Oct. 103312 
Nov. 114331 
Dec. 174911 
.02 20.66 36.25 
50.0 86.8 399.5 
50.0 357.0 234.8 
50.0 713.3 .7 
50.0 529.5 
40.0 70.0 50.6 
50.0 181.2 468.8 
50.0 83.8 198.4 
50.0 522.3 186.8 
50.0 438.0 
50.0 338.0 
50.0 178.0 
50.0 2802.3 187.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX (40.00) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PSSMF (29.66) 
PASMX ( .34) 
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Table 6.30. Resource and product profile for "break-even" levels of 
credit use at medium and low levels of living expenditures 
for the propietario of Apatzing^ n 
Level of living •' 
expenditure/mo. $1191 
Net income $4744 
Level of credit $6994 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 134.92164 176.05 722.62 
product (highes t 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 638 21.6 70.0 59.3 
Feb. 4373 21.6 46.9 3.3 
Mar. 5696 21.6 51.8 1.0 
April 6994 21.6 34.6 
May- 6994 21.3 70.0 50.6 
June 1780 16.1 40.2 57.9 
July 3435 16.1 70.0 27.5 
Aug. 4602 16.1 40.9 3.1 
Sept. 5767 16.1 . 20.1 
Oct. 6994 16.1 41.9 
Nov. 6994 16.1 31.2 
Dec. 20.8 64.5 109.1 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMD ( 1.53) 
PMAMI ( 4.14) 
PR&MO ( .41) 
PQSMX ( .31) 
PMSMI (10.78) 
PASMD ( .50) 
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Table 6.30 (Continued) 
Level of living 
exp end iture/mo. $ 621.31 
Net income $ 7 
Level of credit $3704 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 135.33756 176.59 724.84 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
«7 an. 18.6 53.2 46.7 
Feb. 2372 18.6 43.5 7.0 
Mar. 3050 18.6 47.0 2.6 
April 3704 18.6 30.1 
May- 3704 18.4 70.0 50.6 
June 983 14.0 33.3 37.7 
July 1953 14.0 70.0 17.0 
Aug. 2526 14.0 36.9 1.9 
Sept. 3096 14.0 20.8 
Oct. 3704 14.0 35.4 
Nov. 3704 14.0 26.4 
Dec. 17.1 48.7 71.9 
Crops in solution (hectares 
PAAMO ( . 95) 
PMAMI (2.44) 
PRAM) ( .57) 
PQSMX ( .19) 
PMSm (7.11) 
PASMO (1.32) 
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Table 6.31. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for propietario 
Apatzing^ Cn with 50 hectares and without cantaloupe activity 
1) Assumed living expenditure $21780/year or $1816.63/month 
2) Assumed fixed costs $18665/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$186449 $ .07495 $185987 
160000 .20848 180473 
153827 .22028 179186 
151837 .23750 178747 
91663 .23797 164456 
76643 .47152 158103 
75081 .48180 157129 
74526 .56462 156776 
69941 .63561 153534 
65886 .65102 150429 
56691 .66130 143208 
47496 .66643 135867 
43350 .68482 132531 
39756 .70872 129550 
38331 .71398 128328 
37264 .74209 127406 
35706 .88966 126003 
33009 .89690 123143 
29203 .90413 119077 
28846 .91373 118693 
26666 2.13204 116323 
26481 2.15205 115879 
21405 2.15377 103554 
19406 2.17399 98697 
18761 2.29702 97117 
16274 2.69108 90530 
16168 2.68824 90201 
15837 4.42046 89170 
14953 4.72991 84638 
14489 4.73310 82201 
14452 5.14564 82007 
14397 7.46367 81687 
O^ptimal level 
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Table 6.31 (Continued) 
1) Assumed living expenditure $21780/year or $1816.63/month 
2) Assumed fixed costs $18665/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$ 14334 $ 9.09731 $ 81129 
14091 9.36322 78632 
13028 18.48018 67394 
12869 18.57158 63921 
12819 19.66621 62814 
12605 19.67644 57833 
12238 19.77907 49303 
11975 26.05596 43151 
11796 26.94784 34043 
11718 27.08780 35158 
11675 31.47185 33803 
11569 31.48743 29842 
11433 46.80025 24814 
11192 50.70817 12461 
11149 51.34465 10050 
11040 58.30980 3896 
11011 72.28790 2063 
10992 72.46785 561 
10983 72.67883 -133 
10769 73.03873 -17281 
10709 115.04710 -22166 
10675 135.26116 -26489 
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Table 6.32. Resource and product profiles for selected levels of credit 
associated with high level of living expenditure and without 
the cantaloupe activity for the propletarlo of Apatzing^ n 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net Income 
Level of credit 
$ 21780 
$185987 
$186449 
Credit 
(pesos) 
Land 
(hectares) 
Labor 
(jornales) 
Tractor 
(hours) 
Marginal value .07495 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 12436 
July 43888 
Aug. 63485 
Sept. 88966 
Oct. 112819 
Nov. 125793 
Dec. 186449 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PGAMX (40.00) 
PSSMF (40.00) 
.62 21.23 37.24 
50.0 49.2 313.2 
50.0 289.2 278.4 
50.0 98.0 
50.0 18.0 
50.0 70.9 50.6 
50.0 181.2 468.8 
50.0 83.8 198.4 
50.0 522.3 186.8 
50.0 438.0 
50.0 238.0 
50.0 178.0 
50.0 2802.3 187.2 
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Table 6.32 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $171186 
Level of credit $120000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .23750 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 10465 
July 41188 
Aug. 56116 
Sept. 75254 
Oct. 97910 
Nov. 74114 
Dec. 120000 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PSAMF (10.43) 
PCAMX (29.57), 
PMSMI ( 5.52) 
PSSMF (34.48) 
2194.86 24.44 42.87 
50.0 71.3 295.8 
50.0 267.1 240.0 
50.0 92.5 
50.0 18.0 
50.0 81.9 50.6 
50.0 146.8 428.2 
50.0 135.9 198.4 
50.0 393.6 159.0 
50.0 328.5 
50.0 265.0 
39.6 136.3 
45.1 2100.4 194.2 
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Table 6.32 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $159522 
Level of credit $ 80000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .23797 1757.57 28.02 49.14 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 71.3 295.8 
Feb. 50.0 267.1 240.0 
Mar. 50.0 92.5 
April 50.0 18.0 
May 50.0 81.9 50.6 
June 11592 50.0 157.9 427.9 
July 35571 50.0 135.3 195.3 
Aug. 47828 50.0 332.8 120.1 
Sept. 63009 50.0 260.8 
Oct. 80000 50.0 309.1 
Nov. 71239 43.9 142.9 
Dec. 80000 38.6 1651.7 164.1 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PSAMF ( 6.07) 
PGAMX (23.13) 
PMAMI (10.80) 
PMSMI ( 5.52) 
PSSMF (34.48) 
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Table 6.32 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $145806 
Level of credit $ 60000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .65102 1762.16 35.00 61.39 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 116.1 260.3 
Feb. 50.0 212.1 162.0 
Mar. 50.0 81.3 
April 50.0 18.0 
May 50.0 121.1 50.6 
June 12376 50.0 163.3 421.0 
July 29620 50.0 143.3 192.0 
Aug. 38497 50.0 252.1 77.5 
Sept. 48762 50.0 186.6 
Oct. 60000 50.0 142.3 
Nov. 60000 46.5 142.6 
Dec. 43792 41.8 1141.6 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PSAMF ( 3.49) 
PCAMX (15.10) 
PMAMI (21.40) 
PMSMX (15.73) 
PSSMF (23.27) 
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Table 6,32 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $129752 
Net income $ 40000 
Level of credit 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .68482 1762.12 35.67 62.5' 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 132.6 247.3 
Feb. 50.0 191.9 133.2 
Mar. 50.0 77.1 
April 50.0 18.0 
May 50.0 133.5 50.6 
June 12643 50.0 160.8 406.9 
July 24021 50.0 160.5 189.6 
Aug. 29082 50.0 157.6 35.7 
Sept. 33889 50.0 82.9 
Oct. 40000 50.0 70.9 
Nov. 40000 46.6 133.9 
Dec. 37.0 538.3 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PSAMF ( 3.42) 
PCAMX ( 6.18) 
PMAMI (30.40) 
PMSMX (20.86) 
PSSMF (19.14) 
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Table 6.32 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $119107 
Net income $ 29203 
Level of credit 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value ,90413 1762,12 40.46 70,97 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 141.5 240.3 
Feb. 50.0 181.0 117.8 
Mar. 50.0 74.9 
April 50.0 18.0 
May- 50.0 140.1 50.6 
June 12638 50.0 157.4 397.7 
July 19751 50.0 171.9 188.4 
Aug. 22993 50.0 114.0 14.6 
Sept. 25608 50.0 33.3 
Oct. 29203 50.0 70.0 
Nov. 29203 47.3 127.2 
Dec. 34.5 214.1 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMX ( 1.39) 
PSAMO ( 2.67) 
PCAMX ( 1.39) 
PMAMI (34.56) 
PMSMX (23.07) 
PSSMF (16.93) 
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Table 6.32 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $100140 
Net income $ 20000 
Level of credit 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 2.15377 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May- 15738 
June 8161 
July 13273 
Aug. 15609 
Sept. 17610 
Oct. 20000 
Nov. 20000 
Dec. 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PMMX ( 1.86) 
PSAMO ( .88) 
PMAMI (27.12) 
PMSMX (23.16) 
PSSMF (16.84) 
1847.84 66.90 117.35 
50.0 141.9 240.0 
50.0 180.6 117.2 
50.0 74.8 
50.0 18.0 
50.0 140.4 50.6 
39.9 130.6 295.5 
39.9 134.0 140.2 
39.9 84.1 5.5 
39.9 18.9 
39.9 70.0 
39.0 99.4 
33.2 118.0 234.4 
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Table 6.32 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $78632 
Net income $14091 
Level of credit 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 9.36322 1103.04 225.09 83.53 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 143.8 238.3 
Feb. 50.0 177.9 113.3 
Mar, 50.0 74.3 
April 50.0 18.0 
May 14091 50.0 118.3 50.6 
June 4627 29.8 95.3 194.9 
July 8027 29.8 97.0 93.3 
Aug. 10094 29.8 68.2 5.0 
Sept. 12067 29.8 19.2 
Oct. 14091 29.8 65.2 
Nov. 14091 29.8 70.0 
Dec. 33.7 120.3 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMI ( 2.49) 
PMAMI (17.33) 
PMSMI 
PSSMF 
PSSMO 
(23.72) 
(12.79) 
( 3.49) 
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Table 6.32 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 561 
Net income $10992 
Level of credit 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 72.46785 94.44 388.19 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 21.1 67.0 53.4 
Feb. 3022 21.1 42.7 2.8 
Mar. 4841 21.1 32.6 1.1 
April 6671 21.1 19.1 
May 10992 21.1 70.0 50.6 
June 2838 19.7 52.5 92.6 
July 5334 19.7 70.0 45.4 
Aug. 7190 19.7 47.2 4.6 
Sept. 9043 19.7 18.8 
Oct. 10992 19.7 50.6 
Nov. 10992 19.7 39.9 
Dec. 20.5 63.3 106.3 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PRAMO ( .16) 
PAAMO ( 2.32) 
PMAMI ( 7.20) 
PMSMI (10.50) 
PASMO ( .56) 
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Table 6.27 shows the levels of credit and the marginal value 
products of credit at the extensive margins of land in the summer and 
winter cycles. In all cases the extensive margin of winter land is 
reached considerably before that of summer cycle land. Although, for the 
reasons pointed out in the section on the eiidatario of Zaragoza, at 
higher levels of living the use of winter land is increased less rapidly 
than at low levels of living because of the high cumulative capital 
requirements for consumption in the winter cycle. As the extensive 
margin of winter cycle land is reached a significant drop in the marginal 
value productivity of credit occurs as the farmer begins to deepen the 
employment of capital. The cantaloupe activity is increased to the 10 
hectare limit and other capital intensive crops are substituted for less 
capital intensive crops. As soon as the extensive margin of summer land 
is reached the farmer begins to substitute cotton for corn, sorgo and 
sesame. 
This process is observed in Table 6.28 for the "demand" schedule 
from the "break-even" to the optimum level of credit use associated with 
the high level of living expenditures. At the "break-even" level credit 
is restrictive not only in the summer cycle but also in the winter 
cycle due to the high cumulative capital requirements for consumption in 
the winter. As more credit is made available the farmer moves to the 
extensive margin of winter land and begins to deepen the use of capital 
in this cycle as the line of credit permits. As soon as the cantaloupe 
activity has reached its maximum he substitutes sorgo for corn so as to 
arrive at the optimum mix of crops in the winter cycle long before the 
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summer optimum mix is obtained. In the meantime the extensive margin of 
the summer land is reached and the farmer begins to substitute cotton for 
corn and sorgo until the optimum is reached. As this process occurs the 
credit needs in the winter months decrease due to the large sums of 
generated capital from the summer cycle operations. 
Again the tendency for the shadow price on land to increase with 
increased capital was noted. The shadow prices for labor, mules, and 
tractors decreased. 
Table 6.29 compares the optimum level of credit use in Table 6.28 
with the optimums associated with the other levels of living expenditures. 
The optimum mixes of products are the same and the same amounts of 
resources are used except credit. Less credit is required with the lower 
levels of living expenditure. 
Table 6.30 compares the "break-even" level of Table 6.28 with those 
associated with the other levels of living expenditures. Again, capital 
is shown to be restrictive in both the summer and winter cycles and low 
capital intensive activities are grown. These figures show how, given 
the levels of living expenditures and low levels of credit (capital), the 
farmer can subsist and let a large portion of his land lie idle. This 
may explain, in part, why so much tillable land lies idle for this 
tenancy class, as shown in the census data of Table 4.4. 
By planting two cycles a year the farmer is increasing his income 
significantly. He can employ his savings of the summer crop in his 
winter cycle operations. As is shown in Table 6.28 at higher levels of 
capital employment in the summer cycle, the farmer does not have to 
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borrow for the winter cycle. Because he is employing his own money he 
would have less aversion to uncertainty in the winter cycle than he 
would have if he were borrowing funds. This may be one reason why he 
would want to try to capture the high profits associated with cantaloupes. 
Table 6.31 shows the "demand" schedule for short-term credit 
associated with the high level of living expenditures but when the farmer 
chooses not to grow cantaloupe. The level of credit employed is exactly 
the same, reflecting that the limit is associated with the cotton activity 
in the summer cycle, but the income has decreased from $326,120 to 
$185,987. A comparison of Table 6.32 with Table 6.28 shows that as the 
farmer moves from the "break-even" to the optimum levels of credit the 
pattern is basically the same. A notable difference is that less credit 
is required in the winter cycle because the other crops do not require 
the capital to hire the large quantity labor that the cantaloupe activity 
requires. 
As was observed with the eiidatario from Zaragoza there is a large 
region in the "demand" schedule where the farmer deepens the capital in 
the summer cycle by substituting cotton for other crops. In this range 
the farmer can decrease his borrowings considerably and not decrease his 
income by nearly the same magnitude because the marginal value product 
of credit is not large. For example, in Table 6.32 the farmer could 
reduce his credit by $106,449 from the optimum level to the $80,000 level 
and decrease his income by only $26,435. 
If the farmer had aversion to uncertainty it is likely that he 
might reduce his borrowings in this manner. 
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The farmer generates substantial savings from high to low levels 
of credit use. To the extent he employs these savings in the firm as 
operating capital in the following year he can reduce his credit needs. 
It might be expected that as he substituted his savings for borrowed 
capital that his aversion to uncertainty would decrease and he would be 
more willing to employ borrowed funds in order to approach the optimum 
level shown here. 
The propietario of Apatzing^ n with an 18 percent discount 
This representative farm firm is defined exactly as the propietario 
of Apatzing^ n with a 10 percent discount just studied except that the 
discount is higher for purposes of studying credit rationing with 
certain lenders specified in Table 6.1. It is assumed also that the 
farmer grows only 10 hectares of cantaloupe. 
Table 6.33 presents the "demand" schedule for short-term credit 
g 
associated with the high level of living expenditure. In comparison 
with Table 6.23, the "demand" schedule at a 10 percent rate of discount, 
the schedule at 18 percent has the same general appearance. The amount 
of credit required increases slightly due to the higher discount and for 
the same reason the marginal value product of credit is slightly lower 
at each corresponding level of credit use. 
g 
A "demand" schedule was determined only for the high level of 
living expenditure in order to save computational expense after noting 
the consistency in the "demand" schedules between the various levels 
of consumption at the 10 percent rate of discount. Optimum solutions 
were obtained for each level, however, and are presented in Table 6.35. 
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Table 6.33. "Demand" schedule for short-term credit for propietario 
Apatzing^ n with 50 hectares and 18% discount 
1) Assumed living expenditure $21780/year or $1816.63/mo. 
2) Assumed fixed costs $18665/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$192464 
180000 
160000 
94071 
78923 
78382 
77368 
71384 
67941 
58513 
57159 
49086 
44145 
41127 
39689 
39146 
38601 
36921 
34163 
30268 
27669 
27403 
22314 
22190 
21393 
18627 
16846 
16389 
15248 
14979 
14812 
14778 
$ .03674 
10.69995 
.21069 
.21069 
.24299 
.49558 
.49914 
.53187 
.57934 
.59433 
.60432 
.61631 
.62140 
.65793 
.68091 
.68612 
.69964 
.70180 
.88554 
.89290 
.90025 
2.08700 
2.17745 
3.69236 
3.69537 
4.20034 
4.20787 
4.92822 
8.20093 
8.74915 
8.75511 
8.77079 
$230105 
226849 
223265 
209375 
203316 
202366 
202357 
198454 
196072 
189373 
188186 
182438 
178760 
176366 
175187 
174738 
174279 
172858 
169976 
165876 
163120 
162496 
149842 
149234 
145316 
129483 
119265 
116264 
104425 
101570 
99797 
99431 
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Table 6.33 (Continued) 
1) Assumed living expenditure $21780/year or $1815.53/mo. 
2) Assumed fixed costs $18665/year 
Level of credit Marginal value product Net income after living 
employed of credit expenditures and fixed costs 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
$ 14579 $ 11.00953 $ 96997 
14009 11,13607 89801 
13575 11.15598 84255 
12881 11.41365 75392 
12366 15.06418 68656 
12357 15.09046 68505 
12192 23.19427 65636 
12159 24.20812 64729 
12121 35.52583 63638 
12034 37.74757 59990 
11776 55.63076 48427 
11767 56.44562 47918 
11547 56.48918 34283 
11517 57.03232 32408 
11449 57.24532 28116 
11320 57.40953 20033 
11245 57.88022 15285 
11197 67.69766 12239 
11184 67.74986 11308 
11172 81.90028 10379 
11170 85.78201 10261 
11130 86.15055 6409 
11128 119.99953 6170 
11088 128.93475 858 
11009 129.35035 -10321 
10925 134.23977 -22383 
10896 144.60098 -26710 
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Table 6.34. Resource and product profiles for selected levels of credit 
associated with a high level of living expenditure for the 
propietario of Apatzing^ n with an 18 percent discount 
Level of living 
exp enditure/mo. $ 1816. 63 
Net income $230105 
Level of credit $192464 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .03674 2974.86 21.82 38.28 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 86.8 399.5 
Feb. 50.0 357.0 .7 
Mar. 50.0 713.3 
April 50.0 529.5 
May 40.0 70.0 50.6 
June 12550 50.0 181.2 468.8 
July 44406 50.0 83.8 198.4 
Aug. 64596 50.0 522.3 186.8 
Sept. 90913 50.0 438.0 
Oct. 115836 50.0 338.0 
Nov. 130020 50.0 178.0 
Dec. 192464 50.0 2802.3 187.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX (40.00) 
PSSMF (29.66) 
PASMX ( .34) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
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Table 6.34 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $214838 
Level of credit $120000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value ,21069 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 10465 
July 41531 
Aug. 56753 
Sept. 76285 
Oct. 99807 
Nov. 74935 
Dec. 120000 
2132.36 25.49 44.71 
50.0 86.8 399.5 
50.0 357.0 234.8 
50.0 713.3 .7 
50.0 529.5 
40.0 70.0 50.6 
50.0 145.1 426.3 
50.0 138.4 198.4 
50.0 387.3 157.6 
50.0 323.2 
50.0 261.5 
39.1 134.3 
39.1 2041.4 136.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX (29.07) 
PSAMP (10.93) 
PSSMF (29.66) 
PASMX ( .34) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
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Table 6.34 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $203747 
Level of credit $ 80000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .24299 1761.29 29.28 51.37 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 86.8 399.5 
Feb. 50.0 357.0 .7 
Mar. 50.0 713.3 
April 50.0 529.5 
May 40.0 70.0 50.6 
June 12042 50.0 162.3 530.7 
July 35176 50.0 131.6 194.7 
Aug, 47715 50.0 330.8 115.1 
Sept. 63207 50.0 256.3 
Oct. 80000 50.0 204.1 
Nov. 77239 45.4 147.0 
Dec. 80000 32.7 1597.6 106.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PASMF ( 4.56) 
PGAMX (22.69) 
PMAMI (12.75) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PSSMF (29.66) 
PASMX ( .34) 
327 
Table 6.34 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $190429 
Level of credit $ 60000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jcrnales) (hours) 
Marginal value .59433 1757.46 35.51 62.29 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 155.3 345.4 
Feb. 50.0 273.2 116.4 
Mar. 50.0 694.1 
April 50.0 528.6 
May 40.0 112.3 50.6 
June 12479 50.0 162.5 429.3 
July 29538 50.0 145.4 192.0 
Aug. 38408 50.0 243.1 73.9 
Sept. 48612 50.0 167.8 
Oct. 60000 50.0 135.8 
Nov. 60000 46.4 141.3 
Dec. 41549 41.4 1085.2 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PSAMF ( 3.65) 
PCAMX (14.27) 
PMAMI (22.08) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PMSMK (17.12) 
PSSMF (12.88) 
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Table 6.34 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $175442 
Level of credit $ 40000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornalee) (hours) 
Marginal value .68091 1739.07 37.75 66.21 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 181.4 332.7 
Feb. 50.0 253.4 88.3 
Mar. 50.0 690.1 
April 13815 50.0 528.6 
May 40.0 124.3 50.6 
June 12755 50.0 160.3 405.7 
July 23975 50.0 162.0 189.4 
Aug. 29063 50.0 151.8 33.0 
Sept. 33809 50.0 76.4 
Oct. 40000 50.0 70.0 
Nov. 40000 46.6 133.0 
Dec. 36.7 496.1 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMX ( .15) 
PSAMF ( 3.36) 
PCAMX ( 5.56) 
PMAMI (30.93) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PMSMX (21.15) 
PSSMF ( 8.85) 
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Table 6.34 (Continued) 
Level o£ living 
expend iture/mo. 
Net income $165876 
Level of credit $ 30268 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value .90025 1720.32 43.02 75.47 
pîfôduet (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 179.1 326.6 
Feb. 50.0 243.9 74.9 
Mar. 9130 50.0 688.1 
April 23862 50.0 528.6 
May 40.0 130.1 50.6 
June 12729 50.0 157.1 397.5 
July 20036 50.0 172.2 188.4 
Aug. 23491 50.0 113.8 14.8 
Sept. 26351 50.0 33.3 
Oct. 30268 50.0 70.0 
Nov. 30268 47.2 126.9 
Dec. 34.5 214.1 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMX ( 1.39) 
PSAMO ( 2.79) 
PCAMX ( 1.39) 
PMAMI 04.44) 
PQSMK (10.00) 
PMSMX (23.07) 
PSSMF ( 6.93) 
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Table 6.34 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $137339 
Level of credit $ 20000 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 4.20034 803.38 136.40 243.71 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 178.1 316.4 
Feb. 50.0 234.9 74.5 
Mar. 6610 50.0 629.6 
April 20000 50.0 480.4 
May 40.9 109.3 50.6 
June 7743 38.8 127.5 285.4 
July 12855 38.8 130.1 135.3 
Aug. 15288 38.8 182.0 5.4 
Sept. 17444 38.8 18.9 
Oct. 20000 38.8 70.0 
Nov. 20000 38.8 96.3 
Dec. 33.7 120.3 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMX ( 1.86) 
PSAMO ( .84) 
PMAMI (26.11) 
PMSMI (23.72) 
PQSMX ( 9.06) 
PSSMO ( 7.23) 
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Table 6.34 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $88801 
Level of credit $14009 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 11.13607 790.90 282.35 104.77 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 50.0 157.9 270.0 
Feb. 50.0 201.0 97.6 
Mar. 7988 50.0 299.7 
April 14009 50.0 205.7 
May 46.3 114.7 50.6 
June 4348 28.3 88.9 179.2 
July 7644 28.3 91.1 86.0 
Aug. 9790 28.3 64.8 4.8 
Sept. 11864 28.3 19.2 
Oct. 14009 28.3 63.7 
Nov. 14009 28.. 3 65.6 
Dec. 33.7 120.3 240.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMI ( 2.40) 
PMAMI (15.85) 
PQSMX ( 3.68) 
PMSMI (23.72) 
PSSMO (12.61) 
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Table 6.34 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income $ 858 
Level of credit $11088 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 128.93475 176.70 719.29 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 2344 21.6 70.0 60.1 
Feb. 6844 21.6 47.7 3.6 
Mar. 8966 21.6 56.0 1.0 
April 11088 21.6 38.0 
May 11088 21.2 70.0 50.6 
June 2700 18.4 47.3 79.5 
July 5188 18.4 70.0 39.0 
Aug. 7107 18.4 45.4 4.5 
Sept. 9041 18.4 19.2 
Oct. 11088 18.4 50.1 
Nov. 11088 18.4 36.1 
Dec. 20.7 64.2 108.3 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PAAMO ( 2.23) 
PMAMI ( 5.90) 
PRAMO ( .24) 
PQSMX ( .37) 
PMSMI (10.70) 
PASMO ( .52) 
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Table 6.35. Resource and product profiles for optimum levels of credit 
use at medium, low, and zero levels of living expenditures 
for the propietario of Apatzing^ n with an 18 percent 
discount 
Level of living 
expend i ture/mo. 
Net income 
Level of credit 
$ 1191 
$230427 
$189419 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May-
June 11880 
July 43054 
Aug. 62548 
Sept. 88157 
Oct. 112359 
Nov. 125809 
Dec. 189419 
.07 21.05 36.92 
50.0 86.8 399.5 
50.0 357.0 234.8 
50.0 713.3 .7 
50.0 529.5 
40.0 70.0 50.6 
50.0 181.2 468.8 
50.0 83.8 198.4 
50.0 522.3 186.8 
50.0 438.0 
50.0 338.0 
50.0 178.0 
50.0 2802.3 187.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX (40.00) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PSSMF (29.66) 
PASMX ( .34) 
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Table 6.35 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 621.31 
Net income $230735 
Level of credit $185123 
Credit Land Labor Tractor 
(pesos) (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar, 
April 
May 
June 11300 
July 41883 
Aug. 60775 
Sept. 85770 
Oct. 109348 
Nov. 122160 
Dec. 185123 
.29 21.05 36.93 
50.0 86.8 399.5 
50.0 357.0 234.8 
50.0 713.3 .7 
50.0 529.5 
40.0 70.0 50.6 
50.0 181.2 468.8 
50.0 83.8 198.4 
50.0 522.3 186.8 
50.0 438.0 
50.0 338.0 
50.0 178.0 
50.0 2802.3 187.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX (40.00) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PSSMF (29.66) 
PASMX ( .34) 
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Table 6.35 (Continued) 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. 
Net income 
Level of credit 
$ 0 
$231072 
$180437 
Credit 
(pesos) 
Land 
(hectares) 
Labor 
(j orna les) 
Tractor 
(hours) 
Marginal value 
product (highest 
mo.) 
Months 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 10667 
July 40605 
Aug. 58840 
Sept. 83167 
Oct. 106063 
Nov. 118182 
Dec, 180437 
.29 21.05 36.93 
50.0 86.8 399.5 
50.0 357.0 234.8 
50.0 713.3 .7 
50.0 529.5 
40.0 70.0 50.6 
50.0 181.2 468.8 
50.0 83.8 198.4 
50.0 522.3 186.8 
50.0 438.0 
50.0 338.0 
50.0 178.0 
50.0 2802.3 187.2 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX (40.00) 
PQSMX (10.00) 
PSSMF (29.66) 
PASMX ( .34) 
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Table 6.34 presents the resource and product profiles between the 
"break-even" and the optimum levels of credit use associated with the 
high level of living expenditure. A comparison of this table with its 
counterpart at the 10 percent discount, Table 6.28, shows very little 
difference in product or resource mixes as the level of credit is 
increased. The optimums are exactly the same with the exception of the 
credit requirements. The differences that do exist are explained by 
the additional credit needed in order to get a unit of effective capital 
under the higher discount. 
Table 6.35 compares the optimum levels of credit use associated with 
the other three levels of living expenditure with the optimum of 
Table 6.34, As with the other farms they are observed to be exactly the 
same in terms of the product and resource mixes except for credit. 
The other conclusions noted for the propietario with the lower 
discount are appropriate for this representative farm firm and will not 
be repeated again. 
Hypothesis B 
The hypothesis 
The various representative farmers are subject to external credit 
rationing. 
The tests 
Each farm firm-lender combination specified in Table 6.1 will be 
tested at the rate of discount indicated except the group "other lenders". 
Insufficient information about this group was available to make any 
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specific tests. The tests for the clients of each lender are established 
on the basis of the information presented in Chapter V and are set forth 
below. The results are analyzed immediately following the statement of 
each test. In order to isolate the effects of the institutions, the 
laws, etc., it is assumed that each farmer has a good credit rating and 
is not "shut-out" on that account. The farmers dealing with the Banco 
Elidal and the Banco Agrfcola are assumed to be members of a credit 
society but are not subject to rationing due to "collective decision 
making". 
In each test the optimal solutions of the linear program used in 
testing Hypothesis A are utilized. This solution is referred to as the 
general optimal solution. Essentially the tests of Hypothesis B are 
designed to compare the credit requirements of these general optimal 
solutions with the upper limits of the amount of credit made available 
to each farmer by the lenders. If the amount of credit the lender makes 
available to the farmer is less than that given by the optimal solution 
then credit rationing exists within the context of the assumptions set 
forth. The optimum level of credit use is that associated with the 
potential "demand". It is assumed that the farmer has complete technical 
knowledge (lack of ignorance) and no aversion to uncertainty. Inasmuch as 
ignorance or aversion to uncertainty exist, the results could change 
significantly because the optimum as well as the mix of activities 
could change. These cases will not be considered at this point in the 
study. 
The assumptions underlying the linear program, products, prices and 
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resources, still hold and it must be remembered that a zero level of 
savings is assumed. It is also assumed that the farmer borrows from 
only one lender at a time. To the extent that the farmer has savings 
to employ in the farm business the results may be altered if it is shown 
that the possibility of credit rationing exists. The savings could be 
used to close the "gap" between operating capital needs and that which 
the lender will supply. If, on the other hand, the farmer carried over 
debts the total needs for credit would increase and the "gap" would 
widen. 
Tests for clients of the Banco Elidal 
The sanction test For each eiidatario at each level of living 
compare the amount of credit needed in the critical month, Q, for the 
general optimum solutions of the linear programming problem of Hypoth­
esis A with the amount of credit needed in the critical month, for 
the optimum solutions to a linear program problem where the only activities 
9 10 included are the sanctioned activities as specified in Table 5.3. ' If 
the solutions with the sanctioned crops require less credit, i.e. Lg < Q, 
9 
The sanctioned activities were defined in this table. All 
sanctioned crops were included in the "sanction linear program" if there 
was an activity for which the technical coefficients were more or less 
similar. In all cases except that of the eiidatarios on seasonal land 
there were such activities which were used in the "sanctioned program". 
The case of the eiidatarios on seasonal land is discussed in the analysis 
of the results. 
^^ It is assumed that all of these activities require that the 
farmer use tractor power. 
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external credit rationing exists due to the sanctioning process, given 
the assumptions of the tests set forth above. 
The quota test For each eiidatario at each level of living 
compare the amount of credit needed, 1^ , from the optimum solutions to 
the linear program problem for the sanction tests with the limit to the 
amount of credit the bank will lend for the sanctioned crops based upon 
the quotas in Table 5.3. This limit is defined as = 2 where j 
th  ^
represents the j sanctioned activity in the solution in the critical 
month, Xj is the hectares planted to the activity and is the 
bank's quota of credit per hectare for the activity. If Lq < Lg then 
external credit rationing exists because the quotas are not sufficient 
to cover requirements for credit, given the assumptions of the tests. 
The legal test For each eiidatario at each level of living 
compare the amount of credit needed, Lg, from the optimum solution to 
the linear program for the sanction tests with the legal limit of a loan 
size, L , of 70 percent of the probable value of the harvest. The legal 
limit, L-, can be expressed as = .7 S X.P. where P. represents the 
 ^  ^ i J J J 
til bank's expected value of the harvest of the j sanctioned activity as 
reported in Table 5.3, and the other symbols remain as previously 
defined. If L < L„ then external credit rationing exists, given the 
L b 
assumptions of the tests. 
The eiidatario from Apatzing^ n with 20 hectares 
The sanction test Table 6.36 shows the optimum solutions 
associated with the four levels of living expenditures for the sanctioned 
crops. Only two of the four crops sanctioned by the Bank were used in 
Table 6.36. Resource and product profiles for optimum solutions of sanctioned crops 
associated with high, medium, low, and zero level of living expenditures for the 
ejidatario of Apatzing^ n with 20 hectares 
Credit profile (pesos) Resource profile 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 1816.63 $ 1191 $ 621.31 $ 0.00 Land Labor Tractor 
Net income -12384 -4483 2530 10075 (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Level of credit 29653 26271 23341 20146 
Month 
Jan. 3568 6.0 
Feb. 7072 951.80 6.0 
Mar. 8871 2029 6.0 
April 10687 3117 6.0 
May 12520 4215 6.0 
June 6963 6299 5724 5097 20.0 6.0 156.6 
July 14671 13337 12182 10922 20.0 86.0 139.2 
Aug. 19641 17631 15889 13990 20.0 126.0 
Sept. 22402 19709 17376 14832 20.0 16.0 
Oct. 29653 26271 23341 20146 20.0 286.0 
Nov. 85 6.0 
Dec. 1818 6.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PATMI (20.0) 
Table 6.37. Results of tests for external credit rationing for the Banco Ejidal and the eiidatario 
of Apatzingan with 20 hectares 
(pesos) 
Level of living Optimum solution® Optimum solution with Banco Ejidal's Legal limit 
expenditure sanctioned crops® limit^  
(pesos/month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Credit Net income Credit Net income Credit Credit 
1. $1816.63 $22056 $ 2832 $29653 $-12384 $11650 $19600 
2. $1191.00 18238 10452 26271 -4483 11650 19600 
3. $ 621.31 15308 17402 23341 2530 11650 19600 
4. $ 0.00 12113 24983 20146 10075 11650 19600 
S^ource: Tables 6.7 - 6.8 
S^anctioned crops used were PATMI and PMTMO 
T^he limit is S X.Q., where Q. is the quota for the jth activity as reported in Table 5.3, and j J J J 
Xj is the level of the jth activity in the solution 
T^he limit is .70 EX.P., where P. is the bank's expected monetary yield for the jth activity j J J J 
in the solution as reported in Table 5.3 
Table 6.37 (Continued) 
(pesos) 
Level of living Differences 
expenditure Credit Income 
(pesos/month) (7) = (8) = (9) = (10) = (11) = 
(1) - (3) (3) - (5) (3) - (6) (1) - (6) (2) - (4) 
1. $1816.63 $-7597 $18003 $10053 $ 2456 $15216 
2. $1191.00 -8033 14621 6671 -1362 14935 
3. $ 621.31 -8033 11691 3741 -4292 14872 
4. $ 0.00 -8033 8496 546 -7487 14868 
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this program. They were corn without fertilizer or insecticides and 
sesame with insecticide. The other two activities sanctioned — corn 
with fertilizer and sorgo with fertilizer — were not used. The reason 
was that no activities were defined for these crops with fertilizer 
because the specialist at the Antunez Experiment Station did not recommend 
using fertilizer with these crops on seasonal land. 
The solutions showed the farmer planting all of his land to the 
sesame activity. In Table 6.37 these solutions are compared with the 
general optimum solutions determined with all defined crops. The 
sanctioning process clearly causes an increase in the amount of credit 
required as shown in column 7 where Q - Lg is negative. This interesting 
result simply explains that the capital required per hectare is con­
siderably more for the sanctioned crop. Moreover, when the comparison 
is made in column 11 between the two income levels it is readily apparent 
that the return to the capital is considerably less, because the income 
has fallen near the magnitude of $15,000 pesos at each level of living 
under the sanctioning process. 
These results would indicate that this representative farmer must 
give up a great deal in income in order to benefit society.This is 
corroborated by the fact that this farmer cannot enjoy a level of 
living at the two higher levels when he operates with the sanctioned 
crops. 
This statement assumes that crops are sanctioned in order to 
benefit the total Mexican economy. 
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The quota test The results of this text are shown in columns 
5 and 8 in Table 6.37. Clearly the Bank's quota is not sufficient to 
12 
cover the expenses of producing the sesame activity as it is defined. 
The magnitude of the difference is actually greater than it appears 
considering that the farmer has income from his milking operation. The 
result is that under the assumptions of no aversion to uncertainty and 
complete technical knowledge the farmer is subject to external credit 
rationing and must use savings to make up the difference. In order to 
do this he would have to maintain a relatively low level of consumption. 
If he did not wish to maintain this level of living he would be in debt 
and would not be able to pay off his loan. Therefore low credit quotas 
may be one reason why the Banco Eiidal has a record of many loans not 
being paid off in full.^^ 
The legal test Columns 6 and 9 of Table 6.37 show that, given 
the assumptions, in all cases except at a zero level of living expenditure 
that the legal limit of 70 percent of the estimated value of production 
does not provide sufficient credit to this representative farmer to 
12 
Part of this difference may be due to a specification of the 
activity. The activities as specified in this study and by the Bank are 
quite similar except in the labor requirements at harvest time. The 
activity as defined in this study would cost about $120 more per hectare. 
For the 20 hectares this would mean a difference of $2,400 of capital 
plus interest. Even considering this difference the gap indicating 
credit rationing is large. 
13 
Alvaro de Albornoz (1, p. 296) reports the Bank recovered only 
72 percent of its total loans between 1953 and 1959. For a discussion 
of this problem, see Fernandez y Fernandez (28). 
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undertake the sanctioned crop. This result supports the conclusion of 
the quota test in that under the best of conditions this eiidatario is 
destined to a low level of living and would very likely not be able to 
repay his loans. 
Column 10 shows, however, that if he had the legal limit of funds 
for the sanctioned activities he would have more than enough credit to 
carry on the general plan in an optimal way at the three lower levels 
of living expenditures. 
The eiidatario from Apatzing^n with 10 hectares 
The sanction test Table 6.38 presents the resource and product 
profiles for this farm. As was observed before, the resource and product 
profiles are the same for both optimums except for credit. This farmer 
also produces only sesame for the reasons outlined in the discussion of 
the eiidatario with 20 hectares. The results of the sanctioning process 
are to increase the credit needs and reduce the income of the farmer. 
They also show that this farmer must maintain a low level of living or 
else be continually in debt. 
The quota test This test shows, in column 8, that the Bank is 
not providing sufficient funds to the farmer so the farmer is subject to 
external credit rationing at all levels of living expenditures unless 
he has substantial savings and when it is assumed that he has no aversion 
to uncertainty and complete technical knowledge. 
The legal test This test shows in column 9 that the legal limit 
provides sufficient credit at only very low levels of living expenditure 
unless the farmer has substantial savings to employ in the firm and 
Table 6.38. Resource and product profiles for optimum solutions of sanctioned crops associated 
with high, medium, low, and zero level of living expenditures for the eiidatario 
of Apatzingàn with 10 hectares 
Credit profile Resource profile 
Level of living (pesos) 
expenditure/mo. $ 621.31 $ 0.00 Land Labor Tractor 
Net income -1003 6551 (hectares) (jomales) (hours) 
Level of credit 12076 8881 
Month 
Jan. 6.0 
Feb. 6.0 
Mar. 6.0 
April 239 6.0 
May 735 6.0 
June 3159 2532 10.0 6.0 78.3 
July 6324 5064 10.0 46.0 69.6 
Aug. 8113 6214 10.0 66.0 
Sept. 9156 6612 10.0 11.0 
Oct. 12076 8881 10.0 146.0 
Nov. 6.0 
Dec. 6.0 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PATMI (10.0) 
Table 6.39. Results of tests for external credit rationing for the Banco Ejidal and the 
eiidatario of Apatzing^n with 10 hectares 
Level of living 
expenditure® 
(pesos/month) 
Optimum solution* 
(1) (2) 
Credit Net income 
(pesos) 
Optimum solution with 
sanctioned crops^ 
(3) (4) 
Credit Net income 
Banco Ejidal*s 
limit^ 
(5) 
Credit 
Legal limit 
(6) 
3. $ 621.31 $9044 $ 5757 $12076 $-1003 $5825 $9800 
4. $ 0.00 5568 13336 8881 6551 5825 9800 
^Source: Tables 6.12 - 6.13 
^Sanctioned crops used were PATMI and PMTMD 
^The limit is S where is the quota for the jth activity as reported in Table 5.3 and 
Xj is the level of the jth activity in the solution 
^The limit is .70 S XjPj where is the bank's expected monetary yield for the jth activity 
as reported in Table 5.3, and Xj is the level of the jth activity in the solution 
^The first two levels of monthly living expenditures are not applicable because they always 
result in net dissaving 
Table 6.39 (Continued) 
(pesos) 
Level of living Differences 
expenditure® Credit Income 
(pesos/month) (7) = (8) = (9) = (10) = (11) = 
(1) - (3) (3) - (5) (3) - (6) (1) - (6) (2) - (4) 
3. $ 621.31 $-3032 $6251 $2276 $ 766 $6744 
4. $ 0.00 -3312 3056 -919 4231 6785 
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given no aversion to uncertainty and complete technical knowledge. 
Therefore, under these assumptions, credit rationing exists at all but 
low levels of living expenditure. Column 10 shows that if the fanner 
had these funds at his disposal for any use he could employ them in his 
optimum solution and have excess funds. 
The eiidatario of Zaraeoza 
The credit rationing tests were made for two sets of circumstances: 
1) where the farmer had alternatives of all of the sanctioned crops, and 
2) where the farmer only could receive funds to grow cotton. The second 
set of circumstances will be covered after the first. 
The sanction test Table 6.40 shows the resource and product 
profiles for the optimum output when all crops sanctioned by the Banco 
Eiidal are included. The resource and product profiles are the same with 
the exception of credit. At the higher two levels of consumption the 
farmer is forced to borrow in the winter cycle. Compared with the optimum 
solutions of Tables 6.19 and 6.20 the farmer is not fully utilizing his 
winter cycle land and is growing considerably less cotton. This result 
is attributable to the fact that the farmer does not have the sorgo 
alternatives in the winter and it is optimal to grow winter corn so long 
as a complementary crop of summer corn may be grown. The rest of the 
hectarage, except for the small amount of rice, is planted to cotton in 
the summer and left idle in the winter. 
Table 6.42 shows the comparisons of income and credit levels. The 
optimum solution under the sanctioning process reduces both credit 
needs and income considerably compared with the general optimum as shown 
Table 6.40. Resource and product profiles for optimum solutions of sanctioned crops associated 
with high, medium, low, and zero level of living expenditures for the ejidatario 
of Zaragoza 
Credit profile Resource profile 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 1816.63 $ 1191.00 $ 621.31 $ 0.00 Land Labor Tractor 
Net income 10065 17711 24911 32534 (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Level of credit 32638 28560 25028 21176 
Month 
Jan. 6.04 45.0 27.0 
Feb. 1734 6.04 16.8 
Mar. 3774 6.04 10.0 
April 5726 6.04 3.1 
May 9520 1271 6.04 23.4 
June 9883 9219 8644 8017 10.0 32.3 107.4 
July 16293 14959 13804 12543 10.0 45.0 46.5 
Aug. 20271 18621 16519 14620 10.0 64.7 18.5 
Sept. 23985 21292 18959 16415 10.0 45.0 
Oct. 27734 24352 21423 18227 10.0 35.1 
Nov. 32638 28516 25028 21176 10.0 39.1 
Dec. 26182 21402 17262 12746 10.0 292.5 79.5 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PGAMX (3.96) 
PMAMX (5.61) 
PRAMX ( .42) 
PMSMX 6.64) 
PRSMX ( .39) 
Table 6.41. Resource and product profiles for the optimum solutions of cotton growing associated 
with high, medium, low, and zero levels of living expenditures for the ejidatario of 
Zaragoza 
Credit profile (pesos) Resource profile 
Level of living 
expenditure/mo. $ 1816.63 $ 1191.00 $ 621.00 $ 0.00 Land Labor Tractor 
Net income 7716 15180 23368 29991 (hectares) (jornales) (hours) 
Level of credit 59445 54666 50525 46010 
Month 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
May 
June 5755 5091 4516 3889 10.0 33.0 117.2 
July 16397 15053 13897 12637 10,0 10.0 49.6 
Aug, 23415 21405 19664 17765 10.0 120.0 46.7 
Sept. 30729 28036 25703 23159 10,0 105.0 
Oct. 37645 34263 31333 28138 10.0 80.0 
Nov. 41943 37865 34333 30481 10.0 40.0 
Dec. 59445 54666 50525 46010 10.0 690.0 46.8 
Crops in solution (hectares) 
PCAMX (10.00) 
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in columns 7 and 11. Assuming no savings, no aversion to uncertainty and 
complete technical knowledge the farmer is subject to external credit 
rationing. The decrease in the need for credit and the decrease in 
income is directly attributable to the large cutback in cotton. Although 
the sanctioning process decreases the farmer's income by about $14,000 at 
any level of living the farmer is still able to earn an income that will 
provide for substantial savings at all levels. 
The quota test The Bànk'â quota for the crops iu the solution 
in the critical month of November falls short of the farmer's credit 
requirements at all levels of living expenditures by the amounts shown 
in column 8. Again assuming no savings, no aversion to uncertainty, and 
complete technical knowledge the farmer is subject to external credit 
rationing. With a small amount of savings the farmer could produce at 
the zero level but more substantial amounts are required at the higher 
levels of living expenditures. The net income figures of column 4 show 
that the farmer should be able to have the required quantities of savings 
on hand except at the high level of living. Therefore, with the quota of 
credit the farmer may not have enough capital via credit, but if he has 
substantial savings he can use this credit to maintain the levels of 
income shown in column 4. 
The legal limit The legal limit is larger than the quota but as 
is shown in column 10 under the assumptions of the tests this limit still 
imposes credit rationing on the farmer except at low levels of living. 
It would appear, however, for the reasons noted above, that the farmer 
would have enough savings to close this gap at all levels of living 
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expenditure. 
The sanction test (cotton only) If this farmer grows 10 hectares 
of cotton in the summer and does not grow any crops in the winter cycle his 
credit needs increase slightly compared with the general optimum as shown 
in Tables 6.41 and 6,42. The increase in credit is due to the substitution 
of cotton for the small amount of rice grown in the general solution. 
Income, however, drops significantly as shown in column 11. This drop is 
primarily due to the lack of cultivation of the winter cycle. With the 
savings generated in the summer cycle the farmer could plant the winter 
cycle without resorting to credit in these months as shown in Tables 
6.19 and 6.20. This shows the importance of the winter cycle to earning 
income. 
The quota test (cotton only) The Bank's limit to the line of 
credit as determined by the quota is not sufficient to permit the farmer 
to cultivate the cotton crop at any level of living expenditure when a 
zero level of savings, no aversion to uncertainty and complete technical 
knowledge are assumed. At the two lower levels of living expenditure 
the farmer would have sufficient savings to make up the difference 
caused by the credit rationing. 
The legal test (cotton only) The same analysis applies as with 
the quota test because the Bank's quota is very near the legal limit. 
Tests for the client of the Banco Agricola 
The three tests, the sanction, the quota, and the legal, as out­
lined for the Banco E jidal will be utilized in the study of the Banco 
Agricola's credit rationing for the propietario of Apatzing^n. The 
Table 6.42. Results of tests for external credit rationing for the Banco Ejidal and the 
eiidatario of Zaragoza 
(P esos) 
Level of living Optimum solution® Optimum solution with Limit of Banco Legal limit'* 
expenditure sanctioned crops^ Ejidaic 
(pesos/month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cred it Net income Credit Net income 
1. $1816.63 $55459 $24420 $32638 $10065 $20279 $23105 
2. $1191.00 50679 32136 28560 17711 20279 23105 
3. $ 621.00 46538 39124 25028 24911 20279 23105 
4. $ 0.00 42203 46747 21176 32534 20279 23105 
Comparison of optimum solution and solution with credit only for cotton 
1. $1816.63 55459 24420 59445 7716 36558 37030 
2. $1191.00 50679 32136 54666 15180 36558 37030 
3. $ 621.00 46538 39124 50525 22368 36558 37030 
4. $ 0.00 42203 46747 46010 29991 36558 37030 
^Source: Tables 6.19 - 6.20 
^Sanctioned crops were PMAMK, PGAMX, PRAMX, PRAMO, PAAMI, PIGMI, PMSMX, PRSMO, PRSMX 
^The limit is S » where Qj is the quota for the jth activity as reported in Table 5.3, and 
Xj is the level of the Jth activity in the solution 
*^The limit is .70 EX^P^, where Pj is the bank's expected monetary yield for the jth activity, 
and Xj is the level of the jth activity in the solution as reported in Table 5.3 
Table 6.42 (Continued) 
(pesos) 
Level of living Differences 
expend iture Credit Income 
(pesos/month) (7) = (8) = (9) = (10) = (11) = 
(1) - (3) (3) - (5) (1) - (6) (3) - (6) (2) - (4) 
1. $1816.63 $22821 $12359 $32354 $ 9533 $14355 
2. $1191.00 22119 8281 27574 5455 14425 
3. $ 621.00 21510 4749 23433 1923 14213 
4. $ 0.00 21027 897 19098 -1929 14213 
Comparison of optimum solution and solution with credit only for cotton 
1. $1816.63 -3996 22887 18429 22415 16704 
2. $1191.00 -3987 18108 13649 17636 16956 
3. $ 621.00 -3987 13967 9508 13495 16756 
4. $ 0.00 -3807 9452 5173 8980 16756 
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sanctioned crops, their credit quotas and estimated monetary yields for 
this bank are set forth in Table 5.2. Because these tests and their 
assumptions were outlined in the previous section they are not repeated 
here. 
The propietario from Apatzingan 
The sanction test The general optimal solution was composed of 
a mix of activities that were sanctioned by the Banco Agrfcola with the 
exception of the .34 hectare planted to sesame with both fertilizer and 
insecticides in the winter cycle. Therefore this mix was considered to 
be the same as the sanctioned mix. The sanctioning process did not change 
the farmer's credit requirements nor income. 
The quota test The Bank's quota based upon the December needs 
for cotton is not sufficient to provide the farmer's capital requirements 
as shown in column 8. Therefore credit rationing exists at any level of 
living if the farmer has no savings, has no aversion to uncertainty, and 
has complete technical knowledge. It is likely, as was observed in 
Tables 6.23 through 6.26, that the farmer would have sufficient savings 
to overcome this gap. 
The legal limit The legal limit provides more funds to the 
farmer than the quota limit but given the assumptions of the test external 
credit rationing still exists at all levels of living as shown in column 
10. It is likely, however, that the farmer would have sufficient savings 
to overcome this gap. 
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Tests for credit rationing when no cantaloupe was grown 
The above three tests were also made for the farm firms when no 
cantaloupe was grown as shown in Table 6.42. As was observed above the 
critical month is associated with the cotton crop. The results of the 
analysis are the same as for the above tests. 
The test for the client of the commercial banks 
Assume the propietario has enough operating capital on hand at the 
beginning of the year to cover the minimum bank requirement of 30 percent 
of the costs of production and that he has no aversion to uncertainty 
and complete technical knowledge. Use the results of the general optimum 
solution of Hypothesis A to determine the optimum use of credit. Use the 
value of mortgagable property stated in Table 4.6, $505,350, as the amount 
of property the farmer can pledge as collateral for a loan. It is then 
possible to determine the size of loan the farmer could undertake given 
the amount of owned capital he can utilize and the collateral require­
ments of the bank. 
The propietario of Apatzing^n 
The test was applied in a general way. The amount of owned capital 
the propietario was willing to invest in the firm was assumed to be from 
the 30 percent minimum to a maximum of 90 percent. The amount of credit 
needed to supplement this capital was then determined. The bank's 
collateral requirements of the minimum of twice the value of the loan 
and also those for three and four times the size were determined and 
taken as a percentage of the mortgagable property. The results are 
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presented in Table 6.43. At the 30 percent minimum requirement for 
owned capital the farmer must mortgage 50 percent or more of his property 
when the collateral is twice the size of the loan depending on the level 
of living expenditure. He must pledge 74.9 percent or more when it is 
three times the size of the loan and would have to mortgage other 
property such as his home in order to meet the requirement of collateral 
for four times the size of the loan. As the percentage of owned capital 
employed in the business increases, the burden of the collateral becomes 
less. For example, when 90 percent of the capital is owned 15.2 percent 
of the value of the mortgagable property must be pledged as collateral at 
the high level of living expenditure when four times the value of the loan 
is required as collateral. 
As shown in Table 6.43 external credit rationing only exists in an 
absolute sense when the farmer borrows funds associated with the three 
highest levels of living expenditures, when the bank requires four times 
the volume of the loan as collateral and when the farmer employs only 
30 percent of his owned capital. This conclusion assumes no internal 
rationing in the form of aversion to uncertainty, and no lack of 
technical knowledge. It might be expected, however, that the farmer 
would impose internal rationing upon himself because he would not want 
to mortgage his property above some limit. It is likely then that he 
would only borrow funds when he could finance more than 30 percent of his 
business operation with his owned capital. Tables 6.33 and 6.35 show 
that, at even relatively low levels of credit, the farmer can earn 
substantial savings with the judicious use of credit in both the winter 
Table 6.43. Results of tests for external credit rationing for the Banco Agrfeola and the 
propietario of Apatzing^n 
(pesos) 
Level of living Optimum solution Optimum solution with Banco Agricola's Legal limit 
expenditure sanctioned crops^ limit^ 
(pesos/month) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Credit Net income Credit Net income Credit Credit 
1. $1816.63 $186449 $236120 $186449 $236120 $144000 $161000 
2. $1191.00 183567 243766 183567 243766 144000 161000 
3. $ 621.00 179427 250755 179427 250755 144000 161000 
4. $ 0.00 174911 258377 174911 258377 144000 161000 
1. $1816.63 186449 185987 186449 185987 144000 161000 
^Source; Tables 6.29 - 6.30 and 6.32 
^Sanctioned crops were PCAMX, FBAMX, PQSMX, PMSMX, PSSMF 
°The limit is Z where Qj is the quota for the jth activity as reported in Table 5.2, 
and Xj is the level of the jth activity in the solution 
^The limit is .70 EX^Pj, where Pj is the bank's expected monetary yield for the jth activity 
and Xj is the level of the jth activity in the solution as reported in Table 5.3 
Table 6.43 (Continued) 
Level of living Differences 
expenditure Credit 
(pesos/month) (7) = (8) = (9) = (10) = (11) = 
(1) - (3) (3) - (5) (1) - (6) (3) - (6) (2) - (4) 
1. $1816.63 0 $42449 $25449 $25449 0 
2. $1191.00 0 39567 22567 22567 0 
3. $ 621.00 0 35427 18427 18427 0 
4. $ 0.00 0 30911 13911 13911 0 
1. $1816.63 0 42449 25449 25449 0 
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and summer crop cycles. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that the 
farmer would have a substantial amount of savings to employ in the firm. 
If this were the case, then external credit rationing would have to be 
measured at the level of owned capital the farmer would employ. If the 
amount of collateral required by the bank exceeds that which he is willing 
to pledge then he is subject to external credit rationing and would be 
forced to accept a smaller sized loan. 
The tests for the client of the credit union 
The upper limit, as shown in Chapter V, to the size of the loan 
from the credit union may be determined by three things: 1) the value 
of capital stock held by the farmer, 2) 70 percent of the estimated 
costs of production, and 3) the type of collateral pledged against the 
loan. If the property pledged is non-real property the loan may not 
exceed 10 times the value of the capital stock held. If the property 
pledged is real property the loan may not exceed 20 times the value of 
capital stock held nor more than 50 percent of the value of the mortgag-
able property. 
The value of the capital stock is designated as A. Seventy percent 
of the estimated costs of production is = .7 Z where is the 
number of hectares of the activity and is the estimated costs of 
production. The Banco Agricole's estimated costs of Table 5.2 are used 
as the credit union's estimate. The amount of mortgagable property is MP. 
The amount of credit the farmer needs is Q, given by the general optimal 
solution set forth under Hypothesis A above. There are two tests. 
The first test assumes the farmer is pledging non-real property. 
Table 6.44. Test for external credit rationing for the commercial banks and the propietario of 
Apatzingin 
(pesos) 
Percent Percent Credit Collateral requirements 
of of (loan 2x loan 3x loan 4x loan 
capital capital size) Size Percent Size Percent Size Percent 
owned borrowed of of of 
Level of living total total total 
expenditure mp^ mp mp 
1816.63 90 10 19240 38480 7.6 57720 11.4 76960 15.2 
1191.00 90 10 18935 37870 7.4 56805 11.2 75740 14.9 
621.31 90 10 18506 37012 7.3 55518 11.0 74024 13.5 
0.00 90 10 18038 36076 7.1 54144 10.7 72152 14.3 
1816.63 80 20 38469 76936 15.2 115404 22.8 153872 30.4 
1191.00 80 20 37871 75742 14.9 113613 22.4 151484 30.0 
621.31 80 20 37012 74024 14.6 111036 22.0 148048 29.3 
0.00 80 20 36076 72152 14.3 108228 21.4 144304 28.5 
1816.63 70 30 57719 115438 22.8 173157 34.3 230876 45.7 
1191.00 70 30 56806 113612 22.4 170418 33.7 227222 45.0 
621.31 70 30 55519 111038 22.0 166557 32.9 222076 43.9 
0.00 70 30 54113 108226 21.4 162339 32.1 216452 42.8 
1816.63 60 40 76960 153920 30.5 230880 45.6 307840 60.9 
1191.00 60 40 75742 151484 30.0 227226 45.0 302968 59.9 
621.31 60 40 74024 148048 29.3 222072 43.9 296096 58.6 
0.00 60 40 72147 144294 28.5 216441 42.8 288588 57.1 
%ip designates mortgagable property 
Table 6.44 (Continued) 
(pesos) 
Percent Percent Credit Collateral requirements 
of of (loan 2x loan 3x loan 4x loan 
capital capital size) Size Percent Size Percent Size Percent 
owned borrowed of of of 
Level of living total total total 
expenditure mp^ mp mp 
1816.63 50 50 96200 192400 38.1 288600 57.1 384800 76.1 
1191.00 50 50 94677 189354 37.5 284031 56.2 378708 74.9 
621.31 50 50 92530 185060 36.6 277590 54.9 370120 73.2 
0.00 50 50 90188 180376 35.7 270564 53.5 360752 71.4 
1816.63 40 60 115439 230865 45.7 346302 68.5 461736 91.4 
1191.00 40 60 113613 227226 45.0 340839 67.4 454452 89.9 
621.31 40 60 111036 222072 43.9 333108 65.9 444144 87.8 
0.00 40 60 108234 216468 42.8 324702 63.0 432936 85.7 
1816.63 30 70 134680 269360 53.3 404040 80.0 538720 106.6 
1191.00 30 70 132548 264916 52.4 397374 78-6 529832 104.8 
621.31 30 70 129542 259084 51.3 388626 76.9 518168 102.5 
0.00 30 70 126263 252526 50.0 378789 74.9 505052 99.9 
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If LQ < Q or if lOA < Q the farmer is subject to external credit 
rationing. 
The second test assumes the farmer is pledging real property. In 
this test if < Q, if 2OA < Q, or if .5MP < Q then the farmer is 
subject to external credit rationing. 
Both tests assume a zero level of savings (other than stock in the 
credit union), no aversion to uncertainty and complete technical 
knowledge. 
The propietario of Apatzingin 
Table 6.45 presents the information needed for the two tests. The 
amount of credit required for the general optimal solutions is in 
columns 6 through 9 for the four levels of living expenditures. For the 
first test, assuming the farmer pledges non-real property such as his 
crop, the figures of the four levels of living expenditure columns are 
compared with columns 2 and 3 for any assumed level of capital stock 
held. In any case the 70 percent of the estimated costs of production 
in column 3 is not restrictive. The restrictive factor is lOA. The 
farmer must own $18,645 of capital stock in order to receive the amount 
of credit he needs to undertake his optimal plan associated with the 
high level of living expenditure. Given the levels of savings earned 
at relatively low levels of credit as shown in Tables 6.23 through 6.25, 
it is likely that the farmer could hold this level of capital stock. 
The second test compares columns 6 through 9 with 70 percent of the 
estimated costs of production in column 3, 20 times the amount of 
capital stock in column 4 and 50 percent of the mortgagable property in 
Table 6.45. Results of test for credit rationing for the credit union.and the propietario 
of Apatzing^n 
(pesos) 
Optimal use of credit 
Assumed level lOA 70 percent 20A 50 percent of Level of living expenditure/mo. 
of capital of estimated mortgagable 
stock held production 
costs 
property $1816.63 $1191.00 $621.31 $0.00 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
$ 2000 $ 20000 $205714 $ 40000 $252675 $186449 $183567 $179427 $174911 
4000 40000 205714 80000 252675 186449 183567 179427 174911 
6000 60000 205714 120000 252675 186449 183567 179427 174911 
8000 80000 205714 160000 252675 186449 183567 179427 174911 
10000 100000 205714 200000 252675 186449 183567 179427 174911 
12000 120000 205714 240000 252675 186449 183567 179427 174911 
14000 140000 205714 280000 252675 186449 183567 179427 174911 
16000 160000 205714 320000 252675 186449 183567 179427 174911 
18000 180000 205714 360000 252675 186449 183567 179427 174911 
20000 200000 205714 400000 252675 186449 183567 179427 174911 
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column 5. So long as the farmer is willing to mortgage the 50 percent 
limit of his property this limit is not restricting nor is the 70 percent 
of the estimated costs of production. Again, the limiting amount is the 
amount of capital stock owned. In this case the farmer needs to own 
only $9,623 of stock in order to secure the amount of credit he requires 
to undertake the optimal plan associated with the high level of living 
expenditure. It would appear for the reasons mentioned above that the 
farmer should have enough savings to purchase this quantity of stocks 
Inasmuch as the farmer has savings, aside from those invested in 
the capital of the credit union, his credit needs and capital stock 
requirements would decrease. 
The test for the clients of merchants and dealers 
The merchants are assumed to offer credit with the farmer's pledge 
of the crop as collateral. As shown in Chapter V they require the farmer 
to make a down payment of 30 percent of the value of seed, fertilizer and 
insecticides which they will sell on credit. It is assumed the farmer 
has no aversion to uncertainty, complete technical knowledge, and the 
required savings in order to make the down payment. 
The test is to determine the amount, L^, they will lend for seed, 
fertilizer and insecticides for the crops grown in the critical month 
and to compare this figure with the credit needs, Q, determined from 
the general optimal solutions. If < Q then credit rationing exists. 
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The propietario of Apatzing^n 
The general optimal solutions at the 18 percent discount were stated 
in Tables 6.33 and 6.35. In the summer the farmer planted all of his 
land to cotton. Table 6.46 compares these optimum credit needs for 
cotton with the amount of credit the farmer can receive from the merchants 
when the farmer bases his credit needs on his own estimations reported in 
Table 4.17 for the cotton crop. The difference indicates that the 
farmer clearly is subject to credit rationing given the assumptions of 
the test. However, it is likely that the farmer who secures credit 
directly from the merchant has sufficient owned operating capital in the 
form of savings to make up the difference. 
Hypothesis C 
The hypothesis 
A credit using eiidatario can make a "desirable" income. 
The test 
A "desirable" income is a subjective concept. It will not be 
defined. Rather a test will be made which will allow one to make his 
own judgment based upon his definition of a "desirable" income. 
These tests are made under the assumptions of the model. The 
figures are computed using the coefficients representing good management 
and without consideration of aversion to uncertainty. To the extent that 
lack of technical knowledge or aversion to uncertainty exists the 
incomes will decrease and the credit needs may increase or decrease. 
The test is to consider the net incomes after fixed costs and 
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Table 6.46. Results of test for external credit rationing for merchants 
and dealers and the propietario of Apatzing^n 
(pesos) 
Level of living Credit requirements with Merchant limit to 
expenditure/mo. optimal solution credit 
(1) (2) 
1. $1816.63 $186449 $42015 
2. $1191.00 183567 42015 
3. $ 621.31 179427 42015 
4. $ 0.00 174911 42015 
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levels of living expenditures have been subtracted. If the net income 
is positive it may not be directly concluded that the farmer can 
necessarily make sufficient earnings. The net income may be thought of 
as savings. As was shown under Hypothesis B the farmer usually needs to 
have some savings to supplement his credit in order to undertake the 
optimal solution. In addition savings are important as a means of 
capital formation by permitting intermediate and long-term investment. 
Therefore the magnitude of the net income is very important in deter­
mining whether or not the farmer can earn a "desirable" level of income. 
The results 
Table 6.47 presents the net incomes, the amounts of credit, and the 
shadow prices on land for both the general optimum solution and the 
optimum solution for the sanctioned crops for the eiidatarios studied. 
The ei idatario of Apatzing^n with 20 hectares can save at all 
levels of living expenditure in the general optimum solution. Under the 
sanctioning process, however, he is forced to the lower levels of 
living. In order to have sufficient savings to supplement the credit 
available on the quota system of the Banco Eiidal he would be forced 
to low levels of living expenditure. 
The eiidatario of Apatzingan with 10 hectares is restricted under 
the best of conditions to the two lower levels of living expenditure 
under the general optimum. When subject to the sanctioning process his 
level of living is restricted even further. It is doubtful whether he 
would be able to save enough to supplement the borrowed capital in order 
to carry on each year's operations without being continually in debt 
Table 6.47. Results of tests of Hypothesis G 
(pesos) 
Level of living Optimum solution Optimum solution for sanctioned crops 
expenditure/mo. ^ Net Credit Land Net Credit Land Quota of credit 
, income shadow income shadow Banco Eiidal 
price price 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Eiidatario Apatzins^n 20 hectares 
1. $ 2832 $22056 $1114.47 $-12384 $29653 $ 378.59 $11650 
2. 10452 18238 1114.47 -4483 26271 365.79 11650 
3. 17402 15308 1114.47 2530 23341 352.37 11650 
4. 24983 12113 1116.87 10075 20146 352.37 11650 
Eiidatario Apatzine^n 10 hectares 
1. -9065 16654 -16170 18388 378.59 5825 
2. -400 12576 -8383 15006 378.59 5825 
3. 5757 9044 1167.81 -1003 12076 359.02 5825 
4. 13336 5568 1178.77 6551 8881 352.37 5825 
Eiidatario Zaraeoza 
1. 24420 55459 2582.44 10065 32638 1551.67 20279 
2. 32136 50679 1589.24 17711 28516 1561.30 20279 
3. 39124 46538 2558.43 24911 25028 1576.40 20279 
4. 46747 42203 2558.43 32534 21176 1576.40 20279 
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except at a very low level of living expenditure. 
The ejidatario of Zaragoza on the other hand, can earn substantial 
net incomes under the general optimum to permit him to maintain a level 
living associated with the high level of living expenditures and have a 
sizable amount of savings to employ in the next year's operations or to 
use for intermediate or long-term investment. Under the sanctioning 
process his savings would be reduced considerably but he could still 
maintain any of the lower three levels of living and have sufficient 
savings to supplement the credit available under the quota system of the 
Banco Ejidal, 
Hypothesis D 
The hypothesis 
There are differences among representative farm firms with respect 
to: 
1) their demand for short-term credit; 
2) their monthly credit needs; 
3) their sources of credit; 
4) their external credit rationing; and 
5) their net incomes. 
The test 
The test is to make comparisons among the representative farm firms 
noting the similarities and dissimilarities with respect to the above 
five points. The results of the tests of Hypotheses A, B, and C are 
utilized. It is assumed that the farmers do not have aversion to 
uncertainty, that they have complete technical knowledge, and that they 
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have a zero level of savings unless stated otherwise. 
The demand for credit 
The demand schedules for credit for each of the representative farm 
firms exhibited common characteristics. As the level of living expen­
ditures rose, so did the upper bound and lower bound indicating the 
increase in credit requirements due to living expenditures. Near the 
lower bounds, especially with the lower levels of living expenditures, 
the marginal value products of credit were extremely high. These high 
values are reflections of the ability of additional units of credit to 
bring more of the farmer's physical resources into production. As these 
resources are completely used the marginal value products of credit were 
observed to fall considerably. Once the extensive margin of land was 
reached the farmer used additional credit to deepen the capital employed 
per hectare. In the case of the farmers with two crop cycles a year the 
summer months were observed to have the highest marginal value products 
of credit. These marginal value products were higher at low levels of 
credit use than those for the farmers on seasonal land. This is due to 
the fact that an additional unit of credit in the summer permits 
receipts to be generated at the end of the summer. These receipts are 
available to employ in productive purposes in the winter cycle. Because 
of this linkage between the cycles the marginal value product of credit 
in the summer represents the additional income in the winter cycle as 
well as that in the summer cycle. Therefore when the extensive margin 
of the winter cycle land was reached and the return from capital employed 
in the winter cycle became lower or when generated capital became 
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redundant in the winter the marginal value product of credit dropped 
significantly. 
For each farm after the extensive margin of summer land was reached 
a large range of credit use was observed, approaching the optimum use, 
where the marginal value productivity of credit was relatively low. In 
this range the farmer increased his capital intensity per hectare. If 
the farmer had aversion to uncertainty it is quite plausible that he 
would decrease his credit considerably over this range and not decrease 
his income by nearly the same magnitude. 
The actual amounts of credit required varied depending upon the mix 
of crops grown. The farmers on seasonal land had considerably less 
requirements per hectare than the farmers on irrigated land. This was 
primarily due to two things. Fertilizer, a high capital-requiring input, 
was not used on the seasonal land to any great extent. More importantly, 
the farmer on seasonal land could not grow cotton. This crop has high 
capital requirements due to the fertilizer, insecticides and the hand 
labor required. Both the eiidatario from Zaragoza and the propietario 
from Apatzingin used their irrigated land to grow cotton after they had 
sufficient credit to reach the extensive margin of their summer land. 
The milking operations of the eiidatarios and propietario of 
Apatzing^ n reduced the needs for credit for the crop operations due to 
the steady flow of receipts each month. If these farmers did not have 
these livestock operations the amount of credit they would need in any 
one month would increase by the extent that the receipts from this 
activity were not available plus interest costs. 
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Monthly credit needs 
The monthly requirements for credit were determined on the basis of 
the flow of expenditures and receipts. Expenditures consisted of those 
necessary for production, to pay taxes, and to meet the predetermined 
levels of living. The receipts came from the sale of the crops and in 
some cases, milk. The level of living expenditures were found to 
influence the credit requirements significantly. As the level of living 
rose so did the credit requirements needed in order to start-up the 
farming operations as did the amount of credit required at the optimum. 
The farmers on irrigated land at high levels of living and at low 
levels of credit were observed to decrease their production in the winter 
cycle due to the necessity of providing for the living expenditures 
before they could use available credit for production purposes. As the 
line of credit was increased they were able to increase production in 
the winter cycle as a result of two things; 1) they could use the 
additional credit for productive purposes, and 2) they had more generated 
income from the summer cycle operations to employ in the winter cycle. 
Eventually, as more credit was made available in the summer, no credit 
was required in the winter cycle because of the amount of generated 
capital from the summer. For this reason the capital required in the 
winter cycle for the optimal mix of activities was available to the 
farmer before the amount required for the optimum mix in the summer cycle. 
The ejidatarios of Apatzingin on seasonal land did not have any 
credit requirements in the winter months except when they were net 
dissavers. When dissaving they had to borrow in the winter in order to 
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maintain their level of living. 
When farmers grew cantaloupe in the winter cycle the credit require­
ments in this cycle were observed to increase relative to those who did 
not grow cantaloupe. This is primarily due to the high capital require­
ments of insecticides, fungicides, and hand labor associated with this 
crop. 
In general the farmers were observed to borrow capital throughout 
a cycle and repay the loan at the end of the cycle. Exceptions were 
when a crop was harvested in October or November in the summer cycle or 
in April in the winter cycle. In these cases the farmers would use the 
receipts from these crops in order to meet some of the capital require­
ments in the remaining months of the cycles. The observed pattern of 
borrowing funds throughout the crop cycle and then paying back the 
loan after the crop is harvested is the method of lending operation in 
the zone. 
The sources of credit 
Chapter V presented a brief description of the various lenders in 
the region. In general the eiidatarios were served by the Banco Ejidal 
for the bulk of their credit needs. Some of the more successful 
eiidatarios were members of the credit union or were able to borrow from 
the cotton gins. Others who lacked credit sources were forced to work 
with the local money lenders at very high rates of interest. The 
commercial banks did not work with ei idatarios because this farmer 
usually has little real property that he can use as collateral for the 
loan. 
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On the other hand, the propietario had a much wider array of credit 
sources. Assuming he was determined as credit worthy by each lender his 
sources of credit could include the Banco Agrfcola, the commercial banks, 
the credit union, the merchants and dealers, and the cotton gins. 
External credit rationing 
Each lender had certain characteristics associated with his lending 
operations that could plausibly give rise to external credit rationing. 
The eiidatarios were found to have their credit needs and incomes changed 
considerably from their optimum as a result of the government's sanc­
tioning process through the Banco Ejidal. The credit requirements of 
the eiidatario of Zaragoza decreased whereas those of the eiidatarios 
of Apatzing^ n increased. The optimum solution of the propietario of 
Apatzing^ i was not affected by the sanctioning process. 
With respect to the optimal combination of sanctioned crops tests 
were made to see if the banks loaned sufficient funds, based upon their 
quotas, to meet the credit needs of the farmers. In general the quotas 
were found not to provide enough funds assuming no aversion to uncertainty, 
complete technical knowledge and a zexo—level of savings. The size of 
this external credit rationing became larger as higher levels of living 
were assumed. It was evident that the farmer was to make up the 
difference. He must employ savings in his farming operation. Based 
upon the expected earnings associated with the use of credit it appeared 
quite reasonable that the eiidatario of Zaragoza could have sufficient 
savings in order to make up the difference at all but the highest level 
of living expenditure. For the same reason the propietario of Apatzingin 
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should have sufficient savings at all levels of living expenditure. It 
is doubtful whether the eiidatarios of Apatzingin would be able to have 
sufficient income to provide the necessary savings except at very low 
levels of living expenditure. 
The legal test for the same farmers showed that with the maximum 
amounts of credit permitted by law for the sanctioned crops that the 
farmers would be subject to external credit rationing under the assump­
tions of the tests. In general the farmers would need to employ savings 
in order to make up the difference. Exceptions were the eiidatarios of 
Apatzing^ n with 10 hectares and of Zaragoza who could have sufficient 
credit under this system at low levels of living. 
The propietario of Apatzing&i was also considered as a client of 
the commercial bank, the credit union, and merchants and dealers. In 
all cases it was determined that these lenders could ration credit. In 
the case of the commercial banks the rationing process depended upon the 
farmer's willingness to mortgage his property. With the credit union 
it was found to depend on the amount of capital stock owned. With the 
merchants and dealers the limit was 70 percent of the cost of materials 
they sold. Given no aversion to uncertainty, complete technical know­
ledge and based upon this farmer's income with his optimal solution it 
was concluded that he would likely have sufficient savings to make up 
the differences between the credit limits of the lenders and his credit 
needs. 
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Net incomes 
All profit maximizing farmers except the elidatario of Apatzing^n 
with 10 hectares were found to be able to generate sufficient incomes in 
the general optimum solutions in order to have some residual as savings 
at all levels of living expenditure given no aversion to uncertainty, 
complete technical knowledge, and no external credit rationing. The 
amount of saving was small at the high level of living expenditure for 
the eiidatarlo of Apatzing^n with 20 hectares. The elidatario of 
Zaragoza and the propietario of Apatzing^n were able to earn substantial 
savings. 
The elidatario of Apatzingan with 10 hectares was considerably less 
well off. His income was not sufficient to permit either of the two 
higher levels of living expenditure. 
These results would indicate that the farmers on irrigated land, if 
given their free choice of crops, could maintain higher levels of living 
and have sufficient savings to use as operating capital in future cycles, 
to make capital improvements, or to use for other purposes. The farmers 
on seasonal land, however, are not so fortunate. 
As a result of the sanctioning process (the assumption of no 
external credit rationing is relaxed) the incomes of all farmers except 
the propietario of Apatzingan are reduced significantly. Correspondingly 
the ability to save is reduced. Under these circumstances at the optimum 
solution both the elidatario of Zaragoza and the propietario of Apatzingan 
are able to maintain all levels of living expenditure. The elidatario 
of Apatzingan with 20 hectares is relegated to a low level. The 
elidatario of Apatzingin with 10 hectares is situated at a lower level. 
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Because of the credit requirements for the sanctionad crops the 
magnitude of saving is very important. As was pointed out in the 
previous section, it is doubtful that the ei idatarios of Apatzingin can 
save sufficient income in order to supplement the available credit or 
that the eiidatario from Zaragoza could maintain the high level of 
living. 
Summary and Conclusions 
A theoretical and empirical model was developed to measure the 
marginal value productivity of short-term credit and to determine a 
demand schedule for short-term credit. Four representative farm firms 
were specified for the two municipios of Apatzing^ n and Zaragoza. An 
examination of the lending institutions showed that all institutions had 
characteristics associated with their modes of operation which could 
cause them to impose external credit rationing on their clients. The 
hypotheses set forth in the first chapter in accordance with the 
objectives of the study were tested in the following chapters. Hypoth­
esis D provides a comparative summary of these results for the repre­
sentative farms and so the summary will not be repeated here. As a 
result of these tests several general conclusions can be drawn. 
1) Credit as a means of supplementing owned operating capital is 
an important asset to the farmer. For the farmer who has little capital 
it provides a means for him to undertake production. At low levels of 
capital an additional unit of capital via credit has very high returns 
associated with it because it permits the farmer to bring his owned 
resources into production. At higher levels of credit use it permits 
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him to deepen the capital use per hectare and to earn higher incomes 
although the marginal value productivity of credit at this point is 
considerably less. 
2) Credit rationing can exist for all of the representative farmer-
lender combinations studied. The following results were observed in this 
study with respect to the optimal solutions for crops in which credit 
was granted. The quotas of the Banco Eiidal and Banco Agrifcola do not 
appear sufficient to meet the capital requirements of the crops grown. 
The commercial banks can impose high collateral requirements. The 
credit union's limit is imposed by the amount of capital stock the farmer 
owns. The limit of the merchants and dealers is 70 percent of the value 
of the materials purchased from the merchant which does not cover the 
high costs of hiring labor. 
3) The Federal Government's sanctioning of certain crops to receive 
credit can greatly restrict the farmer's ability to earn income and 
generate savings. 
4) Savings are important to the fanner as a means of avoiding 
credit rationing. A farmer with no savings could not expect to under­
take an optimal combination of crop activities. However, a farmer who 
had substantial savings on hand could undertake the optimal combination. 
5) At low levels of living expenditures the farmer can make 
sufficient earnings to cover his living expenses by employing small 
amounts of credit. It is not necessary that he farm all of his land. 
This may explain why census data report that so much tillable land lies 
idle. 
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6) The results showed the optimizing farmer on irrigated land 
should grow cotton so long as he has the proper crops to grow in the 
winter cycle. This general result supports the fact that cotton is the 
dominant crop in the region at this time. Clients of the Banco Eildal 
were shown to suffer a loss in income if they were restricted to growing 
the sanctioned crops in the winter cycle. Clients of the Banco Ejidal 
and the Banco Agrfcola on irrigated land were found to have considerably 
lower annual incomes if they were restricted fco growing only cotton, and 
planting no crops in the winter cycle. 
7) The ejidatario of Zaragoza who farms 10 hectares of irrigated 
land in both cycles can earn an income of sufficient size to provide 
for substantial savings in addition to maintaining any of the assumed 
levels of living expenditures when he has a free selection of crops. 
When this farmer is subject to growing only the sanctioned crops his 
income and savings fall to the point that it is doubtful that he can 
maintain the high level of living and still have enough savings to make 
up the gap caused by external credit rationing at the optimum level. 
The ej idatario of Apatzing^ n who farms 20 hectares of seasonal land 
can just barely earn enough income at his optimal level of credit use 
in order to maintain the high level of living. He has very little 
savings. When he grows only sanctioned crops his income opportunities 
are decreased and he can maintain no more than the low level of living 
expenditure. 
The ejidatario of Apatzingan with 10 hectares can maintain no more 
than the low level of living expenditure when he has his free choice of 
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crops. When planting only sanctioned crops he is forced to a near zero 
level of living expenditure. 
These results would indicate that the eiidatarios from Apatzingin 
do not have sufficient seasonal land in order to maintain a higher level 
of living and they can be said to be victims of minifundia. The 
sanctioning process contributes to this problem. 
The ei idatario of Zaragoza can maintain the high level of living but 
at a sacrifice of saving when growing the sanctioned crops. The necessary 
reduction in saving may cause this farmer to not be able to change his 
level of living to an even higher level or to make capital improvements 
on his farm because at high levels of living almost all of his savings 
will be used to cover the gap caused by external credit rationing. 
These results and conclusions are subject to interpretation in 
terms of the assumptions of the empirical model, the factors, products, 
prices, and the representative farm firms. The results assume the 
farmer is a profit maximizer and has a high level of technical knowledge 
and has no uncertainty aversion. If these assumptions do not hold the 
results would be expected to change. A lower level of management or 
technical knowledge would mean less income for an equal amount of 
credit. The optimum use of credit would likely, although not necessarily, 
be at a lower level. The affect of aversion to uncertainty would be to 
cause the farmer to employ a lower level of credit and receive a lower 
income. It is difficult to say what the effects of external credit 
rationing would be if these assumptions were relaxed. 
The results of this study should not be interpreted as the correct 
383 
farm plans for all farmers in the region because of the aggregation 
problem. If everyone produced cotton, or cantaloupe, or any other crop 
it would be expected that the prices of the crops would change and 
possibly factors prices would change. Rather, these results should be 
interpreted as studies of individual farm units and of their use and 
demand for credit. 
This study has dealt with Mexican agricultural credit in a particular 
way and in a particular region. It is hoped, however, that these results 
may contribute some small knowledge to a better understanding of the 
Mexican agricultural credit system. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A.l. List of crop activities by code name (Chapter VI)^  
Activity 
number Power , 
Code (Chapter IV) Crop Cycle Source Fertilizer Insecticide 
PQSMX A1 cantaloupe winter tractor yes yes 
FMTMO A6 corn seasonal tractor no no 
PMTMI A7 corn seasonal tractor no yes 
PMEBO A8 corn seasonal mule no no 
PMTBI A9 corn seasonal mule no yes 
PMAMO AlO corn summer tractor no no 
PMAMI All com summer tractor no yes 
PMAMF A12 com summer tractor yes no 
PMAMX A13 corn summer tractor yes yes 
PMABO A14 corn summer mule no no 
PMABI A15 corn summer mule no yes 
PM&BF A16 corn summer mule yes no 
PMABX A17 corn summer mule yes yes 
PMSMO A18 corn winter tractor no no 
PMSMI A19 corn winter tractor no yes 
PMSMF A20 corn winter tractor yes no 
PMSMX A21 com winter tractor yes yes 
S^ee Figure 6.1, page 245. 
^With respect to rice activities the insecticide column should read as herbicides. 
Table A.l (Continued) 
Activity 
number 
Code (Chapter IV) Crop Cycle 
PMSBO 
PMSBI 
PMSBF 
PMSBX 
A22 
A23 
A24 
A25 
corn 
corn 
corn 
corn 
winter 
winter 
winter 
winter 
PCAMI 
PCAMX 
PCABI 
PCABX 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
cotton 
cotton 
cotton 
cotton 
summer 
summer 
summer 
summer 
PRAMO 
PRAMI 
PRAMF 
PR&MX 
PRABO 
PRABI 
PRABF 
PRABX 
PRSMO 
PRSMI 
PRSMF 
PRSMX 
PRSBO 
PRSBI 
PRSBF 
PRSBX 
A26 
A27 
A28 
A29 
A30 
A31 
A32 
A33 
A34 
A35 
A3 6 
A37 
A38 
A3 9 
A40 
A41 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
rice 
summer 
summer 
summer 
summer 
summer 
summer 
summer 
summer 
winter 
winter 
winter 
winter 
winter 
winter 
winter 
winter 
PATMO A42 sesame seasonal 
Power  ^
Source Fertilizer Insecticide 
mule no no 
mule no yes 
mule yes no 
mule yes yes 
tractor no yes 
tractor yes yes 
mule no yes 
mule yes yes 
tractor no no 
tractor no yes 
tractor yes no 
tractor yes yes 
mule no no 
mule no yes 
mule yes no 
mule yes yes 
tractor no no 
tractor no yes 
tractor yes no 
tractor yes yes 
mule no no 
mule no yes 
mule yes no 
mule yes yes 
tractor no no 
Table A. 1 (Continued) 
Activity 
number 
Code (Chapter IV) Crop Cycle 
PATMI 
PATMF 
PATMX 
PATBO 
PATBI 
PATBF 
PATBX 
PAAMO 
PAAMI 
PAAMF 
PAAMK 
PAABO 
PAABI 
PAABF 
PAABX 
PASMO 
PASMI 
PASMF 
PASMX 
PAS BO 
PASBI 
PASBF 
PASBX 
A43 
A44 
A45 
A46 
A47 
A48 
A49 
A50 
A51 
A52 
A53 
A54 
A55 
A56 
A57 
A58 
A59 
A60 
A61 
A62 
A63 
A64 
A65 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
sesame 
seasonal 
seasonal 
seasonal 
seasonal 
seasonal 
seasonal 
seasonal 
summer 
summer 
summer 
summer 
summer 
summer 
summer 
summer 
winter 
winter 
winter 
winter 
winter 
winter 
winter 
winter 
PSTMO 
PSTBO 
PSAMO 
sorgo 
sorgo 
sorgo 
seasonal 
seasonal 
summer 
Power ^ 
Source Fertilizer Insecticide 
tractor no yes 
tractor yes no 
tractor yes yes 
mule no no 
mule no yes 
mule yes no 
mule yes yes 
tractor no no 
tractor no yes 
tractor yes no 
tractor yes yes 
mule no no 
mule no yes 
mule yes no 
mule yes yes 
tractor no no 
tractor no yes 
tractor yes no 
tractor yes yes 
mule no no 
mule no yes 
mule yes no 
mule yes yes 
tractor no no 
mule no no 
tractor no no 
Table A.l (Continued) 
Activity 
number Power 
Code (Chapter IV) Crop Cycle Source Fertilizer Insecticide 
PSAMF sorgo summer tractor yes no 
PSABO sorgo summer mule no no 
PSABF sorgo summer mule yes no 
PSSMO sorgo winter tractor ^ no no 
PSSMF sorgo winter tractor yes no 
PSSBO sorgo winter mule no no 
PSSBF sorgo winter mule yes no 
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APPENDIX B — GLOSSARY OF SPANISH TEEMS 
arendatarlo Farm tenant 
Asociacfon de Algodoneros The Gotten Growers' Association 
Banco Agrfcola A short name for the Banco Nacional de Cr^dito 
Agr£cola, S.A. (the National Agriculture Credit Bank) 
Banco Eiidal A short name for the Banco Nacional de Cr^dito Eiidal, 
£.A. (the National Eiido Credit Bank) 
cr^dito Credit 
cr^dito de &vio Short-term credit 
Codigo Agario The Agrarian Code 
Comiti. Directiva The Agricultural Direction Committee. This 
committee plans agricultural production in a particular region. 
comercio Commerce or trade 
Conosupo  ^Compania Nacional de Subsistencias Populares, ^ .A. 
(the National Company of Popular Subsistence). This company 
administers the Government's agricultural price support program. 
Cos to Cost 
Cultivo Crop 
cuOta Quota 
Defensa Agrfcola An organization that has the responsibility for 
plant disease and insect control 
despepitadora cotton gin 
ecomienda A form of land tenure common in Mexico in the time period 
immediately after the Conquest 
eiidatario An eiido farmer 
eiido A system of communal tenure in which lands are held as the 
property of a town or village either for collective use or for 
distribution among the eiidatarios for cultivation in small plots 
in which the individual has a right of occupancy and usu fruct 
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Fondo As used in this study it is an abbreviation for the Fondo de 
Garant^ a y Fomento para la Agricultura y Ganaderia y la Avicultura 
ganaderia Livestock production 
earantfa Guarantee 
eerente Manager 
grupo soldario A group of three or more persons formed for purposes 
of borrowing money 
hacendado The owner of a hacienda 
hacienda À landed estate 
impuesto de compra venta Sales tax 
impuesto de ingreso Income tax 
impues to de propiedad raiz Real property tax 
inspector del campo A field inspector 
interns Interest 
jornal A work day. Usually defined to be 8 hours. 
ley law 
Lev de Cr^ dito Aericola The Agricultural Credit Law 
Lev General de Ins tituciones de Cr^dito % Organizaciones Auxilares The 
General Law of Credit Institutions and Auxiliary Organizations 
Lev de Seguro Agr^cola Integral ^  Ganadero The Agricultural and 
Livestock Insurance Law 
minifundio A farm that is so small that at present levels of tech­
nology it cannot give the farm family an acceptable level of living. 
municipio The political unit next below the state. The equivalent 
of a county. 
maquinaria Machinery 
pequeno propietario An owner of the legal maximum size of property 
or less than the legal maximum. A small landowner. 
precio publico The published retail price 
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precio rural The price at which the farmer sells his produce 
présidente President 
propietario An owner of property (land) 
seguro Aerfcola Agricultural crop insurance 
sociedad Society 
Socio delgado- The member's delegate elected by the members of the 
ejido to represent the ejido in official matters. 
taza de interns Interest rate 
technico Technition 
tierra caliente The "hot lands" referring to the warm tropical-like 
climate 
unidad Unit 
Valor catastral The cadastral valuation of land 
